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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs)
Washington, D. C.

February 1976

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
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The report includes the Department of Defense manpower requests for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian strengths incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1977.		

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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT
FOR
FY 1977



Prepared By
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

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PART A - Defense Manpower Requirements

Part A presents a summary of the Department of Defense Manpower Program for the Fiscal Years 1977 and 1978. It describes each of the DPPC and the essential elements of U.S. defense policy from which manpower requirements are determined. It also summarizes manpower requirements for each DPPC.

Chapter I	-	Introduction
Chapter II	-	Summary of Defense Manpower Requirements
Chapter III	-	Manpower and US National Security
Chapter IV	-	Strategic Forces
Chapter V	-	General Purpose Forces
Chapter VI	-	Auxiliary Forces
Chapter VII	-	Mission Support Forces
Chapter VIII	-	Central Support Forces
Chapter IX	-	Individuals

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense is pleased to submit to Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1977 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of Title 10, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the following related Defense Department reports:

- The Report of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld To The Congress on the FY 1977 Budget, FY 1978 Authorization Request and FY 1977-81 Defense Programs.
- The FY 1977 Military Manpower Training Report.

This chapter discusses the following general topics:

- Reporting requirement.
- Content and organization of the report.
- Inclusion of reserve manpower requirements.
- Manpower strengths.
- The time period included in each fiscal year.
- The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) language used throughout the report.

Reporting Requirement

The law states, in part that:

"The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, and shall include in that report justification for the strength levels recommended and an explanation of the relationship between the personnel strength levels recommended for that fiscal year and the national security policies of the United States in effect at the time."

Senate Armed Services Committee Report 93-385 requested a report on Reserve manpower at the same time and in the same format as the statutory report on active duty strengths. These two reports have been consolidated this year in order to explain better Total Force manpower programming for the Department.

Content and Organization of the Report

The report includes the Department of Defense manpower requests for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian strengths incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1977. To assist Congress in considering authorizing legislation for FY 1978, the report also includes strengths required by the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

The report is organized into three major parts plus a unit annex.

Part A. Defense Manpower Requirements (Chapters I through IX). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II summarizes the report. Chapter III is a brief overview of national security policy and its relationship to the Defense manpower program. Chapters IV through IX describe manpower requirements for each major Planning and Programming Category across all Military Services. Major changes in manpower associated with each function are explained.

Part B. Manpower Requirements by Component (Chapters X through XIV). This part contains chapters for the Military Services and the Defense Agencies. This permits the reader to examine the manpower requirements of each Service and the Defense Agencies.

Part C. Special Analyses (Chapters XV through XVII). This part contains special analyses of three subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter XV discusses the cost of manpower. Chapter XVI treats the subject of women in the military. Chapter XVII explains the structure of the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC) and the on-going efforts to improve them.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided which describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific units within the force. Since it is classified, the Unit Annex will be provided by a separate transmittal.

Inclusion of Reserve Components

In accordance with the Total Force Policy, this report presents in a single volume all Defense manpower requirements requiring annual Congressional authorization, including those for the Selected Reserve. The separate report on Reserve Components manpower requirements furnished Congress in the past will no longer be prepared. It is essential that the manpower requirements of the Reserve Components be considered together with and on the same basis as requirements for active military and civilian manpower.

Reserve Components manpower is divided into three categories: The Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve consists of members who have completed the active duty and/or Ready Reserve portions of their statutory six-year military obligation or those who choose to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of either the active components or the Ready Reserve who have retired and have transferred to the Retired Reserve. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserves do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be mobilized by authority of Congress.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active forces. It comprises two elements: The Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is a pool of trained individuals who are available upon mobilization to fill jobs in active or reserve units. The Selected Reserve comprises units organized, equipped and trained to perform a wartime mission and selected individual augmentees. Members of the Selected Reserve train with their units throughout the year and participate annually in active duty for training. Although other categories of reserve manpower contribute to our defense capabilities, the Reserve Components manpower displayed in this report is limited to that of the Selected Reserve.

Manpower Strengths

The manpower figures used in this report reflect strengths as of the end of a fiscal year. This is the number of people expected to be on Departmental rolls or receiving drill pay at that time.

In the manpower authorization request (Chapter II) we show average strengths for the Reserve Components in addition to end strengths. This complies with the Congressional decision in 1975 ^{1/} to continue authorizing Reserve Components manpower by average strength rather than by end strength as is done for active military and civilian manpower. The Department is requesting that the Congress authorize strengths of the Reserve Components by end strength for the FY 1977 Budget.

^{1/} House Report 94-413, July 26, 1975, pp. 60-61.

Time Periods

In compliance with the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, the end of the fiscal year shifts from June 30 to September 30 starting with the Transition Quarter, called FY 19TQ. The time periods used in this report are:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Manpower Data</u>
FY 1975	Jun 30, 1975	Actual Strength
FY 1976	Jun 30, 1976	Planned Strength re-
FY 19TQ	Sep 30, 1976	flected in President's
FY 1977	Sep 30, 1977	FY 1977 Budget
FY 1978	Sep 30, 1978	Planned Strength

The change in the end date of the fiscal year from June 30 to September 30, starting with FY 19TQ, causes a seasonal increase in the military and civilian manpower request. The large number of recruits who enter service during the summer months after graduating from high school causes the number of students and trainees to rise in the fall. For example, the Army's military strength increases from 782,000 in FY 1976 to 790,000 in FY 19TQ to accommodate an increased number of trainees. The civilian authorization request for FY 1977 and FY 1978, which end on September 30, includes more than 7,800 teachers and other personnel in overseas dependent schools and about 400 in Marine Corps dependent schools in CONUS, who did not appear in previous civilian employment requests because they are off the rolls on June 30.

Defense Planning and Programming Categories

The language used throughout this report to describe and explain Defense manpower requirements is the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC). These were formerly called "Manpower Categories".

The DPPC are based on the same program elements which are the building blocks of the ten Major Defense Programs. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each Program, all the resources which can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but the base support personnel which sustain these units. The DPPC, on the other hand, aggregates activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The relation between the DPPC system and the Major Defense Programs is explained in detail in Chapter XVII, Manpower Data Structure. The DPPC are shown in the table on the next page.

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

1. Strategic Forces

Strategic Offensive Forces
Strategic Defensive Forces
Strategic Control & Surveillance
Forces

2. General Purpose Forces

Land Forces
Tactical Air Forces
Naval Forces
Mobility Forces

3. Auxiliary Forces

Intelligence & Security
Centrally Managed Communications
Research & Development
Support to Other Nations
Geophysical Activities

4. Mission Support Forces

Reserve Components Support
Base Operating Support
Force Support Training
Command

5. Central Support Forces

Base Operating Support
Medical Support
Personnel Support
Individual Training
Command
Logistics
Federal Agency Support

6. Individuals

Transients
Patients & Prisoners
Trainees & Students
Cadets

As requested in the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the FY 1976 Authorization Bill, we have begun a major effort to refine the DPPC structure. The Department has a study underway which has as objectives improved consistency across the Services in assigning manpower to DPPC and improved correlation between units and DPPC. Details of the study are in Chapter XVII.

Since the DPPC structure is based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, changes in the categories are inevitable from year to year. Program elements are revised to meet the management needs of the Military Departments and functional managers on the OSD staff. We have attempted to minimize these changes pending completion of our on-going DPPC study effort. Despite this, some changes have occurred and these are documented in Chapter XVII.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request, provides an overview of manpower strengths and cost trends and explains the major strength changes which are contained in the manpower program presented in this report.

A. Manpower Request

As required by Section 138(c) of Title 10, United States Code, the Department of Defense submitted to the Congress proposed legislation prescribing for Fiscal Year 1977 the authorized end strengths for active duty military personnel, the authorized end and average strengths for the Selected Reserve of each reserve component and the authorized end strength for civilian personnel (direct and indirect hire). Proposed legislation for Fiscal Year 1978 was submitted separately. The strength requests are as follows:

Active Duty Military Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
Army	790.0	790.0
Navy	544.0	543.8
Marine Corps	196.0	196.0
Air Force	571.0	568.2
Total	<u>2,101.0</u>	<u>2,098.0</u>

Note: For comparison, the military strength for end of the transition quarter (FY TQ) authorized by Public Law 94-106 is 2,106.4.

Selected Reserve Military Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
Army National Guard	400.0	400.0
Army Reserve	219.0	219.0
Naval Reserve	52.0	52.0
Marine Corps Reserve	33.5	33.5
Air National Guard	92.6	93.4
Air Force Reserve	52.4	54.2
DoD Total	<u>849.5</u>	<u>852.1</u>

Note: For comparison, the end FY TQ strength corresponding to the average strength authorized by Public Law 94-106 is 906.5

As required by law, the following table reflects the Department of Defense manpower request for the Selected Reserve expressed in average strengths and, as further requested by House Report 93-1035, 10 May 1974, the appropriate wartime manning requirement has also been stated.

Selected Reserve Manpower
(Thousands)

	FY 1977 Wartime Structure Strength	Average Strength		
		FY TQ 3/ Authorized	FY 77 Request	FY 78 Request
Army National Guard	430.5	400.0	390.0	400.0
Army Reserve	276.0	219.0	215.7	219.0
Naval Reserve	52.0 2/	106.0	52.0	52.0
Marine Corps Reserve	37.2	33.0	33.5	33.5
Air National Guard	100.0	94.5	93.3	93.1
Air Force Reserve	56.6	53.6	52.0	53.9
DoD Total	952.3	906.2	836.5	851.5

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve mobilization billets.

2/ Currently under review by DoD.

3/ Public Law 94-106.

The Department requests authorization for total DoD direct and indirect hire civilian employment, military functions, for end-FY 1977 and FY 1978 as follows:

Civilian 1/ Authorization Request
Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions
End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
Total DoD	1,035,800	1,035,800

Note: For comparison, the civilian strength authorized for FY TQ by Public Law 94-106 is 1,064,400.

1/ Includes about 78,500 National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-106, the DoD Appropriations Authorization Act, 1976, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Included are such employment categories as: Stay-in School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and Worker-Trainee Opportunity Programs. Employment in these categories, based on goals received from the Office of Management and Budget, will be about 9,900 in FY 1977 and 1978.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded for reasons of security, in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. This category includes employees performing civil functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works; Postal Construction Program; Cemeterial Activities; and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1977 and FY 1978 is planned to be 24,000.

The FY 1976 Authorization Act established a single DoD civilian authorization rather than separate authorizations for each Component. The Department strongly recommends this single authorization be continued. For the information of the Congress, the total DoD civilian request is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire; the FY 1977 and FY 1978 requests are identical.

Composition of Civilian Authorization Request of 1,035,800
FY 1977 and FY 1978

	<u>Direct Hire</u>	<u>Indirect Hire</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	313,895	64,487	378,382
Navy	309,222	11,284	320,506
Marine Corps <u>1/</u>	(17,346)	(2,527)	(19,873)
Air Force	240,932	16,207	257,139
Defense Agencies	<u>77,951</u>	<u>1,822</u>	<u>79,773</u>
Total DoD	942,000	93,800	1,035,800

1/ Marine Corps civilians included in Department of Navy strengths.

B. Manpower Trends

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables. (Strengths are shown for 30 September 1975 for comparison with Fiscal Years 1976, 1977 and 1978 which end on 30 September.)

Defense Employment (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>FY 1977 Budget</u>			
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>30 Sep 1975</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Active Military	2,685	3,547	2,127	2,104	2,087	2,102	2,101	2,098
Civilian <u>1/</u>	<u>1,176</u>	<u>1,406</u>	<u>1,078</u>	<u>1,076</u>	<u>1,058</u>	<u>1,062</u>	<u>1,036</u>	<u>1,036</u>
DoD Total	<u>3,861</u>	<u>4,953</u>	<u>3,205</u>	<u>3,180</u>	<u>3,145</u>	<u>3,163</u>	<u>3,137</u>	<u>3,134</u>
Reserve Paid								
Drill	953	922	897	887	874	875	849	852

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Direct and indirect hire.

1. Active military strengths. The table below shows the trend in active duty military strength by service.

Military Manpower - Active Duty (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>FY 1977 Budget</u>			
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>30 Sep 1975</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Army	972	1,570	784	775	782	790	790	790
Navy	667	765	535	532	525	532	544	544
USMC	190	307	196	196	196	196	196	196
USAF	856	905	613	601	584	584	571	568
DoD Total	<u>2,685</u>	<u>3,547</u>	<u>2,127</u>	<u>2,104</u>	<u>2,087</u>	<u>1/ 2,102</u>	<u>1/ 2,101</u>	<u>2,098</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Authorized by Congress, Public Law 94-106; FY 76, 2091; FY TQ, 2106.

The FY 1977 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,101,000. This request:

- Continues military strength at a stable level of about 2,100,000.

- Is 584,000 lower than the actual strength in FY 1964, before the expansion for the Vietnam war.

- Is 5,400 lower than authorized by Public Law 94-106 for the end of the Transition Quarter.

Active military manpower trends by Service are as follows:

- Army. The Army's actual strength on 30 September 1975 was below program due to recruiting shortfalls. This resulted from changes in recruiting procedures to match personnel accessions weekly (rather than monthly) with the number, quality and skills the Army needs. This caused a temporary shortfall in accessions until recruiters adjusted to the new procedures. The recruiting shortfall has been made up. Although Army active military strength varies only slightly from FY 1970 to FY 1977, the internal composition changes significantly. Two new combat brigades are added to complete the buildup to 16 active divisions. Additionally, other combat units will be manned at higher levels. These combat manpower increases are made possible by decreases in support activities and the trainees.

- Navy. The increase in Navy active military strength is related primarily to the size and composition of the active and reserve fleets (reserve fleet ships affect active manpower because a significant portion of a reserve ship's complement is active duty sailors). Total active and reserve warships increase from 540 in FY 1976 to 553 in FY 1977. In addition to manning the increased number of ships the Navy is improving manning levels in the fleet. The Navy was able to limit its increase in FY 1977 to 12,000 spaces by making offsetting reductions in support activities.

- Marine Corps. Marine Corps strength is stable. Manning levels in combat forces will increase by 2,500 spaces, offset by decreases in support activities and trainees.

- Air Force. Despite a reduction of 13,000 spaces in FY 1977, the Air Force has been able to accommodate crew ratio increases for tactical air, reconnaissance, and strategic airlift forces. This is made possible by substantial reductions in base operations, training and support activities. The individuals account is also reduced by about 6,000 spaces in FY 1977.

2. Selected Reserve strengths. The table below shows the trend in Selected Reserve strength by service.

Selected Reserve Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Actual				FY 1977 Budget			
	FY 64	FY 68	FY 75	30 Sep 1975	FY 76	FY TQ	FY 77	FY 78
Army National Guard	382	389	395	390	380	380	400	400
Army Reserve	269	244	225	222	212	212	219	219
Naval Reserve	123	124	98	99	101	101	52	52
Marine Corps	46	47	32	31	34	34	34	34
Air National Guard	73	75	95	94	95	95	93	93
Air Force Reserve	61	43	51	51	53	54	52	54
DoD Total	953	922	897	887	874	875	849	852

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

- Army National Guard strength declines from its FY 1975 level due to two reasons. First, recruiting in the first five months of FY 1976 produced 10,000 fewer accessions than programmed. Second, new non-prior service accessions who are awaiting training have been transferred from paid-drill status (Pay Category P) to non-paid-drill status (Pay Category L). The latter change, which reflects the desires of the Defense Appropriation Conference Committee, accounts for about half of the 15,000 reduction in paid-drill strength.

- The Army Reserve manpower reductions during FY 1976 represent the change in pay status of non-prior service accessions described above and the Congressional appropriation action which directed an average strength of 212,400 for FY 1976. The planned increase for FY 1977 permits improved manning of the Army Reserve structure.

- Naval Reserve. A review of the Naval Reserve indicates that individuals whose wartime assignment is to augment the Navy Shore Establishment do not require 48 or 24 training drills annually. They can maintain their proficiency with two weeks annual refresher training in their mobilization assignment. Accordingly, we plan to transfer 40,000 of these individuals to Pay Category D. In addition, we have reviewed the Naval Reserve force structure and have eliminated 9 of 17 Mobile Construction Battalions.

- Marine Corps Reserve. Within a stable end strength, a small increase in the manning of units is offset by a decrease in trainees.

- Air National Guard strength decreases in FY 1977 reflecting small reductions in headquarters manpower and in unit manning.

- Air Force Reserve manpower in FY 1977 decreases slightly in spite of the transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Selected Reserve.

3. Civilian manpower. The table below shows the trend in civilian manpower.

Civilian Employment
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>FY 1977 Budget</u>			
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>30 Sep 1/ 1975</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Army	453	541	401	392	394	390	378	378
Navy/Marine Corps	347	433	326	330	324	324	321	321
Air Force	338	357	278	273	265	265	257	257
Defense Agencies	38	75	73	81	75	83	80	80
DoD Total	<u>1,176</u>	<u>1,406</u>	<u>1,078</u>	<u>1,076</u>	<u>1,058</u>	<u>1,062</u>	<u>1,036</u>	<u>1,036</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Adjusted for overseas dependents education transfer.

To correctly interpret the above trend table, one must understand two accounting changes which involve the Overseas Dependents Education Program. A total of 9,900 civilians administer, maintain or teach in primary and secondary schools for dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas. Seventy-eight hundred of these civilians are employed only during the school term, September through May; the other 2,100 work throughout the year. The two accounting changes are as follows:

- Beginning with the FY 76 strengths in the FY 77 Budget Plan, all Overseas Dependents Education personnel are transferred to the Defense Agency account; previously they were in the three Military Departments, primarily Army, at the end of FY 1976, 2,100 dependent education personnel are added to the Defense Agencies.

- When the fiscal year end changes to September in FY TQ, the full 9,900 employees appear in the Defense Agencies end strengths.

The "Actual 30 September 1975" column in the above table has been adjusted to show all Overseas Dependents Education personnel (9,900) in the Defense Agency account to permit comparison with FY 1976, FY 1977, and FY 1978 which also end on 30 September.

The DoD civilian authorization requests for FY 1977 and FY 1978 are 1,035,800. That request is:

- 139,000 less than the pre-Vietnam peacetime strength in FY 1964.
- 370,000 less than the Vietnam peak in FY 1968.
- 28,600 less than the strength authorized for FY TQ by Public Law 94-106, the FY 1976 Authorization Act.

The true magnitude of civilian reductions since FY 1964 is masked by the effects of two major civilian substitution programs which added over 120,000 civilians to the workforce. Thus, compared with the FY 1964 peacetime level, the FY 1977 authorization request represents a manpower reduction of over one-quarter million.

The total civilian strength requirement decreases 25,700 during FY 77. This represents savings from the Department's continuing effort to streamline the support structure, including high level headquarters. We plan to reapply some of the savings to important programs which bear directly on combat readiness. These include ship maintenance and overhaul, support for the new Army divisions, manning of the new Trident facility, aircraft maintenance related to tactical crew ratio increases, and other important functions.

C. Manpower Program Changes by Component

This section lists planned changes in the manpower programs of DoD components from the end of the Transition Quarter to the end of FY 1977. Manpower figures are in thousands.

Army

Active Military Strength End FYTQ	790.0
Two brigades plus support	+ 8.4
Manning level of three new divisions	+ 2.0
Force manning improvements	+ 5.4
Base closures/realignments	- 2.0
Safeguard program	- 0.4
Intelligence program	- 1.0
Pacific support forces	- 1.4
Headquarters and Washington area support	- 1.0
Individuals account	- 8.8
Individual training	- 0.5
Other reductions	<u>- 0.7</u>
End-FY 77	790.0
National Guard Strength End FYTQ	380.0
Increased unit manning	+18.4
Unit conversions	+ 1.4
(20 unit activations)	
(23 unit inactivations)	
Individual training	+ 0.4
Trainees	<u>- 0.2</u>
End-FY 77	400.0
Reserve Strength End FYTQ	212.4
Unit conversions	+ 4.6
(140 unit activations)	
(20 unit inactivations)	
Individual training	+ 0.9
Trainees	<u>+ 1.1</u>
End-FY 77	219.0
Civilian Strength End FYTQ	390.2
Reserve Components technicians	+ 0.9
Base operating support for new divisions	+ 0.3
Improved medical services	+ 0.5
Base Realignments	- 5.9
Headquarters and Washington area support	- 1.4
Commissaries	- 0.7
Tripler Hospital transferred to Navy <u>1/</u>	- 0.9
Pacific area support	- 2.7
Other general support reductions	<u>- 2.0</u>
End FY 77	378.4

1/ Decision to transfer has been reversed; resources will be realigned.

Navy

Active Military Strength End FYTQ	531.8
Commission New Ships	+ 6.9
Special Aviation (USS FDR and Air Wing)	+ 3.9
Force manning improvements	+ 6.6
Individuals increase	+ 2.7
Miscellaneous	+ 0.1
Decommission old ships	- 2.3
Base closures/realignments	- 2.7
Flight training	- 2.0
Headquarters and Washington area support	- 1.0
End FY 77	544.0
Reserve Strength End FYTQ	101.4
Unit conversions	+ 0.6
Shift from Paid Drill to Pay Category D	-40.0
Construction (Seabee) Battalions	- 5.7
Other unit inactivations	- 4.3
End FY 77	52.0

Navy

Civilian Strength End FYTQ	324.0 (20.1) <u>2/</u>
Shipyards	+ 2.1
TRIDENT base	+ 0.3
TRIDENT/POSEIDON/POLARIS missile maintenance	+ 0.3
Military sealift and ship manning	+ 0.3
New Orleans Hospital	+ 0.2
Tripler Hospital transferred from Army <u>1/</u>	+ 0.9
Fleet base facilities maintenance	+ 0.3
Other increases	+ 0.6 (0.2)
Base realignments	- 3.2
Headquarters and Washington area support	- 1.6 (0.2)
Commissaries	- 0.5 (0.1)
Air Rework Facilities	- 1.0
Supply Centers and Inventory Control Points	- 0.7
Other general support reductions	- 1.6 (0.2)
End FY 77	320.5 (19.9)

1/ Decision to transfer has been reversed; resources will be realigned.

2/ Marine Corps civilians included in Navy strength.

Marine Corps

Active Military Strength End FYTQ	196.0
Improved manning in combat units	+ 2.5
Infantry training school (Camp Lejeune)	+ 0.3
Naval base security guards	- 0.8
Individuals account	- 1.5
Other reductions	<u>- 0.5</u>
End FY 77	196.0
Reserve Strength End FYTQ	33.5
Improved manning in combat units	+ 0.1
Individual trainees	<u>- 0.1</u>
End FY 77	33.5

Air Force

Active Military Strength End FYTQ	584.0
Air crew ratio increases	
Tactical fighter	+ 0.8
Strategic airlift	+ 0.2
Reconnaissance	+ 0.2
Tactical fighter maintenance	+ 1.8
Munitions maintenance	+ 1.2
Activate 3d F-5E squadron	+ 0.3
Other increases	+ 0.3
Base activities	- 6.9
Management headquarters	- 1.1
KC-135s to Reserve Components	- 0.8
Individual training	- 2.3
Transients	- 4.7
Defense agency manning	- 0.5
Medical support	- 0.6
Security police	- 0.3
Intelligence reductions	- 0.4
Net other reductions	<u>- 0.2</u>
End FY 77	571.0
National Guard Strength End FYTQ	94.5
Trainees	+ 0.1
Communications manning	+ 0.1
Unit manning	- 1.9
Headquarters reductions	<u>- 0.2</u>
End FY 77	92.6

Reserve Strength End FYTQ	53.5
Conversion to modern aircraft	+ 1.3
Unit manning	- 1.5
Headquarters	- 0.9
End FY 77	52.4
Civilian Strength End FYTQ	264.6
Logistic support for flying hours due to tactical crew ratio increase and surge mission crew proficiency	+ 0.5
Foreign military sales	+ 0.2
Other increases	+ 0.2
Base realignments	- 3.0
Headquarters and Washington area support	- 1.1
Commissaries	- 0.8
Aircraft inventory changes and flying hour reductions	- 1.5
Depot plan modernization	- 0.5
Other general support reductions	- 1.5
End FY 77	257.1

Defense Agencies


Military - Changes included in Military Service tables.

Civilian Strength End FYTQ	82.7
Defense Investigative Service (civilianization)	+ 0.2
Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences	+ 0.1
Office of the Secretary of Defense/ Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	- 0.2
Defense Supply Agency	- 2.4
Defense Mapping Agency	- 0.3
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency	- 0.2
Defense Contract Audit Agency	- 0.1
Defense Intelligence Agency	- 0.1
End FY 77	79.8

D. The Cost of Manpower

The escalating cost of manpower has had a major impact on the composition of the Defense Manpower program for FY 1977. During the period 1964 to 1976 Defense annual payroll costs have increased from \$22 billion to \$53 billion, even though manpower levels have declined from 3.86 million to 3.14 million. As a percentage of annual Defense outlays, payroll costs have grown from 44% in FY 1964 to 53% of the FY 1977 Defense budget. ^{1/} This increase in payroll costs, when applied to the FY 1977 budget outlays of \$100.1 billion, represents a shift of \$9 billion from RDT&E procurement, maintenance, and operations to manpower, in spite of the fact that there are 19% (724,000) fewer active military and civilian personnel on the payroll. These trends are portrayed on the following chart.

MANPOWER COST AND STRENGTH TRENDS



^{1/} In addition to payroll costs, there are nonpayroll costs involved in supporting people. These personnel support costs are consistently an additional 4 to 5% of Defense outlays.

During the three fiscal years 1973-1975, the Department cut active military and civilian manpower by 295,000 -- nearly 100,000 per year. Yet payroll costs claimed about 55% or more of Defense outlays in all three of those years. In FY 1976, in spite of a further reduction of 60,000 personnel as well as significant steps to restrain the growth of manpower costs (including a 5% limit on increases in military and civilian pay), payroll costs will again be about 55% of outlays. The FY 1977 budget, if approved as submitted to Congress, would reduce payroll outlays to 53%.

This general trend is common to each major manpower classification. The active military payroll has increased over 100%, from \$12.8 billion in FY 1964 to \$25.7 billion in FY 1977. Over the same period, civilian payroll is up almost 125%, and the Reserve Components payroll has increased almost 150%. Military retired pay is up 600%, from \$1.2 billion in FY 1964 to \$8.4 billion in FY 1977.

The Department is taking steps to restrain the growth of manpower costs. We are making a substantial strength reduction of 28,600 civilians as well as a modest reduction in active duty military strength of 5,400, from the levels authorized by Congress for the end of the Transition Quarter. These strength reductions, along with the transfer of 40,000 Naval Reservists to pay category D, will provide a savings of about \$230 million for FY 1977 and about \$580 million annually thereafter. These strength reductions have required some difficult decisions, and the actions which will permit them to happen will require the understanding and support of the Congress.

We are also making a major effort to restrain the growth in per person costs. There are a number of initiatives we are taking to do this:

- Restraining increases in military and civilian pay.
- Restraining growth in the cost of military retirement.
- Adjusting other elements within the total compensation package.
- Reducing personnel turnover and turbulence.
- Reversing the trend toward military and civilian grade enrichment.

Together, these steps will assist the Department in maintaining an adequate defense capability within constrained resources. By slowing the growth of Defense manpower costs, we will assure an adequate level of resources for development, procurement, maintenance of equipment, and the operation of our forces.

A more detailed discussion of manpower costs is presented in Chapter XV.

E. Military Force Levels

The justification of Defense manpower requirements is necessarily based on the level of military forces established to meet US national security objectives. US forces programmed for Fiscal Year 1977 represent a balanced program which the Department believes provides the maximum deterrence and war fighting capability for the Defense dollar. Details of force requirements may be found in the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense.

The following is a summary of major force elements planned for Fiscal Year 1977.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>			
ICBM/SLBM	1,710	1,710	1,710
Bombers (UE) 1/	396	396	382
Tankers (KC-135) (UE) 1/			
Active	615	583	543
Reserve Components	-	32	72
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	6	6	6
Reserve Components	14	10	7
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	14	16	16
Reserve Components	8	8	8
Marine Corps Division			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve Components	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	89	89	91
Reserve Components	43	46	48
Navy Squadrons			
Active	107	99	95
Reserve Components	16	16	16
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	31	30	30
Reserve Components	8	8	8

	<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces (continued)</u>			
Naval Forces			
Carriers (active only)	15	13	13
Attack Submarines (active only)	75	75	80
Surface Combatants			
Active	161	163	171
Reserve Components	32	30	30
Amphibious Ships			
Active	64	62	64
Reserve Components	-	3	3
Patrol Craft			
Active	14	7	7
Reserve Components	-	5	5
ASW Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	46	51	53
Reserve Components	22	16	17
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active	34	32	32
Reserve Components <u>3/</u>	54	54	54
Sealift Ships			
Active <u>2/</u>	18	13	12

1/ Unit equipment. Excludes training aircraft, etc.

2/ Excludes controlled fleet charter ships.

3/ Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate squadrons.

Highlights of force changes programmed for FY 1977 are:

Strategic Forces

- The number of bombers decreases slightly in FY 1977, reflecting the transfer of 14 unit equipment (UE) B-52G aircraft from active squadrons to non-operational (NOA) status. This change recognizes a "fact of life" shortage of B-52G NOA aircraft.

- The transfer of KC-135 aircraft from active to reserve forces which was begun in FY 1976 continues in FY 1977.

- Aircraft National Guard interceptor squadrons decrease from ten in FY 1976 to seven in FY 1977. This reflects the phasing out of the obsolete F-101 interceptor aircraft.

General Purpose Forces

- Land Forces. The Army completes the addition of active brigades to its new divisions. Each of the three new divisions activated since FY 1974 contains two active brigades and one "round-out" brigade from the Reserve Components. The Marine Corps in FY 1977 will fill several combat units previously in the force structure but in an unmanned status.

- Tactical Air Forces. Navy tactical air squadrons decrease from 99 in FY 1976 to 95 in FY 1977. This is due to restructuring of the existing 13 Navy tactical air wings.

- Naval Forces. The number of attack submarines increases from 75 in FY 1976 to 80 in FY 1977 with the addition of five nuclear submarines. The number of surface combatant ships also increases in FY 1977. This reverses the long term trend in which more ships are retired than commissioned in a fiscal year. The anti-submarine warfare squadrons also increase slightly in FY 1977.

- Mobility Forces. There are no significant changes in FY 1977.

F. Manpower Summary Tables

The tables which follow present military and civilian manpower by DPPC for the Defense Department as a whole and by military component.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>111.2</u>	<u>102.3</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>99.7</u>
Strategic Offensive	82.6	76.5	74.6	74.9	74.7
Strategic Defensive	15.6	13.3	13.0	12.8	12.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.9	12.4	12.5	12.4	12.7
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>898.5</u>	<u>932.2</u>	<u>930.2</u>	<u>964.1</u>	<u>971.7</u>
Land Forces	527.0	553.1	549.8	561.7	565.7
Tactical Air Forces	162.8	169.6	170.0	178.0	180.3
Naval Forces	166.3	170.8	171.8	183.6	185.1
Mobility Forces	42.4	38.6	38.6	40.8	40.7
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>137.7</u>	<u>125.7</u>	<u>125.7</u>	<u>122.7</u>	<u>120.9</u>
Intelligence & Security	52.1	42.0	41.5	39.6	38.3
Centrally Managed					
Communications	38.2	37.2	37.3	36.3	35.8
Research & Development	32.7	32.4	32.4	30.9	30.8
Support to Other Nations	2.8	2.8	3.3	4.8	4.9
Geophysical Activities	11.9	11.2	11.2	11.0	11.0
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>304.6</u>	<u>286.8</u>	<u>287.3</u>	<u>277.4</u>	<u>277.7</u>
Reserve Components Support	14.1	14.1	14.2	13.8	14.1
Base Operating Support	211.1	194.9	195.2	185.8	184.8
Force Support Training	33.7	33.6	33.8	34.9	35.6
Command	45.7	44.1	44.1	42.8	43.1
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>359.4</u>	<u>335.1</u>	<u>334.6</u>	<u>319.8</u>	<u>317.6</u>
Base Operating Support	52.6	44.7	44.8	41.1	40.6
Medical Support	90.0	86.5	86.5	84.6	84.8
Personnel Support	33.2	30.9	30.7	30.9	30.9
Individual Training	124.2	115.4	115.4	108.5	106.6
Command	35.7	35.3	35.3	33.2	33.2
Logistics	20.8	18.9	18.9	18.6	18.7
Federal Agency Support	3.0	3.4	2.9	2.9	2.9
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>315.9</u>	<u>310.5</u>	<u>338.1</u>	<u>321.5</u>	<u>307.0</u>
Transients	94.6	92.6	89.7	88.0	83.1
Patients & Prisoners	9.7	9.8	10.0	9.3	9.4
Trainees & Students	200.8	196.4	225.6	211.4	201.6
Cadets	10.7	11.6	12.9	12.9	12.9
<u>Over/Understrength</u>		<u>-6.0</u>	<u>-14.2</u>	<u>-4.6</u>	<u>+3.3</u>
<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>2127.3</u>	<u>2086.7</u>	<u>2101.8</u>	<u>2101.0</u>	<u>2098.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>19.2</u>
Strategic Offensive	0.1	3.9	4.8	7.5	10.5
Strategic Defensive	14.2	11.8	10.9	7.9	7.9
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>713.6</u>	<u>698.0</u>	<u>699.5</u>	<u>708.6</u>	<u>703.2</u>
Land Forces	555.8	535.9	536.7	559.7	556.6
Tactical Air Forces	67.9	66.2	66.2	66.3	64.3
Naval Forces	44.4	50.5	50.7	36.9	36.7
Mobility Forces	45.5	45.4	45.9	45.7	45.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>18.4</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>10.7</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	5.7	5.3	5.3	-	-
Communications	11.4	11.5	11.5	9.6	9.6
Research & Development	0.5	0.4	0.4	-	-
Support to Other Nations	-	-	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.1
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>52.1</u>	<u>52.4</u>	<u>52.5</u>	<u>34.5</u>	<u>36.3</u>
Reserve Components Support	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.5
Base Operating Support	31.2	31.5	31.7	19.9	19.9
Force Support Training	4.5	2.3	2.2	1.8	2.2
Command	13.7	15.8	15.8	10.3	11.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>71.9</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>55.2</u>	<u>55.0</u>
Base Operating Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	-
Medical Support	12.6	9.6	9.6	8.3	8.3
Personnel Support	0.9	0.8	0.8	-	-
Individual Training	47.8	45.1	45.1	45.7	45.5
Command	2.9	2.4	2.4	0.4	0.4
Logistics	7.5	6.5	6.5	0.8	0.8
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>25.8</u>	<u>24.4</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>27.7</u>
Transients	-	-	-	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	-	-	-	-	-
Trainees & Students	25.8	24.4	23.5	24.3	27.7
Cadets	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>896.9</u>	<u>874.5</u>	<u>875.3</u>	<u>849.5</u>	<u>852.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>11.4</u>
Strategic Offensive	1.9	2.8	3.0	4.2	4.9
Strategic Defensive	6.7	5.8	5.2	4.2	4.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.9	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>80.1</u>	<u>78.8</u>	<u>78.9</u>	<u>79.9</u>	<u>79.1</u>
Land Forces	42.1	41.0	41.0	41.3	41.3
Tactical Air Forces	14.4	14.6	14.7	14.7	14.1
Naval Forces	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Mobility Forces	23.1	22.9	22.9	23.4	23.2
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>121.3</u>	<u>118.3</u>	<u>118.1</u>	<u>115.9</u>	<u>115.8</u>
Intelligence & Security	9.9	9.5	9.4	9.0	8.9
Centrally Managed					
Communications	1.5	14.9	14.9	14.0	14.0
Research & Development	84.3	80.2	80.1	78.0	78.0
Support to Other Nations	2.4	3.4	3.4	4.9	4.9
Geophysical Activities	10.2	10.4	10.4	10.0	10.0
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>220.1</u>	<u>220.4</u>	<u>219.0</u>	<u>212.5</u>	<u>212.9</u>
Reserve Components Support	19.5	19.1	19.2	18.6	18.6
Base Operating Support	187.7	189.2	187.7	181.8	182.0
Force Support Training	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.2
Command	9.9	9.3	9.3	9.1	9.1
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>646.2</u>	<u>629.7</u>	<u>635.0</u>	<u>616.7</u>	<u>616.7</u>
Base Operating Support	105.4	101.9	101.5	94.4	94.1
Medical Support	42.9	44.4	44.7	43.9	43.9
Personnel Support	11.0	12.1	19.9	19.8	19.8
Individual Training	42.7	42.2	42.1	41.0	41.2
Command	58.7	59.2	59.0	56.2	56.2
Logistics	385.5	370.0	367.9	361.3	361.4
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>1078.4</u>	<u>1058.0</u>	<u>1061.4</u>	<u>1035.8</u>	<u>1035.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

ARMY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	0.6	0.5	0.3	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>444.3</u>	<u>465.9</u>	<u>466.7</u>	<u>476.0</u>	<u>479.1</u>
Land Forces	<u>443.7</u>	<u>465.3</u>	<u>466.1</u>	<u>475.5</u>	<u>478.6</u>
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>35.5</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>26.0</u>	<u>26.1</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	<u>17.9</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>
Communications	8.9	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.4
Research & Development	7.2	7.6	7.6	7.3	7.3
Support to Other Nations	1.3	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>47.3</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>41.9</u>
Research Components Support	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Base Operating Support	30.5	26.7	26.7	25.2	25.2
Force Support Training	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Command	10.7	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>142.1</u>	<u>123.4</u>	<u>122.8</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>119.5</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>24.1</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>
Medical Support	34.6	31.1	31.0	30.2	30.2
Personnel Support	15.3	14.7	14.6	14.5	14.5
Individual Training	50.8	44.4	44.4	43.9	43.8
Command	8.9	8.5	8.5	7.6	7.6
Logistics	7.9	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Federal Agency Support	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>113.8</u>	<u>125.2</u>	<u>137.7</u>	<u>128.9</u>	<u>119.5</u>
Transients	<u>23.4</u>	<u>32.5</u>	<u>28.6</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>27.3</u>
Patients & Prisoners	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2
Trainees & Students	84.2	86.6	101.7	91.1	84.7
Cadets	3.0	3.0	4.3	4.3	4.3
Over/Under Strength		<u>-3.9</u>	<u>-8.4</u>	<u>-3.0</u>	<u>+3.3</u>
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>783.9</u>	<u>782.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>22.4</u>
Strategic Offensive	17.6	18.3	18.5	19.7	20.6
Strategic Defensive	-	*	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.1	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>231.2</u>	<u>238.5</u>	<u>239.4</u>	<u>255.1</u>	<u>256.6</u>
Land Forces	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9
Tactical Air Forces	62.4	65.0	64.9	68.8	68.8
Naval Forces	165.8	170.3	171.3	183.1	184.6
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>28.2</u>
Intelligence & Security	10.4	9.6	9.6	9.3	9.2
Centrally Managed Communications	9.8	10.9	10.9	10.5	9.8
Research & Development	6.6	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.6
Support to Other Nations	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
Geophysical Activities	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>70.6</u>	<u>68.8</u>	<u>68.9</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>65.3</u>
Reserve Components Support	7.5	7.9	8.0	7.2	7.5
Base Operating Support	37.5	35.7	35.7	32.4	32.6
Force Support Training	12.9	13.0	13.0	12.8	12.8
Command	12.7	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.4
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>84.6</u>	<u>86.1</u>	<u>85.8</u>	<u>82.2</u>	<u>81.1</u>
Base Operating Support	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Medical Support	21.6	21.5	21.5	22.1	22.1
Personnel Support	8.1	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3
Individual Training	36.0	37.2	36.9	33.1	31.8
Command	8.2	9.0	9.0	8.7	8.7
Logistics	7.1	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.6
Federal Agency Support	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>100.4</u>	<u>83.6</u>	<u>93.7</u>	<u>93.3</u>	<u>90.3</u>
Transients	34.2	26.0	26.6	28.2	26.7
Patients & Prisoners	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.1	4.2
Trainees & Students	58.1	48.7	58.1	56.7	55.1
Cadets	3.3	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.4
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		<u>-2.1</u>	<u>-5.8</u>	<u>-1.6</u>	
Temporary Unit Understrength		-2.1	-5.8	-1.6	
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>534.9</u>	<u>524.6</u>	<u>531.8</u>	<u>544.0</u>	<u>543.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	*	*	*	*	*
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*	*	*
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>110.3</u>	<u>113.7</u>	<u>109.6</u>	<u>112.1</u>	<u>113.1</u>
Land Forces	80.7	85.0	80.9	83.3	84.2
Tactical Air Forces	29.0	28.2	28.2	28.2	28.4
Naval Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Mobility Forces	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>
Intelligence & Security	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*	*	*
Research & Development	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Support to Other Nations	0.1	0.1	*	*	0.1
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>21.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Base Operating Support	18.3	17.7	17.8	17.0	17.0
Force Support Training	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.5
Command	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>
Base Operating Support	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.5
Medical Support	-	-	-	-	-
Personnel Support	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7
Individual Training	9.1	8.0	8.0	8.3	8.3
Command	4.7	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.1
Logistics	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>40.3</u>	<u>38.8</u>	<u>37.8</u>
Transients	11.6	11.5	11.6	11.2	10.6
Patients & Prisoners	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Trainees & Students	23.2	23.3	27.3	26.3	25.8
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
		<u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>			<u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>91.4</u>	<u>81.1</u>	<u>78.9</u>	<u>78.0</u>	<u>76.7</u>
Strategic Offensive	65.0	58.2	56.1	55.2	54.1
Strategic Defensive	15.0	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	11.4	10.2	10.2	10.0	10.3
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>112.9</u>	<u>114.1</u>	<u>114.6</u>	<u>120.9</u>	<u>122.9</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	71.4	76.4	76.9	81.0	83.1
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	41.5	37.7	37.7	39.9	39.8
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>70.6</u>	<u>66.7</u>	<u>66.6</u>	<u>65.9</u>	<u>64.7</u>
Intelligence & Security	22.6	21.2	21.2	20.7	19.5
Centrally Managed					
Communications	19.5	18.0	18.0	17.5	17.6
Research & Development	17.9	17.2	17.2	16.1	16.1
Support to Other Nations	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.6	2.6
Geophysical Activities	9.5	9.0	9.0	8.9	8.9
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>163.3</u>	<u>152.8</u>	<u>153.1</u>	<u>149.5</u>	<u>149.2</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Base Operating Support	124.8	114.8	115.0	111.2	110.0
Force Support Training	17.1	17.3	17.5	19.0	19.8
Command	20.5	20.1	20.1	18.8	18.9
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>108.8</u>	<u>103.9</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>96.3</u>	<u>95.3</u>
Base Operating Support	21.3	19.8	19.9	16.9	16.4
Medical Support	33.8	33.9	34.0	32.3	32.5
Personnel Support	6.6	6.1	6.0	6.4	6.4
Individual Training	28.3	25.8	26.1	23.2	22.7
Command	13.9	13.5	13.5	12.8	12.8
Logistics	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>65.5</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>66.4</u>	<u>60.4</u>	<u>59.4</u>
Transients	25.4	22.6	22.9	18.3	18.5
Patients & Prisoners	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7
Trainees & Students	35.3	37.8	38.5	37.3	36.0
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.2
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>612.6</u>	<u>584.1</u>	<u>584.0</u>	<u>571.0</u>	<u>568.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY 1/ MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.6</u>
Intelligence & Security	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
Centrally Managed					
Communications	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Research & Development	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Support to Other Nations	*	*	*	*	*
Geophysical Activities	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.4
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support					
Force Support Training					
Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Medical Support	*	*	*	*	*
Personnel Support	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4
Individual Training	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Command	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.4
Logistics	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students					
Cadets					
<u>Total Defense Agencies</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Military strengths assigned to Defense Agencies are included in Service strengths.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Strategic Offensive					
Strategic Defensive					
Strategic Control and Surveillance					
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>367.2</u>	<u>353.0</u>	<u>353.9</u>	<u>373.4</u>	<u>370.8</u>
Land Forces	<u>367.2</u>	<u>353.0</u>	<u>353.9</u>	<u>373.4</u>	<u>370.8</u>
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence & Security					
Centrally Managed					
Communications					
Research & Development					
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities					
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>8.7</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.7	8.7
Force Support Training					
Command					
<u>General Support Forces</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.0</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support					
Individual Training	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.9	6.8
Command					
Logistics					
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>13.5</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	11.9	11.9	11.0	10.8	13.5
Cadets					
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>394.7</u>	<u>380.0</u>	<u>380.0</u>	<u>400.0</u>	<u>400.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

ARMY RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Offensive					
Strategic Defensive					
Strategic Control and Surveillance					
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>165.7</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>161.5</u>	<u>161.0</u>
Land Forces	<u>165.7</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>161.5</u>	<u>161.0</u>
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security					
Centrally Managed Communications					
Research & Development					
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities					
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>6.9</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.9
Force Support Training Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>45.7</u>	<u>43.5</u>	<u>43.5</u>	<u>44.5</u>	<u>44.4</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support	6.4	6.1	6.1	6.2	6.2
Personnel Support					
Individual Training Command	39.3	37.4	37.4	38.3	38.2
Logistics					
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.7</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	6.6	5.0	5.0	6.1	6.7
Cadets					
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>225.1</u>	<u>212.4</u>	<u>212.4</u>	<u>219.0</u>	<u>219.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

**NAVAL RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 75 Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	
		<u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>			<u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Strategic Offensive	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>59.9</u>	<u>60.1</u>	<u>47.0</u>	<u>47.0</u>
Land Forces	1.3	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0
Tactical Air Forces	5.0	4.9	4.9	7.0	7.2
Naval Forces	44.4	50.5	50.7	36.9	36.7
Mobility Forces	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence & Security	5.7	5.3	5.3	-	-
Centrally Managed					
Communications	1.5	2.0	2.0	-	-
Research & Development	0.5	0.4	0.4	-	-
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3	-	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>20.4</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support	10.7	12.0	12.0	-	-
Force Support Training	1.6	0.4	0.4	-	-
Command	8.1	7.5	7.5	2.8	2.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>16.6</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Base Operating Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	-
Medical Support	3.9	1.4	1.4	-	-
Personnel Support	0.9	0.8	0.8	-	-
Individual Training	1.6	1.2	1.2	0.5	0.5
Command	2.9	2.4	2.4	0.4	0.4
Logistics	7.1	6.1	6.1	0.4	0.4
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Cadets					
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>98.2</u>	<u>101.1</u>	<u>101.4</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>52.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

**MARINE CORPS RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Strategic Offensive				
Strategic Defensive				
Strategic Control and				
Surveillance				
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>30.7</u>	<u>30.8</u>
Land Forces	<u>21.6</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>22.8</u>
Tactical Air Forces	7.6	8.0	8.0	8.0
Naval Forces				
Mobility Forces				
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security				
Centrally Managed				
Communications				
Research & Development				
Support to Other Nations				
Geophysical Activities				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Reserve Components Support				
Base Operating Support				
Force Support Training				
Command				
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Base Operating Support				
Medical Support				
Personnel Support				
Individual Training				
Command				
Logistics				
Federal Agency Support				
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Transients				
Patients & Prisoners				
Trainees & Students	3.2	2.7	2.8	2.7
Cadets				
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>32.4</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>33.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>16.8</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	3.6	4.5	6.1	8.7
Strategic Defensive	13.7	11.2	10.3	7.4	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>63.6</u>	<u>62.5</u>	<u>62.3</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces	50.2	48.0	47.8	46.2	44.0
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces	13.4	14.5	14.5	15.5	15.5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.2</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed Communications	9.9	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.6
Research & Development Support to Other Nations Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.5</u>
Reserve Components Support	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2
Base Operating Support	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Force Support Training Command	2.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.0
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support					
Personnel Support					
Individual Training					
Command					
Logistics					
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.4</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4
Cadets					
<u>Total Air National Guard</u>	<u>95.4</u>	<u>94.6</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>92.6</u>	<u>93.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

**AIR FORCE RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	1.3	1.7
Strategic Defensive	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>36.0</u>	<u>34.8</u>	<u>35.4</u>	<u>34.2</u>	<u>34.0</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.1	5.1
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces	30.9	29.4	29.9	29.1	29.0
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Intelligence & Security					
Centrally Managed					
Communications					
Research & Development					
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities	-	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>13.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
Base Operating Support	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9
Force Support Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Command	5.6	0.3	8.3	7.5	9.0
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Personnel Support					
Individual Training					
Command					
Logistics	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6
Cadets					
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>51.1</u>	<u>52.9</u>	<u>53.5</u>	<u>52.4</u>	<u>54.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>45.8</u>	<u>44.6</u>	<u>44.6</u>	<u>44.9</u>	<u>44.9</u>
Land Forces	42.1	41.0	41.0	41.3	41.3
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>29.1</u>
Intelligence & Security	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.8
Centrally Managed					
Communications	3.9	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2
Research & Development	22.6	22.1	22.0	21.9	21.9
Support to Other Nations	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Geophysical Activities					
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>101.4</u>	<u>107.1</u>	<u>106.0</u>	<u>102.4</u>	<u>102.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	10.9	10.9	11.0	11.0	11.0
Base Operating Support	86.7	92.5	91.3	87.7	87.7
Force Support Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Command	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>222.9</u>	<u>211.7</u>	<u>209.3</u>	<u>201.4</u>	<u>201.5</u>
Base Operating Support	46.3	43.4	42.9	38.1	38.1
Medical Support	25.1	26.2	26.5	25.1	25.1
Personnel Support	6.0	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2
Individual Training	18.3	18.5	18.3	18.7	18.7
Command	23.1	23.2	23.1	21.8	21.8
Logistics	104.1	96.1	94.2	93.5	93.5
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>401.1</u>	<u>394.2</u>	<u>390.2</u>	<u>378.4</u>	<u>378.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NAVY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.1</u>
Strategic Offensive	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5
Mobility Forces	5.1	4.9	4.9	5.1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>47.7</u>	<u>45.2</u>	<u>45.2</u>	<u>43.9</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Communications	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.5
Research & Development	38.7	36.2	36.2	35.5
Support to Other Nations	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.7
Geophysical Activities	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>31.1</u>	<u>30.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.8</u>
Base Operating Support	26.3	26.0	25.6	25.3
Force Support Training	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Command	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>219.2</u>	<u>220.6</u>	<u>220.5</u>	<u>218.7</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>20.4</u>	<u>20.7</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>20.0</u>
Medical Support	10.0	10.2	10.2	10.9
Personnel Support	1.7	2.8	2.9	2.7
Individual Training	14.8	14.2	14.1	13.3
Command	15.7	16.4	16.4	15.7
Logistics	156.5	156.4	156.3	156.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>306.0</u>	<u>304.4</u>	<u>303.8</u>	<u>300.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security	-	-	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-	-	-
Research & Development	-	-	-	-	-
Support to Other Nations	-	-	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.1</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Base Operating Support	10.5	10.6	11.0	11.0	11.0
Force Support Training	-	-	-	-	-
Command	*	*	*	*	*
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Base Operating Support	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
Medical Support	-	-	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Individual Training	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
Command	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
Logistics	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>20.1</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>19.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

1
AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>8.0</u>
Strategic Offensive	0.6	1.5	1.7	2.6	3.4
Strategic Defensive	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.7	3.7
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>28.7</u>	<u>29.0</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>29.4</u>	<u>28.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	14.4	14.6	14.7	14.7	14.1
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	14.3	14.4	14.4	14.7	14.5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>31.4</u>	<u>31.4</u>	<u>31.3</u>	<u>31.3</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7
Communications	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.1
Research & Development	22.8	21.6	21.6	20.3	20.3
Support to Other Nations	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.9	1.9
Geophysical Activities	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>76.1</u>	<u>71.0</u>	<u>70.8</u>	<u>68.7</u>	<u>69.0</u>
Reserve Components Support	5.5	5.0	5.0	4.7	4.7
Base Operating Support	64.2	60.0	59.8	57.8	58.0
Force Support Training	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5
Command	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>134.5</u>	<u>126.4</u>	<u>126.4</u>	<u>120.5</u>	<u>120.3</u>
Base Operating Support	30.2	29.6	29.8	28.5	28.2
Medical Support	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.7	7.7
Personnel Support	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Individual Training	7.2	7.0	7.1	6.4	6.4
Command	11.9	11.6	11.5	11.1	11.1
Logistics	75.7	69.0	68.9	65.4	65.5
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>278.0</u>	<u>264.8</u>	<u>264.6</u>	<u>257.1</u>	<u>257.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.5</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communications	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Research & Development	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Support to Other Nations	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.3	7.3
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support					
Force Support Training					
Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>60.4</u>	<u>61.9</u>	<u>69.7</u>	<u>67.3</u>	<u>67.5</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.2</u>
Medical Support	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	1.5	3.5	11.3	11.5	11.5
Individual Training	*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
Command	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.7	5.7
Logistics	46.2	45.6	45.6	43.4	43.4
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total Defense Agencies</u>	<u>73.3</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>82.7</u>	<u>79.8</u>	<u>79.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

CHAPTER III

MANPOWER AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

A. National Security Objectives and Policy

The fundamental objective of national security policy is to preserve the United States as a free nation, protecting the physical security, the political independence and the general welfare of the American people. Strong and capable Armed Forces are essential to the accomplishment of this objective.

The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1977 addresses in detail the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment. Reference should be made to that report for a more comprehensive treatment of these considerations. The manpower requirements stated in this report have been derived from an analysis of the force structure required to implement defense strategy in a world characterized by the threat summarized below.

B. Threat

1. Worldwide

Currently, the primary threat to U.S. interest worldwide is posed by the USSR. The threat presented by the large Soviet strategic nuclear capability -- which is still increasing in size and sophistication -- is the first priority concern of U.S. defense planning. Major areas of concern in structuring U.S. general purpose forces are the NATO theater and Northeast Asia.

2. Europe/NATO

In the event of war, the nuclear and conventional forces of the Soviet Union (supplemented by the Warsaw Pact allies) are designed to seize the initiative with offensive operations employing heavily armed formations. The Soviets have for some time been embarked on major development and modernization programs for their conventional forces, particularly in the NATO Central Region. Of prime significance are recent trends showing increased numbers and/or improvements in tanks and armored vehicles, armed assault helicopters, self-propelled artillery, tactical aircraft, and manpower.

Trends in Soviet naval forces reflect efforts to modernize their cruiser-destroyer and underway replenishment fleets and to develop a sea-based air capability. Soviet capabilities for sea lane interdiction with other types of naval forces are also on the increase.

3. Asia

As in Europe, the principal threat to U.S. interests in Asia and the Pacific is the Soviet Union. Soviet naval forces represent a potential threat to U.S. and allied maritime interests throughout the Pacific and Soviet air forces present a threat to allied and U.S. bases in Northeast Asia. The Soviet Union also maintains large ground forces in Asia, but, at the present time, these are directed mainly at the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The PRC maintains large ground, air and naval forces which could be used against her immediate neighbors. However, given the present climate, we believe the probability of Chinese aggression in the near future is very low.

Partnership with Japan and South Korea are fundamental to our Asian strategy.

4. Other

The chronically unstable situation in the Middle East could deteriorate swiftly. Should this occur, significant U.S. and Soviet interests would be involved and with them the prospect of direct super-power confrontation.

C. Force Structure

In developing a force structure adequate to meet the threat outlined above, the following policies have been adopted as guidelines:

- Nuclear forces will be structured to permit their employment in a full range of flexible options and thus reduce the risk of automatic or uncontrolled escalation.
- The structure of General Purpose Forces will be designed to maximize their strength for conventional warfare and thus sustain the highest practicable threshold for nuclear warfare. It must also, however, provide the capability for those forces to operate in a nuclear environment.
- We will not rely upon theater nuclear forces and other nuclear capable elements of general purpose forces as a substitute for conventional forces. The structure of these nuclear and nuclear capable forces will, however, permit them to contribute to deterrence of con-

ventional and nuclear warfare and to control escalation. The combined use of conventional and theater nuclear forces would be appropriate in circumstances where conventional forces alone have insufficient capability to achieve U.S. objectives.

- We will seek to obtain maximum combat power from available resources by encouraging cooperation and participation with allies in shared defense concerns, by capitalizing on interservice mutual support within our own Armed Forces and by developing more effective integration of our active and reserve components.

D. Force Deployments

1. Rationale for Forward Deployments

The forward deployment of U.S. forces is an integral part of our national security policy. Specifically, we maintain forward deployments of our forces in regions most vital to our interests in order to:

- Deter aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and to our allies the U.S. resolve to honor its major commitments;

- Enable the United States to assist our allies in the event they are attacked;

- Provide the President with the flexibility necessary for prompt response to contingencies.

In assessing overseas deployment posture, principal concerns are the threat, the military requirements peculiar to the area, costs, and political considerations.

Forward deployment is advantageous for our land forces because of their dependence on heavy, bulky weapons and support equipment. Moving large land forces rapidly from the United States to a conflict area requires either extensive airlift and sealift forces to move troops and high priority equipment or, alternatively, a mix of forward positioning and maintenance of major equipment and ammunition, with airlift/sealift for the remaining equipment, troops, and resupply.

Tactical air forces are less dependent on forward deployments for rapid employment during a crisis because additional planes can be flown into existing forward airfields. Nevertheless, the peacetime forward posturing of selected tactical air units is required to provide evidence of the firmness of our commitments as well as an immediate reaction capability in the event of hostilities.

Navy and Marine Corps forces, deployed primarily to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific areas, serve the same purpose. Most Navy land-based patrol air units and afloat units rotate through these areas from their homeports in the United States. A number of ships are, however, permanently stationed overseas along with major staffs and shorebased support activities.

2. Summary of Manpower by Geographic Location

The following tables summarize our present and planned forward deployments.

Military Manpower by Location
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Total Military Manpower	2127.3	2086.7	2101.8	2101.0
US Territories & Possessions (Afloat)	1641.9 (143.7)	1619.5 (142.4)	1634.5 (142.9)	1638.5 (153.1)
Total Foreign Countries (Afloat)	485.4 (64.2)	467.2 (62.6)	467.3 (62.9)	462.5 (63.6)
Europe & Related Areas	314.5	313.0	313.3	311.9
Western Pacific & Southeast Asia	156.3	145.1	144.9	141.5
Other Countries & Areas	14.6	9.1	9.1	9.1

3. European Deployments

Forces in Europe and related areas represent our largest overseas deployment. These forces are part of our contribution to NATO. The U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean is also available for use in crisis situations outside the NATO area where U.S. interests may diverge from the interests of other NATO nations. While our long term objective is to turn a larger share of the responsibility for the defense of Europe over to our allies, in the near term we will continue to provide, during peacetime, approximately 10 percent of the ground forces, 10 percent of the major combatant ships and 25 percent of the aircraft in the NATO area.

Total manpower programmed for Europe has decreased slightly from FY 1975 to FY 1977, but improved utilization of this manpower will provide NATO with increased conventional combat capability. The restructuring of U.S. forces to improve combat capability is consistent with the provisions of the Nunn Amendment to the FY 1975 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act which requires the non-combat component of the U.S. military strength in Europe be reduced by 18,000 by end FY 1976.

The 18,000 non-combat force reductions will be completed by end of FY 1976. Most are being taken from headquarters and miscellaneous supporting units. To date only about 14,000 of the 18,000 non-combat reductions have been identified for replacement with combat forces; however, review of requirements for combat force deployments is continuing.

Army combat increases include the introduction of two brigades into Germany, one in FY 1975 and one in FY 1976. Without any increase in overall Army manpower in Europe, Army combat power in Europe will increase from 4-1/3 to 5 division equivalents. In addition, the combat capability of many existing Army units in Europe is being increased. Similarly, the Air Force will deploy additional C-130 units for improved intra-theater lift capacity and has enhanced combat air control capability. The Navy will increase manning of combatant ships by 300 positions during FY 76.

Apart from this unilateral effort to improve our forces, the NATO Executive Working Group has begun studies to determine if more efficient use of resources, including manpower, can be achieved through consolidation of training, consolidation of communications, and host nation support for wartime lines of communications. The U.S. is committed to strong support of this concept of rationalization and specialization.

4. Western Pacific Deployments

The other major location of U.S. forces overseas is in the Western Pacific. By the end of FY 76, all U.S. combat forces will have been withdrawn from Thailand and we will have attained a posture which we believe to be appropriate for the next several years. Our principal combat forces in the area will be an Army division in Korea, elements of a Marine division and wing in Japan and Okinawa, nine Air Force tactical fighter squadrons -- deployed in Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines -- and carrier and amphibious forces afloat. Minor reductions in support forces will occur during FY 77, but, in general, our posture will be stable.

5. Other Deployments

Deployments outside Europe and Related Areas, the Western Pacific Area and Southeast Asia include Naval activities in Bermuda for operation and support of patrol aircraft covering the central Atlantic area, and naval forces deployed to the Indian Ocean. Most of the remaining deployed manpower is allocated to small Military Assistance Groups and diplomatic missions.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIC FORCES

A. Definition

Strategic forces consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces which have as their fundamental objective deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas. These forces, along with U.S. theater nuclear and general purpose forces, also assist the military forces of our allies (and other nations whose security is important to us) to deter attack on themselves by nuclear powers or by states assisted by nuclear powers. These forces also strengthen the resistance to attempts at coercion by nuclear powers or their allies.

If deterrence should fail and aggression occur, strategic forces would be used to support political measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the U.S. and its allies. This requires the capability for selected, controlled, effective military measures that offer the prospect for controlling escalation of the conflict. However, if escalation could not be controlled, and a major nuclear conflict occurred, strategic forces would be used to obtain the best possible outcome for the U.S. and its allies.

B. Strategic Forces Manpower

The following table portrays Strategic Forces manpower:

Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Strategic Offensive	82.6	76.5	74.6	74.9
Strategic Defensive	15.6	13.3	13.0	12.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.9	12.4	12.5	12.4
Total DoD	<u>111.2</u>	<u>102.3</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>100.1</u>
Reserve Components				
Strategic Offensive	0.1	3.9	4.8	7.5
Strategic Defensive	14.2	11.8	10.9	7.9
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Total DoD	<u>15.0</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>16.1</u>
<u>Civilian</u>				
Strategic Offensive	1.9	2.8	3.0	4.2
Strategic Defensive	6.7	5.8	5.2	4.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.9	2.4	2.4	2.4
Total DoD	<u>10.6</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

C. Threat

1. Soviet

The deployed strategic forces of the Soviet Union together with the pace, character and scope of their developmental programs continue to be a matter of grave concern to us. Highlights of Soviet strategic offensive force developments for 1975 were:

- ICBMs - deployment of the new generation of MIRVed systems began.
- SLBMs - SSBN construction continued with one new type of submarine appearing and an additional one or two new types under construction.
- Strategic Bombers - Backfire bombers joined the operational forces.
- Cruise Missiles - the inventory of short-range air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles was maintained.

The Soviets have continued their evolutionary approach to modernization and improvements of their strategic defense systems:

- ABM - current emphasis appears to be aimed at a broadly based R&D program to investigate advanced concepts.
- Air Defense - continued improvements and deployments in both SAM systems and the manned interceptor force, with the latter augmented by more of the advanced Foxbat and Flagon E aircraft.
- ASW - continued deployment of the new Victor SSN and continued emphasis on, and exercise of, a combined ASW force - SSNs, surface ships, carrier-based helicopters and shore-based aircraft.

2. PRC

The slow pace of the Chinese strategic forces program continued during the past year. They have neither long-range bombers nor SLBMs. They have had an ICBM developmental program for several years, but since there was no major progress in either of the candidate missiles, the CSS-X-3 the CSS-X-4, during the past year, their development of an offensive capability against the continental US still appears to be several years away.

D. Strategic Offensive Forces

To accomplish our objective of a strong deterrent posture we maintain a well diversified mix of strategic offensive forces consisting of land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs and manned bombers and their supporting command, control, and communications systems. This force, commonly referred to as the TRIAD, must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet first-strike and still be capable of achieving a decisive reduction of the enemy's power and influence and post-attack recovery capability. The diversification of our TRIAD forces insures high-confidence in our second-strike capability and provides;

- assurance that a technological breakthrough against any one element will not negate the effectiveness of the entire force.
- a hedge against widespread failures of any element or its command, control and communications system due to unanticipated nuclear weapons effects.
- a compounding of Soviet offensive and defense problems in attempting to defeat or defend against U.S. forces.
- reinforcement of the viability of each element by the presence of the others, thereby strengthening the credibility of our deterrent posture as a whole.

Active strategic offensive force manpower is continuing to be reduced through the transfer of KC-135 refueling tankers from the active forces to the Air Reserve Components. This transfer, which started during FY 1976, allows a reduction in the number of active force tanker crews. By end FY 1977 nine squadrons of eight unit equipment (UE) KC-135 aircraft each will have been transferred to the Air Reserve Components with an additional four squadrons being transferred in FY 1978.

The FY 1977 budget includes the transfer of 14 UE B-52G aircraft to non-operational (NOA) status. Since flying hours, aircrews and maintenance manpower are not provided for NOA aircraft, there was an attendant reduction in manpower.

Production of the Trident submarine is continuing. Although this system will not be deployed until after FY 1978, there will be initial increases in manpower during FY 77 associated with the support of this system and the training of personnel to operate it.

Development work on the Trident missile, the B-1 bomber and the Advanced ICBM is continuing. However, since these systems will not be deployed in FY 77 no operational manpower is provided for them.

Strategic offensive forces, as shown in the following table, remain essentially the same during the period FY 75-78 with the exception of the KC-135s being transferred to the Air Reserve Components and the B-52 force, which will be reduced slightly by end FY TQ as a result of the transfer of 14 aircraft to NOA status.

Strategic Offensive Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Bombers:				
B-52 (UE) a/	330	330	316	316
FB-111 (UE)	66	66	66	66
KC-135 (UE)				
Active Force	615	583	575	543
Air Reserve				
Components	-	32	40	72
Missiles:				
Titan II	54	54	54	54
Minuteman	1000	1000	1000	1000
Polaris/Poseidon	656	656	656	656
Ballistic Missile				
Submarines (SSBN)	41	41	41	41
Submarine Tenders (AS)	5	5	5	5

a/ Unit Equipment (UE) is the basis for manning aircraft squadrons. This is less than the Total Active Inventory (TAI), which will remain level from FY 75 through FY 78 except for attrition.

The following table displays Strategic Offensive Forces manpower:

Strategic Offensive Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	82.6	76.5	74.6	74.9
Reserve Components	0.1	3.9	4.8	7.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	2.8	3.0	4.2

The increase in Reserve Components manpower in FY 1977 is due to the transfer of KC-135 aircraft from the active forces. The increase in civilian manpower reflects the Reserve Components technicians required to support these KC-135 aircraft.

E. Strategic Defensive Forces

Strategic defensive forces include all forces for air defense, ballistic missile defense, and civil defense. Strategic defense complements our strategic offensive forces, and is an essential element of our strategic deterrence posture.

Given the current strategic environment, we continue to place low priority on actively defending CONUS against an all-out strategic attack. Air defense of CONUS without a comparable missile defense, in an era of massive missile threat, is not a sound use of resources. Damage to CONUS can best be limited through control of escalation and minimization of the scale of nuclear conflict. Consequently our emphasis on CONUS defense is focused on airspace sovereignty and surveillance and warning, while providing R&D hedges against future requirements and minimizing peacetime costs.

Ballistic Missile Defense

In accordance with FY76 Congressional direction, operation of the SAFEGUARD System has been terminated. The Missile Site Radar is being deactivated and the interceptor missiles and warheads are being removed. The Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) will remain fully operational in support of the NORAD warning and attack assessment mission. The PAR will provide much more extensive and accurate information on the numbers of attacking missiles and their targets than is available from any of our other warning systems. We are continuing R&D on all types of missile defense at a pace adequate to maintain our technological base and to preserve options to meet potential future requirements.

Air Defense

As proposed last year, the Air National Guard F-101s will be phased out by the end of FY 1977. At that time our dedicated interceptor force will consist of 6 active and 6 ANG F-106 squadrons. They will operate from peacetime alert sites around the periphery of the 48 contiguous states. Additional alert sites located on Air Force and Air National Guard tactical bases, will be maintained with F-4 aircraft.

We will continue to maintain one ANG air defense squadron (F-4) in Hawaii. We will also maintain some air defense capability within General Purpose forces; specifically, one active Air Force F-4 squadron in Alaska and the active Army general purpose force Nike-Hercules and Hawk batteries now operational in Alaska and Florida.

Last year the EC-121 airborne radar force was proposed for phase out by end FY 1977, consistent with the planned introduction of AWACS. In reviewing our plans this past year, it was determined that a coverage gap would exist in the North Atlantic region if the EC-121s were phased-out and removed from Iceland before the AWACS were available. Thus, we have reconsidered the planned phase-out and now plan to retain the Reserve EC-121 squadron located at Homestead AFB, Florida through FY 1978. Additional aircraft, increasing the squadron UE to ten EC-121s, and active aircrews will be provided to augment the Reserve unit to enable it to maintain three EC-121 aircraft on station in Iceland until AWACS becomes available.

Civil Defense

Two key elements of our Civil Defense program for the protection of the U.S. population in the event of a nuclear attack are:

- development of plans for relocation of population from high risk areas near key military installations and from major metropolitan areas; and
- protection of the entire population from nuclear fallout.

About 1100 military reservists are assigned for purposes of emergency planning and operations to Federal, State and local civil defense offices.

Strategic Defensive Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Air Defense</u>				
Interceptor Squadrons				
Active (F-106)	6	6	6	6
ANG (F-101, F-106, F-4)	14	11	10	7
Control Centers	12	11	11	11
Radars				
Ground Based	66	66	66	66
Airborne EC-121 (UE)				
(Active and AFR)	14	10	10	10
<u>Ballistic Missile Defense</u>				
ABM Sites	1	-	-	-
Missile Warning				
Satellites/Ground Stations	3/2	3/2	3/2	3/3
Radars	9	9	9	9

Manpower required for Strategic defensive forces is shown in the following table:

<u>Strategic Defensive Forces</u> (End Strength In Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.6	13.3	13.0	12.8
Reserve Components	14.2	11.8	10.9	7.9
<u>Civilian</u>	6.7	5.8	5.2	4.2

F. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic control and surveillance forces provide warning to the United States of impending attacks by enemy ICBMs. These forces also provide command and control facilities to the National Command Authority.

Ballistic Missile Attack Warning and Space Systems

The early warning satellite system and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars will continue to be relied on for warning of ICBM attacks. Surveillance and warning against SLBM attacks will be provided by satellites and SLBM Detection and Warning System radars.

Information essential to understanding foreign space activity will continue to be provided by the existing USAF spacetrack systems and the Navy's SPASUR system, both of which are tied into NORAD and supported by the Space Defense Center for continuous monitoring of foreign and domestic space activities.

Command and Control

The strategic command and control system assures the President continuous control of our nuclear forces. The Advanced Airborne Command Post program, initiated in FY 1973, will be continued. In addition, development will continue on other programs to ensure that our command and control system will be able to perform its mission in the future.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Space Surveillance Forces</u>				
Radars	12	12	12	11
Optical Sensors	4	4	4	4
<u>Strategic Command and Control</u>				
National Level Command				
Centers	3	3	3	3
Major Subordinate Level				
Commands	15	15	15	15
Major Communications				
Systems	11	12	15	15

Manpower associated with Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces is shown below:

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	12.9	12.4	12.5	12.4
Reserve Components	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilians</u>	1.9	2.4	2.4	2.4

The reduction in active military strength in FY 1976 is due to Air Force program reductions including conversion to civilian contract at Baker-Nunn camera sites and inactivation of two radar warning sites for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This is partially offset by small increases in the programs of the other Services. The increase in civilian manpower reflects minor increases in the program of each Service, except the Marine Corps, and the Defense Agencies.

G. Strategic Forces Deployments

As shown in the following table, except for our sea-based SLBMs, our strategic forces are primarily located in CONUS.

<u>END FY77 STRATEGIC FORCES</u>		
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1054 ICBM	CONUS	Deter nuclear attack against the U.S. and its allies, our military forces, and bases. If deterrence should fail, support political measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the U.S. and its allies.
25 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 24 CONUS	
35 Tanker Squadrons	1 Okinawa 34 - CONUS	
<u>ANG</u>		
7 Tanker Squadrons	CONUS	
<u>Reserve</u>		
2 Tanker Squadrons	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
41 SSBNs and 5 Submarine Tenders	Charleston, SC Rota, Spain Holy Loch, Scotland Guam, Hawaii	
<u>Reserve</u>		
2 Ship Reinforcement Units (SRU)	1 Each Coast	

DEFENSIVE

AIR FORCE

Active

6 Interceptor Squadrons	6 CONUS	Airspace surveillance and control & world-wide air defense.
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1 Defense Sys Eval Squadron (EB-57)	CONUS	Defense systems evaluation & ECM training.
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ANG

7 Interceptor Squadrons	6 CONUS 1 Hawaii	Airspace surveillance and control.
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2 Def Sys Eval Squadrons (EB-57)	CONUS	Defense systems evaluation & ECM training.
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Reserve

1 AEW&C Squadron (EC-121)	CONUS	Support of Iceland air defense mission.
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H. FY 1978 Strategic Forces Manpower

The following table displays manpower requirements for Strategic Forces for FY 78 compared to FY 77.

Strategic Forces Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Active</u>		<u>Reserve Components</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Strategic Offensive	74.9	74.7	7.5	10.5	4.2	4.9
Strategic Defensive	12.8	12.4	7.9	7.9	4.2	4.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.4	12.7	0.7	0.7	2.4	2.4
Total DoD	100.1	99.7	16.1	19.2	10.8	11.4

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Strategic Offensive Forces remain stable in FY 78 except for the continued transfer of KC-135 tanker aircraft to the Reserve Components. This causes an increase in Air Force Reserve Components and Air Force civilian personnel.

The change in Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces reflects a phased increase in Air Force military manpower to support Space-track stations.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

A. Introduction

General purpose forces are so named because they are designed to provide the United States with the capability to conduct military operations at any level of warfare, including operations in conjunction with strategic forces during and after a strategic nuclear exchange. General purpose forces include land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces and mobility forces. General purpose forces manpower is divided between active and reserve personnel, with the Reserve Components contributing about 45% of the total.

General purpose forces manpower is displayed in the following table:

<u>General Purpose Forces Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
<u>Active</u>				
Land Forces	527.0	553.1	549.8	561.7
Tactical Air Forces	162.8	169.6	170.0	178.0
Naval Forces	166.3	170.8	171.8	183.6
Mobility Forces	42.4	38.6	38.6	40.8
Total DoD	<u>898.5</u>	<u>932.2</u>	<u>930.2</u>	<u>964.1</u>
<u>Reserve Components</u>				
Land Forces	555.8	535.9	536.7	559.7
Tactical Air Forces	67.9	66.2	66.2	66.3
Naval Forces	44.4	50.5	50.7	36.9
Mobility Forces	45.5	45.4	45.9	45.7
Total DoD	<u>713.6</u>	<u>698.0</u>	<u>699.5</u>	<u>708.6</u>
<u>Civilian</u>				
Land Forces	42.1	41.0	41.0	41.3
Tactical Air Forces	14.4	14.6	14.7	14.7
Naval Forces	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5
Mobility Forces	23.1	22.9	22.9	23.4
Total DoD	<u>80.1</u>	<u>78.8</u>	<u>78.9</u>	<u>79.9</u>

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

1. The Need for General Purpose Forces

DoD has established a firm objective of maintaining strong general purpose forces. This objective has resulted in resource expenditures which make general purpose forces by far the most expensive part of the defense establishment, representing about 37% of DoD total obligational authority requested for FY 1977.

With our general purpose forces, we seek to:

- Deter conventional conflicts;
- Limit tendencies toward nuclear escalation should a conventional conflict occur by keeping the nuclear threshold high;
- End a conventional war on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies.

2. Contributions of Allies

a. Europe/NATO

Beyond the direct defense of the United States, European security is the highest priority objective for our general purpose forces. Our strategy for NATO is based upon the view that NATO must have a credible posture to deter and defend against conventional and/or theater nuclear attacks, particularly in the Central Region. In assessing Allied participation, NATO defense has been far from a single-handed effort by the United States. Of the peacetime forces deployed in the European area, our allies contribute approximately 90 percent of NATO's ground forces, 90 percent of the ships, and 75 percent of the aircraft. In the critical Central Region, the United States contributes only 24 percent of NATO's peacetime ground forces manpower -- compared with the Soviet Union's 47 percent of Warsaw Pact ground forces manpower.

b. Pacific

With our assistance, the South Koreans have developed a significant military capability, especially in ground forces, which we now believe are adequate, with U.S. tactical air, naval and logistics support, for defense against a unilateral attack by North Korea. In addition, South Korea continues to assume an increasing portion of the cost of its armed forces. They continue, however, to require our materiel assistance to accomplish the goals of the Five Year Korean Modernization Plan and the follow-on force improvement plan. The presence of U.S. forces as a deterrent and sign of U.S. commitment is equally important.

The current Japanese Five Year Defense Plan continues to improve the ability of the Japanese Self-Defense Force to defend the home islands, without developing an offensive capability which could contravene constitutional prohibitions and popular attitudes. The Japanese forces do not have the capability to defeat a conventional attack on the home islands by the Soviet Union, and they cannot alone defend Japan's vital shipping from the Soviet submarine threat. On the other hand, we believe the Japanese forces probably are sufficient to contain a conventional attack on the home islands from North Korea or the PRC -- primarily because those two countries lack sufficient capability to project their forces across several hundred miles of ocean.

3. Theater Nuclear Forces

Theater nuclear forces are maintained to deter enemy nuclear attack and, by complementing conventional capability, enhance deterrence of conventional attack. They consist primarily of dual-capable (conventional or nuclear) artillery, tactical air, and land-based missiles. (These forces can be augmented by ballistic missile submarines which are addressed under strategic forces.) The existence of theater nuclear forces does not reduce the requirement for conventional general purpose forces. Our objective is to have sufficient conventional capability to successfully oppose conventional enemy forces. Theater nuclear forces provide us options short of strategic exchange should our conventional forces fail and, at the same time, provide a response capability to first use of theater nuclear weapons by the enemy. In conjunction with conventional and strategic forces, theater nuclear forces provide the United States with the complete range of force capabilities and greatly increase the risks to enemy forces, thereby enhancing the deterrent value of U.S. forces. Because theater nuclear forces consist mainly of conventional forces which have been given a nuclear capability, they are included within the descriptions and manpower levels of land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces.

B. Land Forces - Forces, Manpower, Capabilities, and Missions

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

The following tables summarize Land Forces and manpower. Reserve Component forces provide a significant portion of these manpower intensive forces.

Land Force Levels

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Army</u>				
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>				
Active				
Deployed	5(17)	5(18)	5(18)	5(18)
CONUS/Hawaii	9(25)	11(26)	11(26)	11(28)
Reserve Components	8(24)	8(24)	8(24)	8(24)
TOTAL	<u>22(66)</u>	<u>24(68)</u>	<u>24(68)</u>	<u>24(70)</u>
<u>Separate Brigades</u>				
Active				
Deployed	2	2	2	2
CONUS/Alaska	4	4	4	4
Reserve Components <u>a/</u>	20	20	20	20
TOTAL	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>
<u>Marine Corps Divisions</u>				
Active				
Deployed	1	1	1	1
CONUS	2	2	2	2
Reserve Components	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>

a/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included. This unit is in the Central Support Category.

Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	527.0	553.1	549.8	561.7
Reserve Components	555.8	535.9	536.7	559.7
<u>Civilian</u>	42.1	41.0	41.0	41.3

The Land Forces manpower increase between FY 75 and FY 77 is attributable to the Army's plan to increase the number of its active divisions. The details of this plan and other changes in the Land Forces manning level are discussed in the individual Service chapters and in Chapter IV of the Annual Defense Department Report for FY 77.

2. Capabilities of Land Forces

Land Forces are subdivided into two subcategories: Division Forces and Theater Forces (formerly Special Mission Forces). Division Forces comprise the combat divisions and the additional combat and tactical support units required in the theater of operations to sustain combat operations of the divisions. Division Forces provide the bulk of the combat power to wage land combat in the potential theaters of major warfare. Theater Forces comprise the combat and support units required in the theater of operations to accomplish missions other than conventional land combat such as air defense and long-range nuclear firepower (surface-to-surface missiles).

a. Army Division Forces

(1) The Army division is an organization which includes under a single commander all combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery, engineer and aviation) and some of the support (signal, supply, transportation, maintenance, and administration) to fight a battle. The Army division consists of about 16,000 men. It includes from 9 to 12 maneuver battalions and four artillery battalions. There are several types of Army divisions and each is designed for a particular role on the battlefield.

Characteristics of Typical Army Divisions

<u>Type Division</u>	<u>Objective Mix of Maneuver Battalions</u>				<u>Full TOE Strength</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Mech</u>	<u>Tank</u>	<u>Total</u>		
Armored		5	6	11	16,558	Shock power in attack; mobility for reserve
Mechanized		6	4	10	16,267	Mobile defense or attack
Infantry	8	1	1	10	16,572	All-around capability against light forces
Airborne	9		1	10	14,890	Parachute assault; strategic mobility
Air Assault	9			9	17,729	Battlefield mobility

Several of our active divisions rely on affiliated "roundout" Reserve Component brigades and battalions to complete the wartime structure of the division.

(2) The division cannot operate alone in the theater of war; additional combat units and tactical support units are necessary to allow the division forces to operate at their intended level of combat power. Divisions are part of the larger structure of the theater of operations, which may include army corps and theater army headquarters as higher command levels. Support units, over and above those organic to the divisions, are in the corps and theater organizations. Additional combat units are also in the corps and theater organizations.

(3) Only about 60% of the combat power of the division forces is included in the combat divisions themselves. Other combat power is found in the following organizations.

(a) Separate combat brigades are similar to divisions, except that they are smaller. A separate brigade includes from three to five maneuver battalions, one artillery battalion, and appropriate support units. Infantry, mechanized, and armored brigades differ by battalion mix. A separate brigade may be attached to a division or employed separately under a corps commander.

(b) The cavalry brigade (air combat) is a new organization which includes attack helicopters and air cavalry. This brigade exploits the capabilities of helicopters in land warfare.

(c) The armored cavalry regiment is an organization consisting of infantry, tank, artillery, and reconnaissance elements integrated at squadron (battalion) level. An air cavalry troop is also included in each regiment. The armored cavalry regiment is designed for such roles as reconnaissance, flank protection, and screening the divisions and brigades.

(d) Separate artillery battalions comprise about one-half the total artillery of the division forces. This non-divisional artillery includes missile battalions as well as cannon artillery.

(4) The Division Force Equivalent (DFE) is a force planning term used to describe a division and its support forces. The DFE is divided into three increments: the division, a separate combat increment, and a tactical support increment. The division itself requires about 16,000 people. Separate combat increments, such as those described above, require about 12,000 people per division. Separate tactical support increments require about 20,000 men per division. About one-half of this support is required in the theater of operations shortly after the division arrives. The other half, consisting generally of the same types of units, is needed later on to provide the capability for sustained operations. Examining the time-phased requirements for these forces assists in determining which part must be active forces and which can be in the Reserve Components or unmanned.

b. Marine Division Forces

(1) The Marine Division Force is similar to the Army Division Force, allowing for the unique mission and concept of employment for the Marine Corps. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, assigns the Marine Corps the mission of providing "... Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is the basic element for the conduct of amphibious operations or land operations ashore. The MAF is an integrated force of combined arms, consisting typically of a Marine Division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, supporting elements from Force Troops, and a Force Service Support Group.

(2) The Marine Division is an infantry division configured specially for amphibious operations; its strength is about 18,000 structure spaces. It includes nine infantry battalions and three artillery battalions plus units designed specifically to facilitate amphibious operations.

(3) The Marine Aircraft Wing is an integral part of the MAF and operates in conjunction with a division. Close integration of land and tactical air capabilities is an essential ingredient of the Marine Corps capability for amphibious operations. The manpower associated with the fixed-wing portion of the Marine Air Wings is in the Tactical Air Forces category while helicopter resources are designated as Land Forces aviation.

(4) Force troops provide additional combat and combat support units not organic to the Marine Division, but needed to sustain the operations of the division and air wing. Added combat units include tank and amphibious tractor battalions, and artillery batteries.

(5) The Force Service Support Groups provide additional combat service support units in support of the entire MAF. These units provide transportation, supply, maintenance and administrative support to the MAF.

c. Theater Forces

There are four subcategories of Theater Forces:

(1) Theater Missile Forces include the surface-to-surface missile units and supporting ammunition supply and maintenance units which provide the theater commander a responsive theater nuclear capability. (The Division Forces also include a nuclear capability because they include dual-capable units which can wage either conventional or nuclear combat.)

(2) Theater Air Defense Forces include surface-to-air missile units and supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units devoted to the theater-wide air defense mission under the control of the theater commander.

(3) Theater Special Operations Forces include units devoted to special missions including psychological operations, civil affairs support, and unconventional warfare on a theater-wide basis under control of the theater commander.

(4) Theater Defense Forces include active and reserve component units provided for the defense of selected critical areas: Alaska, Berlin, Panama Canal Zone, Iceland, and the Caribbean. Provision of specific units for these essential defense missions achieves economies by allowing the units to be tailored for their missions and precludes diversion of Division Forces units from the main theaters in the event of war. The following shows the allocation of these forces:

End FY 77 Theater Defense Forces

	<u>Infantry Brigades</u>	
	<u>Active</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>
Alaska	1	1
Panama	1	1
Berlin	1	-
Iceland	-	1
Caribbean	-	1
TOTAL	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>

3. Regional Missions for Land Forces

a. NATO

The most demanding contingency for U.S. land forces is world-wide conflict with the USSR and its allies. Our land force requirements in this contingency are largely determined by planning for U.S. and Allied conventional forces which, after a period of warning and mobilization, would be able to defend NATO Europe against a mobilized conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. In FY 77, we plan to continue land force deployments to Europe at their FY 76 level. However, within that level changes are occurring. These changes are outlined in the Annual Defense Department Report for FY 77.

A large number of Warsaw Pact divisions located in Eastern Europe could be committed against NATO forces. These divisions are predominantly tank or motorized divisions and most are maintained in a high state of readiness. In the event of a major conflict with the Warsaw Pact, we plan on deploying most of our active and reserve component divisions to Europe. The length of the NATO frontage to be defended,

the European terrain and road network, and the size and high degree of mechanization in Pact forces all combine to make possible rapid advances by attacking forces. For this reason, the early arrival of large U.S. reinforcements is critical to a successful defense of NATO Europe. A detailed discussion of the balance of forces in NATO is contained in Chapter IV of the Annual Defense Department Report for FY 77.

b. Asia

We do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. land forces oriented toward Asia. If a large land war involving the United States should occur in Asia, we would be prepared to mobilize, and would initially use our non-NATO-committed forces and, if required, portions of the forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO. In the future, we expect the emphasis in Asia more and more to be placed on U.S. support to our allies, who will provide the required ground forces manpower.

c. Tactical Air Forces - Forces, Manpower, Capabilities, and Missions

The threat discussed in Chapter II poses a wide range of potential conflict situations in which military response might be required. The tactical air force structure described in this section provides to the National Command Authorities a variety of options, ranging from small, conventional deployments to large scale conventional and/or tactical nuclear operations. These forces are being structured to provide the responsiveness, positive control, and overall capability to meet the requirements of our strategy.

The flexible nature of tactical air forces enables elements of the combat and supporting forces to be deployed as a package to meet threats to our national interests at the level of theater or sub-theater conflict. These contingency force packages can be configured to expressly counter threats to our allies or for minor contingency situations where rapid reinforcement or force presence may be required.

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

In order to meet the tactical air portion of national strategy goals, the forces shown in the following table are planned for FY 77. Forces for FY 75 and FY 76-TQ are shown for comparison. As can be seen in this table, all military assets are considered in force planning. For example, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical aircraft are included in the table, and are an integral part of planned deployments. A table showing the corresponding manpower levels is also included.

The basic organizational building block for tactical air forces is the squadron. Squadrons are composed of like aircraft which vary numerically depending on type and operating environment. For example, Air Force fighter squadrons usually have 24 aircraft (UE), while the Navy and Marine Corps fighter squadrons have 12. Specialized squadrons of both Services (reconnaissance, ECM, etc.) usually have less. The major tactical air force operational organization is the wing. Wings are composed of one or more squadrons depending on the size of the support facility. Air Force wings are usually made up of three squadrons with like aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps wings are usually composed of five or more squadrons with dissimilar aircraft because of their isolated operating environments (carrier, beachhead) which demand mixed capability air units.

Tactical Air Forces a/

Squadrons b/

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active</u>				
Air Force	89	89	89	91
Navy	107	99	97	95
Marine <u>c/</u>	31	30	30	30
<u>Reserve Components</u>				
Air National Guard	36	37	37	39
Air Force Reserve	7	9	9	9
Naval Reserve	16	16	16	16
Marine Corps Reserve <u>c/</u>	8	8	8	8

a/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, early warning, ECM, and special operations squadrons. For further classified detail, see the Annual Defense Department Report.

b/ Squadron UEs are variable.

c/ Includes integrated tanker squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces Manpower a/ (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	162.8	169.6	170.0	178.0
Reserve Components	67.9	66.2	66.2	66.3
<u>Civilians</u>	14.4	14.6	14.7	14.7

a/ The specific changes in the size, structure, and manning of tactical air forces are discussed in the appropriate Service chapters.

2. Capabilities of Tactical Air Forces

Tactical aircraft have the capabilities to carry out a variety of missions in a conflict. These capabilities include close air support, interdiction, counterair (including air defense), reconnaissance, and special purpose missions. Tactical Air Forces can also wage nuclear war because they include aircraft which have both a nuclear and conventional weapon delivery capability.

a. Close Air Support (CAS)

Close air support sorties are flown against enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. Primary goals of close air support are: (1) to destroy or neutralize enemy forces close to friendly forces; and (2) to attack these enemy forces rapidly after receiving requests for close air support. CAS systems should be able to: (1) deliver accurate, lethal fire; (2) provide fire support responsive to the ground commander; (3) survive in likely enemy air defense environments; (4) maneuver well enough to employ the tactics required for various targets; and (5) carry ordnance in sufficient quantity and variety.

b. Interdiction

Interdiction sorties are flown by both land- and sea-based tactical aircraft against a wide range of targets including: (1) enemy forces maneuvering behind their front lines; (2) enemy lines of communication; (3) storage and production facilities in rear areas; (4) enemy surface ships such as surface-to-surface missile launching patrol boats, cruisers, and destroyers; and (5) enemy ports and naval bases.

c. Counterair

Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain air superiority by destruction or neutralization of an enemy's air capability. Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, and other elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy initiative. Air defense sorties are flown to protect friendly air, sea, or ground forces from enemy air attack. The primary objective is to limit the effectiveness of enemy air efforts to a level permitting freedom of action to friendly forces of all types.

d. Reconnaissance

Tactical reconnaissance resources are a vital part of the information collection capability available to commanders engaged in unilateral, joint, or combined operation in peacetime and in all intensities of warfare. Tactical air reconnaissance operations provide timely intelligence information concerning the enemy's installations, lines of communication, and electronic emissions, as well as the disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces. Intelligence information is collected, and surveillance of battle areas is carried out day and night and in all kinds of weather.

e. Special Purpose

Special purpose aircraft are used in electronic warfare (detection of and countermeasures against enemy electronic emitters), special operations forces (for example, specifically tailored for unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations), tactical air control (enroute and terminal control of tactical aircraft), and airborne early warning (airborne search radar).

3. Regional Missions and Other Employments for Tactical Air Forces

a. NATO

In the NATO central region, Allied ground forces are quantitatively inferior to Warsaw Pact ground forces, especially armor. NATO, however, has a substantial tactical air capability that can assist in countering a Pact armored assault. U.S. ground attack aircraft, earmarked to NATO, possess the capabilities which could be used to advantage against Pact armored units, provided NATO tactical air forces can achieve a local numerical superiority over Pact air forces. The Warsaw Pact has developed a tactical air force with major emphasis on air defense and has combined this force with an extensive ground radar network complemented by anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles.

The NATO southern flank (Greece, Turkey, and Italy) is of increasing concern because of the Middle East situation. Both land-based U.S. Air Force and carrier-based U.S. Navy tactical aircraft would be employed on this flank. In addition, U.S. Marine Corps tactical aircraft are a reserve that could be used in any of the NATO regions.

b. Asia

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps would provide tactical air support for conflicts in Asia. Because of the proximity of potential trouble spots to open seas and the current lack of a serious naval or air threat, the utility of carriers is enhanced in

the Western Pacific. Problems associated with Asian conflicts include the distance for resupply and the possibility of conflict in more than one theater. Tactical air provides the United States with the ability to provide rapid and significant support in these conflicts without involving substantial land forces. In addition, tactical air forces provide flexibility against the spectrum of conflicts possible in these areas.

c. Sea Lane Protection

Our dependence on sea lines of communication necessitates their protection. Tactical air for sea lane protection will be provided by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The mission involves defending both military and support shipping against bombers with air-to-surface missiles and cruise missiles, and from cruise missile firing surface ships and submarines. By using carriers and bases in both the United States and allied countries, U.S. tactical air can provide the defensive umbrella necessary to help maintain the sea lines of communication essential in both NATO and Asian conflicts.

d. Contingencies

The high degree of readiness maintained by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical air forces enhances their value in contingency situations. Navy carriers, Marine Corps Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) installations, and the Air Force forward base posture and capability to deploy to and sustain operations from bare bases provide a flexibility that will enable the United States to respond to contingencies in almost any part of the world.

D. Naval Forces - Forces, Manpower, Capabilities, and Missions

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

The following tables summarize Naval Forces and manpower.

Naval Forces 1/

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Ships</u>				
<u>Active Forces</u>				
Carriers	15	13	13	13
Attack Submarines				
Nuclear	64	65	67	70
Diesel	11	10	10	10
Surface Combatants	161	163	165	171
Amphibious Forces	64	62	62	64
Support Forces				
Underway Replenishment	43	40	41	40
Major Fleet Support	20	20	20	20
Minor Fleet Support	48	44	44	38
Patrol Craft	14	7	7	7
Minesweepers	3	3	3	3
Subtotal	<u>443</u>	<u>427</u>	<u>432</u>	<u>436</u>
<u>Reserve Components Forces</u>				
Surface Combatants	32	30	30	30
Amphibious Forces	--	3	3	3
Patrol Craft	--	5	5	5
Minesweepers	31	22	22	22
Minor Fleet Support Ships	--	--	--	4
Subtotal	<u>63</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>64</u>
Total Ships	506	487	492	500
<u>ASW Aircraft Squadrons</u>				
<u>Active Forces</u>				
Land-Based	24	24	24	24
Ship-Based (Fixed/Rotary Wing)	22	27	27	29
Subtotal	<u>46</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>53</u>
<u>Reserve Components Forces</u>				
Land-Based	12	12	12	13
Ship-Based (Fixed/Rotary Wing)	10	4	4	4
Subtotal	<u>22</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>
Total ASW Aircraft Squadrons	68	67	67	70

1/ Table excludes Strategic Force ships, RDT&E ships, and the ship assigned to Central Support Forces (Individual Training).

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	166.3	170.8	171.8	183.6
Reserve Components	44.4	50.5	50.7	36.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5

The increase in active military manpower between FY 1976 and FY 1977 supports the introduction of 20 new ships into the Navy, partially offset by the transfer of 5 ships to Naval Reserve Force and the decommissioning of 6 other ships. The decrease in reserve components strength is due to the shift to pay group/training category D of Naval Reservists and the elimination of 9 construction battalions.

2. Capabilities and Missions of Naval Forces

a. Threat

The Soviet navy possesses a large submarine force including both nuclear and diesel powered long-range attack submarines. Included in the Soviet submarine force are several classes of cruise-missile launching submarines which appear to have been developed to counter the U.S. and allied surface naval forces.

Soviet Naval Aviation possesses long-range, air-to-surface missile-armed bombers which can be projected against both naval forces and shipping in the sea lanes and can be augmented by similar aircraft from Soviet long-range aviation forces. The Soviets also possess a sizable force of long-range reconnaissance aircraft of sufficient range and endurance to be employed in either the Atlantic or Pacific.

The Soviet navy includes a substantial surface force of both combatant and support ships. Although these forces have limited access to the open ocean, they have been developing the capability for sustained operations there. The Soviets are gradually improving their sea-based air capability, but they do not yet possess an aircraft carrier capable of operating high performance fighters and, consequently, lack a strong organic air defense capability. As a result, effective use of Soviet surface ships against U.S. carrier forces would be limited to surprise attacks at the initiation of hostilities or defensive operations within range of land-based interceptors.

With these submarine, long-range aviation, and surface force assets, the Soviet navy has a capability to attack sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in a NATO war and to defend against U.S. amphibious and tactical air strikes from the sea.

b. Missions

The principal wartime mission of U.S. general purpose naval forces is to be able, in conjunction with allied forces in a NATO war, to protect military support shipping and naval forces at sea against a Soviet conventional interdiction effort. Simultaneously, U.S. forces in the Pacific should be capable of supplementing the forces of our Pacific allies to insure that a minimum necessary level of supplies can be maintained against expected threats to the sea lanes.

There also exists a requirement for naval forces to be capable of projecting power ashore using tactical air and amphibious forces. This capability is required not only for the NATO war but also for response to small-scale conflicts elsewhere.

Naval forces are routinely deployed in peacetime as part of our forward defense strategy. These deployments demonstrate commitment to our allies through the presence of U.S. naval forces and provide the timely and flexible response necessary to manage crises and to deter outbreak of hostilities.

c. Capabilities

For sea control operations, the United States maintains sea- and land-based aircraft, surface combatants to provide anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) support, attack submarines, mines, surveillance systems, and logistics support forces. For the projection of power ashore, the United States provides sea-based aircraft and amphibious forces, together with escorting and supporting forces. Many of these forces have utility in both the sea control and force projection roles and also carry out the naval presence and crisis control missions in peacetime.

Requirements for active U.S. naval forces are derived by the need to maintain in high states of readiness those forces which forward deploy in peacetime or which are planned for early use in a NATO war. Reserve forces are planned to provide the additional sustaining capability needed in a NATO war.

In peacetime and wartime, naval forces are organized into task units depending upon the mission to be performed, the threat, and the environment. The building block for these task units is the individual ship. The following examples demonstrate the formation of these task units.

- Carrier Task Group (CTG) -- A representative CTG engaged in sea control operations would comprise one carrier and seven surface combatants to protect the carrier. A representative mix of these combatants would be one cruiser (CG), three guided missile destroyers (DDG), and three destroyers (DD). This CTG would normally operate in the open ocean where the air threat is not numerically demanding.

- Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) -- An ARG would comprise 3-5 amphibious ships capable of transporting a Marine Amphibious Unit (1/9 of a division/wing team) and protection forces as necessary. A representative mix of protection forces would consist of five frigates (FF) and two guided missile destroyers (DDG).

- Underway Replenishment Group (URG) -- URGs are designed to provide logistics support (fuel, munitions, food) to other task units at sea. A typical URG would have three underway replenishment ships -- an oiler (AO), an ammunition ship (AE), and a combat stores ship (AFS) and five protection ships -- three frigates (FF) and two guided missile frigate (FFG).

E. Mobility Forces

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

The following tables display the Mobility Forces and manpower.

Mobility Forces

<u>Airlift Forces</u> (Squadrons/UE)	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active</u>				
Strategic	17/304	17/304	17/304	17/304
Tactical	16/267	15/234	15/234	15/234
<u>Reserve Components</u>				
Strategic <u>1/</u>	17/--	17/--	17/--	17/--
Tactical	37/342	37/374	37/374	36/366

Sealift Forces

<u>Active</u>				
Ships in Commission	18	13	13	12
Controlled Fleet				
Charter Ships <u>2/</u>	35	35	35	35

1/ Air Force Reserve associate squadrons operate active force aircraft.

2/ Including long-term charter option ships.

Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	42.4	38.6	38.6	40.8
Reserve Components	45.5	45.4	45.9	45.7
<u>Civilian</u>	23.1	22.9	22.9	23.4

The increase in active military manpower in FY 1977 reflects an increase in the Air Force strategic airlift crew ratio and the transfer of support airlift resources and "Red Horse" combat construction squadrons.

2. Capabilities of Mobility Forces

Mobility forces are a vital element of our general purpose force structure. As part of our overall attempt to deter aggression, we must have a credible capability and resolve to bring our forces to bear quickly whenever and wherever necessary. Mobility forces enable the United States to do this and at the same time to meet its security commitments to overseas allies with fewer U.S. forces actually positioned abroad.

Mobility forces consist of strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, pre-positioned equipment, mobility support forces including air and sea terminals, aerospace rescue and recovery, and aeromedical evacuation units.

a. Airlift

(1) Strategic Airlift

Strategic airlift provides the capability to rapidly deploy forces or critical logistical support to any part of the world. Our military strategic airlift force consists of both active and Air Force Reserve Associate Units. The active comprises four C-5 and thirteen C-141 squadrons. For each active force unit there is a collocated Air Force Reserve Associate Squadron.

In addition to the military assets, U.S. commercial airlines have committed 240 long-range aircraft to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Of these, 149 are cargo or passenger/cargo convertible aircraft and 91 are passenger-only aircraft.

(2) Tactical Airlift

In contrast to strategic airlift which provides deployment capability from CONUS to overseas areas, tactical airlift provides transportation and air logistic support for theater forces. Our active tactical airlift force consists of 15 C-130 squadrons. This active force is augmented by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve which maintain 30 C-130, 4 C-123, and 3 C-7 squadrons.

(3) Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

The aerospace rescue and recovery force provides a rapid global deployment capability to meet contingency or emergency rescue requirements, primarily for downed air crews. Additionally, this force is manned to furnish regional search and rescue coordination for the inland/CONUS region and Alaska. The active force is composed of HC-130 fixed wing aircraft and HH-53, HH-3 and HH-1 helicopters. As with airlift, the active force is augmented by Reserve forces operating HC-130, HH-3 and HH-1 aircraft.

(4) Aeromedical Evacuation

The aeromedical evacuation system provides the capability to move patients as expeditiously as possible to hospitals. The active force consists of one C-9 CONUS squadron, one C-9 squadron in the Pacific, and one in Europe. The CONUS unit is augmented by an Air Force Reserve Associate squadron.

b. Sealift

We rely heavily on sealift for military requirements to deploy and sustain our forces. The ships controlled by the Military Sealift Command have only a limited capability. We are reliant on U.S. flag ships, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the ships of our allies to provide the necessary sealift both in a major war and in contingencies short of war.

3. Missions

Mobility forces could be used in a variety of situations, ranging from a show of force to support of an all-out conventional war. Present planning for the spectrum of possible deployments involves principally military and U.S. commercial assets. However, in the case of a war in Europe we have adjusted our planning to include NATO Allied participation in assisting U.S. deployments.

F. Peacetime Force Deployments

U.S. national security planning emphasizes Europe; however, we still retain a presence in South Korea with backup forces primarily in Okinawa. Most of our forces are oriented toward a war in Europe, but we maintain some less heavily armored and mechanized units for a rapid reaction force and for use against less sophisticated enemy forces.

We have two basic needs from our general purpose forces: (1) the capacity for a successful strong initial forward defense based primarily on our forward deployed active forces with important supplements from our reserve land and tactical air forces and, (2) a long-war hedge that depends primarily on our guard and reserve forces and our production base. With these needs in mind, the forward force deployments and the strategic reserve in the United States will be discussed.

1. Forward Deployments

The rationale for our forward deployments is presented in Chapter III. The following table summarizes end FY 77 deployments of major U.S. general purpose force units. It does not include Navy forces which deploy primarily in ocean areas contiguous to the United States and Hawaii.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

END FY 77 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other U.S. forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack and stabilize the military situation without major loss of NATO territory.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
Bde, 4th Infantry Division (M)		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.
<u>Army Separate Brigades</u>		
Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of Canal Zone.
172d Infantry Brigade	Alaska	Defense of Alaska.
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft</u>		
<u>Sixth Fleet a/</u>	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict.
2 Attack/Multi-purpose Carriers		
16 Surface Combatants		Provide tactical air and amphibious "protection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank.
19 Attack Submarines, Patrol Ships and Auxiliaries		
1 Amphibious Ready Group b/		
1+ ASW Patrol Squadrons (12 aircraft)		Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
<u>Middle East Force a/</u>	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
1 Flagship		
2 Surface Combatants		

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific a/</u>	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.
2 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers		
18 Surface Combatants		
20 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
2 Amphibious Ready Groups b/		
4 ASW Patrol Squadrons		
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Caribbean Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Caribbean.
Special Mission Force	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	Defense of Guantanamo Naval Base
3d Marine Division (-)	Okinawa	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-)	Japan and Okinawa	
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Western Pacific	

Air Force Tactical Fighter Aircraft

26 Squadrons c/ 9 U.K. 8 W. Germany 1 Netherlands 3 Spain 1 Iceland 4 Dual-based	Provide force presence in forward areas. Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for a NATO conflict.
9 Squadrons 2 Philippines 4 Okinawa 3 Korea	Provide force presence. Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for an Asian conflict.

- a/ Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.
- b/ An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is one-ninth of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF). It consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team or a Marine Amphibious Unit embarked.
- c/ Includes four squadrons dual-based in CONUS.

2. Strategic Reserve

While there would be significant advantages to forward deploying a larger number of forces, the costs of doing so would require substantial increases in the defense budget. Based upon these cost considerations, we have created a strategic reserve of CONUS based forces and the strategic mobility to move them in a timely manner whenever and wherever required by a crisis. The following table summarizes the composition and location of the end FY 77 strategic reserve.

STRATEGIC RESERVE

END FY 77 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
<u>Active</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) (Minus 1 Brigade in Europe)	Ft. Riley, Kansas
2d Armored Division	Ft. Hood, Texas
4th Infantry Division (M)	Ft. Carson, Colorado
1st Cavalry Division	Ft. Hood, Texas
9th Infantry Division	Ft. Lewis, Washington
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Ft. Campbell, Kentucky
82d Airborne Division	Ft. Bragg, North Carolina
7th Infantry Division*	Ft. Ord, California
24th Infantry Division*	Hunter/Stewart, Georgia
5th Infantry Division (M)*	Ft. Polk, Louisiana
25th Infantry Division*	Hawaii

* Comprises two active brigades and one from the reserve components.

Army Separate Brigades

194th Armored Brigade	Ft. Knox, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade	Ft. Benning, Georgia
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Ft. Hood, Texas

Reserve Components

Army Divisions

49th Armored Division	Texas
50th Armored Division	New Jersey, Vermont
40th Infantry Division (M)	California
38th Infantry Division	Indiana, Michigan, Ohio
28th Infantry Division	Pennsylvania
26th Infantry Division	Massachusetts, Connecticut
42d Infantry Division	New York
47th Infantry Division	Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa

UnitLocationArmy Separate Brigades

30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
155th Armored Brigade	Mississippi
48th Mechanized Brigade*	Georgia
157th Mechanized Brigade	Pennsylvania (USAR)
218th Mechanized Brigade	South Carolina
256th Infantry Brigade*	Louisiana
69th Infantry Brigade	Kansas
29th Infantry Brigade*	Hawaii
32d Mechanized Brigade	Wisconsin
67th Mechanized Brigade	Nebraska
30th Mechanized Brigade	North Carolina
45th Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
187th Infantry Brigade	Massachusetts (USAR)
39th Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
81st Mechanized Brigade	Washington
205th Infantry Brigade	Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa (USAR)
41st Infantry Brigade	Oregon
53d Infantry Brigade	Florida
92d Infantry Brigade	Puerto Rico

* Round-out brigade for active Army division.

Navy Ships and AircraftActive

Second Fleet & Western Atlantic	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
5 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers	
68 Surface Combatants	
106 Attack Submarines, Patrol Combatants, Mine Warfare Ships, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
8 ASW Patrol Squadrons	
Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
4 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers	
67 Surface Combatants	
93 Attack Submarines, Patrol Combatants, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
8 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

Reserve Components

Second Fleet and Western Atlantic	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
23 Surface Combatants and Patrol Combatants	
14 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
2 Auxiliaries	
7 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
12 Surface Combatants and Patrol Combatants	
11 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
2 Auxiliaries	
6 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

Marine Corps Forces

Active

I MAF

(1st Marine Division/3d Marine Air Wing Team, plus supporting Force Troop elements and Force Service Support Group).

Camp Pendleton, Calif./Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), El Toro, Calif. and Marine Corps Base, Twenty Nine Palms, Calif.

II MAF

(2d Marine Division/2d Marine Air Wing Team, plus supporting Force Troop elements and Force Service Support Group).

Camp Lejeune, N.C./MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C. and MCAS, New River, N.C. and MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.

1st MARINE BRIGADE

(Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine Air Group 22, plus supporting Force Troops and Service Support Elements).

Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii
Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

Reserve Components

IV MAF

(4th Marine Division/4th Marine Air Wing Team, plus supporting Force Troops and Force Service Support Group).

Headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California
Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana

Air Force Tactical Aircraft

Active

56 Squadrons
54 CONUS
1 Alaska
1 Canal Zone

CONUS, Alaska, and Canal Zone

Reserve Components

48 Squadrons
47 CONUS
1 Puerto Rico

CONUS and Puerto Rico

G. FY 78 Manpower Requirements.

The following table compares FY 1978 manpower requirements for General Purpose Forces to those programmed for FY 1977:

General Purpose Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Active Military</u>		<u>Reserve Components</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Land Forces	561.7	565.7	559.7	556.6	41.3	41.3
Tactical Air Forces	178.0	180.3	66.3	64.3	14.7	14.1
Naval Forces	183.6	185.1	36.9	36.7	0.5	0.5
Mobility Forces	40.8	40.7	45.7	45.6	23.4	23.2
Total DoD	964.1	971.7	708.6	703.2	79.9	79.1

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER VI

AUXILIARY FORCES

Auxiliary Forces carry out major defense-wide programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence and Security, Communications, Research and Development, Support to Other Nations, and Geophysical Activities. The following table shows the manpower for Fiscal Years FY 75-77.

DoD Auxiliary Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Intelligence & Security	52.1	42.0	41.5	39.6
Centrally Managed				
Communications	38.2	37.2	37.3	36.3
Research & Development	32.7	32.4	32.4	30.9
Support to Other Nations	2.8	2.8	3.3	4.8
Geophysical Activities	11.9	11.2	11.2	11.0
Total DoD	<u>137.7</u>	<u>125.7</u>	<u>125.7</u>	<u>122.7</u>
Reserve Components				
Intelligence & Security	5.7	5.3	5.3	-
Centrally Managed				
Communications	11.4	11.5	11.5	9.6
Research & Development	0.5	0.4	0.4	-
Support to Other Nations	-	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.1
Total DoD	<u>18.4</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>10.7</u>
<u>Civilian</u>				
Intelligence & Security	9.9	9.5	9.4	9.0
Centrally Managed				
Communications	14.5	14.9	14.9	14.0
Research & Development	84.3	80.2	80.1	78.0
Support to Other Nations	2.4	3.4	3.4	4.9
Geophysical Activities	10.2	10.4	10.4	10.0
Total DoD	<u>121.3</u>	<u>118.3</u>	<u>118.1</u>	<u>115.9</u>

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

A. Intelligence and Security

This category includes the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies of the Department of Defense. Their operations are directed toward the provision of intelligence for strategic planning, national intelligence estimates and command and departmental support. These activities have been integrated to insure that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort.

Intelligence resource policies and controls are exercised by the Secretary of Defense, whose principal advisor in these matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). Specific requirements for intelligence collection and production are established by the Department of Defense, the Services and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for intelligence to support force planning, operations, and research and development. These requirements and other strategic guidance policy statements from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) form the basis for budget and manpower allocations.

Intelligence unit manning is determined by functional requirements, engineering standards, and other criteria. Manning authorizations are derived through experience, and are modified as broad missions of the staffs change, as science and technology impact on the methods and procedures of intelligence, and as actual combat experience requires. Military expertise has proven essential in the various intelligence planning, management and analysis functions. A cadre of civilian personnel is essential for continuity and for specialized skills not routinely available through military sources. The manpower in this category can be divided into two major subcategories according to program responsibility and management.

1. Cryptologic Program. Cryptologic activities are managed by the Director, National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA mission involves the performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of the intelligence activities of the United States. Resources included are those authorized and appropriated by the Congress for selected intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. For security reasons NSA civilian manpower is excluded from the DoD civilian authorization request, in accordance with PL 86-36.

The Director, National Security Agency has been assigned three basic responsibilities under the Secretary of Defense:

- Organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for collection, processing and analysis of intelligence information.

- Organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the U.S. Government which are in support of the Cryptologic Program.

- Regulating certain communications in support of agency missions.

2. General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The mission of the General Defense Intelligence Program is to provide for the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis and production of information, and dissemination of finished intelligence to military consumers. Resources for general Defense intelligence activities are managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The resources of this program are aggregated within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the individual services. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency has substantive management responsibility, which includes the following specific tasks:

- Representation on National Security System boards and committees.
- Intelligence support to the National Command Authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Coordination and substantive management of defense community collection, standard and scientific and technical production, and Automated Data handling matters.
- Management and control of the worldwide Defense Attache System and the Defense Special Security System.

The following table portrays Intelligence and Security manpower (less NSA):

<u>Intelligence and Security Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	52.1	42.0	41.5	39.6
Reserve Components	5.7	5.3	5.3	-
<u>Civilian</u>	9.9	9.5	9.4	9.0

The reductions between FY 76 and FY 77 represent such actions as unit inactivations and the phase-down of reconnaissance and signal intelligence based on realignment of priorities, management efficiencies and the application of technological advances. The reduction in reserve component end strength in FY 77 reflects the change in training status

of Naval Reservists from Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve. Naval Reservists are thus placed in the same status as those in the other services.

B. Centrally Managed Communications (CMC)

This category consists of the key worldwide dedicated and common-user communications systems of the Defense Department required to support and implement overall national security policy and objectives. Central management avoids duplication of effort and improves the responsiveness of these communications systems to our national command authorities. The manpower resources associated with these systems operate and maintain dedicated command and control networks and common-user systems for the National Command Authorities, all elements of DoD, and other governmental agencies. Additionally, CMC includes the manpower involved in communications security.

Worldwide communications to facilitate command and control of our forces is provided by the Defense Communications System (DCS) and the Military Service Communications Systems. The DCS is made up of a number of general purpose subsystems such as the automatic voice network, the digital transmission network and the secure voice network. Military Service communications systems provide internal networks for the Services and interface with DCS systems. Communications requirements for these systems are established based on current and projected deployment of our forces, i.e., the number, type, and location of installations and the distances between locations. Then, based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the field commander, the required capacity for each of several modes of communications is determined. Each such operating location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required and the need for administration and support. Therefore, personnel strengths to operate and maintain the systems are not directly correlated to the size of the forces being supported. The total strength of the Centrally Managed Communications category is determined by the number of operating locations, the manning of each, and additional personnel for supervision and support of the system.

The stable level of the Defense Department's communications manpower reflects completion of the large drawdown following the Vietnam conflict and resulting austere staffing of the Service Communications Management organizations.

The following table reflects the functional breakout of DoD manpower in Centrally Managed Communications.

DoD Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Active				
Defense Communications Sys	12.5	12.0	12.0	11.3
Services' Communications Sys	19.1	18.3	18.3	17.7
Satellite Communications	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.1
Communications Security	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.0
Engineering & Installation	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.3</u>
Total DOD	38.2	37.2	37.3	36.3
Reserve Components				
Defense Communications Sys	0.2	1.0	1.0	0.4
Services' Communications Sys	7.7	6.9	6.9	5.9
Satellite Communications	-	-	-	-
Communication Security	0.2	0.3	0.3	-
Engineering & Installation	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>
Total DOD	11.4	11.5	11.5	9.6
<u>Civilian</u>				
Defense Communications Sys	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.4
Services' Communications Sys	5.8	5.6	5.6	4.7
Satellite Communications	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Communications Security	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5
Engineering & Installation	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.2</u>
Total DOD	14.5	14.9	14.9	14.0

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The reductions in this category from FY 1975 to FY 1977 represent the initial conversion of overseas maintenance activities to civilian contract operation and consolidation of selected communication stations to conserve manpower. The change in Reserve Components end strength in FY 77 reflects the transfer of Naval Reserve manpower from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve.

Telecommunications and Command Control Program (T&CCP)

The Centrally Managed Communications category does not represent the full scope of the communications management effort in DoD. To insure that reliable, survivable, and cost-effective communications are available to the National Command Authorities, the Secretary of Defense has given the Director of Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems (DTACCS) the responsibility for managing all the resources within the T&CCP.

The Defense T&CCP is divided into two major functional categories: Consolidated Telecommunications Program (CTP) and the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Each is discussed below.

1. Consolidated Telecommunications Program. The functional grouping known as the CTP consists of all dedicated and common-user DoD communications systems except those that are integral to weapons systems or in direct support of combat units. The CTP includes all of the Centrally Managed Communications category. Specific examples of communications systems within the CTP other than those included in the Centrally Managed Communications category are: (1) general support communications systems both organic and nonorganic to military units; (2) post, camp and station communications; and (3) telecommunications for command and control.

CTP manpower, over and above that in CMC is dispersed throughout the five major DPPC categories in this report and is based upon the size, composition, and mission of the forces supported. CTP manpower in the Strategic Forces category includes the National Military Command System, Fleet Ballistic Missile Control, and a number of Air Force strategic missile systems. General Purpose Forces include such telecommunications systems as TRITAC, AF Tactical Air Command and Control, and Army combat support and combat service support systems. In the Mission Support Forces are the base communications for installations supporting operational commands in both US and overseas locations. In Central Support Forces are Base Communications in support of the logistic, training, medical and administrative installations of the Services.

2. WWMCCS. WWMCCS provides for command and control of US forces by the President and the Secretary of Defense during a time of national emergency. Because of the crucial nature of the system, the Secretary of Defense has vested policy and resource management in the WWMCCS Council which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and includes the DTACCS, the ASD(I), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members. For management purposes, WWMCCS assets have been subdivided into functional areas of Communications, ADP, Facilities and the WWMCCS Warning System. WWMCCS Communications manpower is also included in the CTP and accounts for about 5% of the manpower resources in the Consolidated Telecommunications Program.

The following table depicts Defense T&CCP manpower and shows the relationship between the T&CCP, Centrally Managed Communications and the Defense Planning and Programming Categories.

Telecommunications and Command Control Program
(FY 77 End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>Active</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	
<u>Defense Planning and Programming Categories</u>			
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	12.2	-	1.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	21.5	-	0.4
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u> (Centrally Managed Comm)	40.5 (36.3)	9.6 (9.6)	15.9 (14.0)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	10.8	-	6.1
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>4.0</u>
Total DoD	87.4	9.6	28.0

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

C. Research and Development (R&D)

Our R&D effort has two essential objectives: (1) Development of effective weapon systems to deter war and respond to aggression, and (2) assuring a continuous flow of initiatives and options out of the base of science and advanced technology and into development projects so that we can respond to the continuous changing environment of danger and opportunity. An important aspect of this environment is the significant technological improvements the Soviet Union is making in its forces. National defense depends in the long run on successful R&D programs.

This category contains the manpower responsible for carrying out the R&D programs necessary to meet the above objectives. This manpower conducts the work performed in the 107 laboratories and test and evaluation facilities of the DoD and also manages R&D contracted with agencies outside the DoD. This work encompasses virtually all aspects of the physical, biomedical, environmental, and behavioral sciences, plus the engineering disciplines. It is characterized by breadth, complexity, and constant change.

The DoD R&D organization is a balanced workforce which includes both military and civilian manpower. Military experience and expertise has proven essential in transitioning military requirements through the design, development, test and evaluation phases toward the final production of effective weapons systems. Military personnel are heavily used in test activities, where they possess and maintain operational skills and professional backgrounds which are unavailable in the civilian labor market, e.g., current experience in aircraft carrier landings.

Civilian R&D manpower is required to execute efficiently the RDT&E program, to provide essential continuity in the performance of in-house military oriented research, development, test and evaluation, to provide expertise not readily available from military resources, and to maintain an adequate in-house capability. Civilian manpower is involved in all aspects of the operation and control of the RDT&E program. Civilian scientific and engineering personnel must be available and have the capability to discover and exploit new developments and ideas that will be beneficial in the efficient operation of the total R&D mission as well as improve the effectiveness of combat forces. The DoD must have enough in-house personnel qualified to monitor adequately the contractors engaged in research and development activities. They must also be able to operate the R&D in-house establishment, from the laboratory to the test ranges, efficiently and economically.

Revised R&D Plan

The FY 1976 research and development manpower levels contained in this report will be revised consistent with the Conference Report on the FY 76 Authorization Bill. The conferees agreed that DoD should proceed with a drawdown, provided it is phased over a longer period of time than two years, and directed a revised plan be submitted to both Committees on Armed Services prior to implementation. However, while the Conferees disapproved the reductions, they did not restore the spaces to the manpower program.

The FY 1976 Defense Manpower Requirements Report showed a decrease of 5,600 R&D civilian spaces. This reduction was overstated by about 600 spaces due to an accounting adjustment in the Army R&D program. Additionally, the Army reduced its R&D account by about 900 spaces during FY 75. Therefore, this report shows a reduction in Defense civilian R&D manpower of only 4,100 civilians during FY 1976.

The revised plan to stretch this drawdown over a three year period (FY 76 - FY 78) is not reflected because program changes are still tentative. However, the revised plan calls for a reduction in FY 76 of only 2,300 spaces. Extension of the reduction will require restoration of about 1,800 civilian R&D spaces in FY 76 and FY TQ; with 447 spaces in the Army and 1330 in the Navy. An additional 319 Army spaces will be needed for R&D work being performed by the Missile Command Armaments Command which appear in the Logistics DPPC. The Navy will also require 500 spaces in FY 77.

The sources of the spaces needed to extend the drawdown still have not been identified. The Congress will be notified as to how the DoD will obtain these spaces.

A summary of R&D manpower is shown below:

<u>Research and Development Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	32.7	32.4	32.4	30.9
Reserve Components	0.5	0.4	0.4	-
<u>Civilian</u>	84.3	80.2	80.1	78.0
(To be added)		(1.8)	(1.8)	(0.5)

D. Support to Other Nations

U.S. defense materials and services are provided to foreign governments and international organizations by DOD as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). These programs are in direct support of U.S. national security interests as well as U.S. foreign policy and, thus, they are an inherent part of the DOD mission. These programs have been in existence since 1950 beginning with grant aid for post World War II reconstruction in Europe. Due to improved foreign economies, however, annual sales agreements by 1964 exceeded grants. In FY 1974 sales agreements reached the \$10 billion level. Meanwhile, grant aid diminished from a high of \$5.4 billion in FY 1954 to about \$584 million in FY 1975.

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of State and the Ambassador/Country Team, tailors security assistance activities individually to meet the needs of the country being supported whether they be grant aid, foreign military sales (FMS) credit or FMS cash sales. The recent trend away from grant aid toward foreign military sales requires the best possible projections of foreign requirements as the basis for coordinating total needs.

Manpower to support the military security assistance program consists of Military Assistance Advisory Groups and similar organizations and staffs abroad, and certain staff elements of DoD and the Military Departments. It also includes MAP and FMS fully funded Mobile Training Teams, Technical Assistance Field Teams, and the personnel of the Military Departments who support the program on a less than full-time basis. The military departments identified 4,539 man-years of effort for FMS in FY 1975, however, a portion of the associated manpower was reflected in other DPPCs e.g., Federal Agency Support. These spaces are now being realigned to this category, consistent with Congressional interest, to highlight resources dedicated to FMS workloads. The Services have projected 6,830 manpower spaces in the category as full-time FMS personnel at end FY 1977. However, the cost of all this effort, direct or indirect, is reimbursed by the foreign governments.

In addition to full-time personnel, there are those who devote only a portion of their time to FMS work. One example of this is the mechanic in a tank maintenance depot, the output of which is used by both U.S. forces and foreign countries. Another example is a flight training instructor who trains both U.S. and foreign students. These part-time FMS personnel are reported against the manpower categories which most closely relate to their function in support of U.S. forces. Hence, foreign military sales generate a considerable workload for our active forces beyond that identified within the Support to Other Nations Category.

Approximately 1,450 military and 200 civilian personnel are authorized for assignment to the 44 MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups worldwide. Included in this authorization are security assistance augmentees assigned to the offices of Defense Attaches in eight additional countries. MAAGs have been funded historically from both the military function accounts and the Military Assistance Program and will continue to be so funded until 30 June 1976. Commencing 1 July 1976, the MAAGs will be completely funded from MAP. The effect of this change is reflected in the increases in end strength in FY TQ since the associated manpower has been transferred to this category from Federal Agency Support. The increases in FY 77 are primarily attributable to realignment of full-time foreign military sales resources from other DPPC categories. The remaining manpower spaces in the category are associated with activities such as the John F. Kennedy Military Assistance Center at Fort Bragg, the School of the Americas in the Canal Zone, the Inter-American Defense Board, and the United Nations Truce Observer Teams.

The manpower associated with Support to Other Nations is shown below:

Support to Other Nations Manpower

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.8	2.8	3.3	4.8
Reserve Components	-	-	-	-
<u>Civilian</u>	2.4	3.4	3.4	4.9

E. Geophysical Activities

This category consists of manpower associated with meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities. These activities provide common services involving geophysical phenomena within the DoD, as well as to other departments and agencies.

Meteorological activities include Air Force weather reconnaissance units, Navy weather centers, and Air Force base weather detachments. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Air Weather Service and the Navy Weather Service.

Topographic and oceanographic activities involve the preparation, production, and dissemination of maps and charts, and the investigation and evaluation of topographic and oceanographic phenomena. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Defense Mapping Agency and the Oceanographer of the Navy.

Navigational activities include units which provide Defense-wide navigational support via the operation of navigation satellite control facilities.

Manpower requirements for geophysical activities are predicated upon the services performed at each location and the activity level of all organizations serviced by each location. The manpower needed to provide these services is determined by applying work measurement standards. As in other categories, civilian manpower is used to provide continuity, to obtain skills not readily available from military sources and to fill billets not absolutely requiring military incumbents. Included are professional meteorologists and oceanographers who supplement the small military officer community in manning weather facilities; meteorological technicians who observe, collect, record and analyze

meteorological and oceanographic data in the development of forecasts and related environmental services; technical specialists who perform diverse functions encompassing ADP operations and maintenance, atmospheric and oceanographic modeling, and environmental data product development and dissemination; and a small staff to perform supervisory clerical and logistics functions.

The manpower devoted to the provision of the Defense-wide services associated with geophysical activities for FY 75-77 is:

Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	11.9	11.2	11.2	11.0
Reserve Components	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	10.2	10.4	10.4	10.0

F. FY 1978 Auxiliary Forces Manpower

<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>Active Military</u>		<u>Reserve Components</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Intelligence & Security	39.6	38.3	-	-	9.0	8.9
Centrally Managed						
Communications	36.3	35.8	9.6	9.6	14.0	14.0
Research & Development	30.9	30.8	-	-	78.0	78.0
Support to Other Nations	4.8	4.9	-	-	4.9	4.9
Geophysical Activities	11.0	11.0	1.1	1.1	10.0	10.0
Total DoD	122.7	120.9	10.7	10.7	115.9	115.8

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The reduction in Intelligence and Security manpower is related to a change in the Air Force program. The programmed reduction in Centrally Managed Communications military manpower is the result of Navy base closure/realignment actions.

The following table summarizes Mission Support Forces manpower.

DoD Mission Support Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Reserve Components Support	14.1	14.1	14.2	13.8
Base Operating Support	211.1	194.9	195.2	185.8
Force Support Training	33.7	33.6	33.8	34.9
Command	45.7	44.1	44.1	42.8
Total DoD	<u>304.6</u>	<u>286.8</u>	<u>287.3</u>	<u>277.4</u>
Reserve Components				
Reserve Components Support	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.5
Base Operating Support	31.2	31.5	31.7	19.9
Force Support Training	4.5	2.3	2.2	1.8
Command	13.7	15.8	15.8	10.3
Total DoD	<u>52.1</u>	<u>52.4</u>	<u>52.5</u>	<u>34.5</u>
<u>Civilian</u>				
Reserve Components Support	19.5	19.1	19.2	18.6
Base Operating Support	187.7	189.2	187.7	181.8
Force Support Training	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0
Command	9.9	9.3	9.3	9.1
Total DoD	<u>220.1</u>	<u>220.4</u>	<u>219.0</u>	<u>212.5</u>

A. Reserve Components Support

Reserve Components Support consists of active duty and Selected Reserve military personnel and civilians who are dedicated to the overall administration of reserve components units, facilities, training programs, and personnel. Included are activities with area responsibilities such as Army Reserve Readiness Regions and Groups, Naval Reserve Readiness Commands, Marine Corps Reserve Districts, Air Force Reserve Regions, and National Guard state headquarters. General administrative activities such as the Naval Reserve Manpower Center, and Air Force Reserve Personnel Center are included. Personnel associated with the operations and maintenance of Army inactive installation garrisons, Army Reserve Training Centers, National Guard Armories, Naval Reserve Training Centers, Naval Reserve Air Stations, Marine Corps Reserve Training Centers and Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve air bases are included. Manpower associated with two DoD management headquarters, Chief of Naval Reserve and Air Force Reserve, are included.

The following table summarizes Reserve Components Support manpower:

Reserve Components Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	14.1	14.1	14.2	13.8
Reserve Components	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.5
<u>Civilian</u>	19.5	19.1	19.2	18.6

The decreases in all forms of manpower from FY 76 to FY 77 are due primarily to the reduction of the Naval Selected Reserve and the transfer of the Air National Guard training squadron to the Force Support Training category.

In addition to the civilian manpower shown in this sub-category, there are personnel in other categories who also support reserve component units. Most of the additional civilians involved are "technicians" who double as members of the reserve unit. They are included in the DPPC which corresponds to the mission of their unit.

B. Base Operating Support

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) consists primarily of those organizations which operate installations where Strategic and General Purpose Forces are the principal tenants. Occasionally, Central Support Forces activities are conducted at these same installations. For example, approximately 50% of Navy specialized training is performed at fleet operating installations. The Base Operating Support manpower related to these centrally managed support activities is not separately identifiable from the manpower providing services to Navy mission forces.

Base Operating Support manpower frequently provides services to active duty manpower from more than one Service. For example, approximately eight thousand Marines in Base Operating Support are security guards at Naval stations.

Many active CONUS installations are used by Reserve and National Guard units as well as active forces. For example, Air Force Reserve strategic airlift squadrons operate from Military Airlift Command (MAC) installations. The Base Operating Support manpower that provides services to Reserve units at active installations is, in most cases, not separately identifiable.

Base Operating Support includes a wide range of diverse services similar to those provided by local government, utilities, and the "service industry" segment of the civilian economy. Included are: (a) services which directly support forces, active and reserve (e.g., airfield operations, wharf operation, and base supply and transportation activities); (b) services which maintain the installation facilities (e.g., building and road construction and repair, police and fire protection, trash and sewage disposal, and utilities operation); (c) services which directly support operating personnel, military and civilian (e.g., food services, laundries, clothing issue, payroll and administrative activities, and housing); and (d) services which maintain the "standard of living" of servicemen, dependents, and retirees (e.g., commissaries, exchanges, theaters, libraries, religious activities, and sports and entertainment facilities).

The requirement for manpower to perform all of these Base Operating Support services depends upon workload. The relationship of workload and manpower for each Base Operating Support service is based on engineered standards and staffing guides which are periodically revised by the Services.


The amount of manpower required in Base Operating Support is dependent upon: (a) the number of installations; (b) the size of the population supported; (c) the composition of the population supported; and (d) the range and level of services provided. The decision to open or retain an installation generates a workload that requires a relatively "fixed" number of people. Activities such as road repair or electrical power plants are relatively insensitive to the number of people supported by the installation, but rather, depend on the existence of the installation. The "fixed" requirements can change over time because of policy decisions to change the level of service provided (e.g., shorter commissary hours, off-duty shuttle buses, etc.).

The "variable" portion of Base Operating Support manpower depends upon the size and composition of the population that is being supported. This population consists of active duty personnel and their dependents, and to a lesser extent, retirees and their dependents, Reserve and National Guard personnel, civilian Defense employees, members of other Uniformed Services (e.g., Coast Guard), and Foreign Service personnel, and their dependents. The active duty serviceman assigned to an installation and accompanied by dependents is the largest consumer of Base Operating Support services.


Organizational differences cause the percentage of manpower accounted for as Base Operating Support to vary among the Services. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps include in the Base Operating Support category only that manpower which provides fixed-site services such as housing, real property maintenance, commissaries, etc. Manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services to divisions and ships are integral with those units for mobility purposes and are counted as mission manpower. The Air Force carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and General Purpose categories. All base manpower that supports wing operations and maintenance manpower with either fixed-site or other services is counted as Base Operating Support.

The differences in organizational structure among the Services are illustrated in the following comparison of the treatment of typical aggregation categories.

Army, Navy, Marine Corps



Air Force



The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) for FY 75-77.

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	211.1	194.9	195.2	185.8
Reserve Components	31.2	31.5	31.7	19.9
<u>Civilian</u>	187.7	189.2	187.7	181.8

The decrease in active duty and civilian manpower from FY 1976 to FY 1977 is the result of continuing initiatives to reduce support costs, withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and additional base closures. The sharp reduction in reserve manpower is largely due to the shifting of all Navy reservists in this category from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve.

C. Force Support Training

Force Support Training consists largely of advanced flight training and specialized centers. It provides the necessary link between the specialized, centrally managed training activities that provide individuals the basic skills to do a job, and the operational units themselves. Here individual skills are sharpened and directed toward mission accomplishment in combat. Advanced training is provided by Combat Readiness Air Wings (Navy), Marine Combat Crew Readiness Training Groups, and Combat Crew Training Squadrons (Air Force), in the specific aircraft to be flown into combat, thus making the transition from the undergraduate training aircraft where the basic flying skills are learned to the high performance operational aircraft. When crews leave these units they are ready to join deployed operational units and can fly combat missions.

The Army operates specialized warfare centers (e.g., arctic and jungle warfare), and the Navy operates fleet training centers that perform similar types of functions for teams or entire operational units and ship crews.

In peacetime, all organizations carry out training as part of their normal unit activities. The kind of training discussed above is in addition to this normal training.

The following table summarizes Force Support Training manpower for FY 75-77.

Force Support Training
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	33.7	33.6	33.8	34.9
Reserve Components	4.5	2.3	2.2	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0

The increase in active duty and civilian manpower from FY 76 to FY 77 is due to the activation of an Air Force tactical fighter training squadron and increases in Air Force airlift, air defense and tactical training. The reduction in reserve manpower is due to the transfer of all Navy reservists in this category from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve.

D. Command

The following subsections describe the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Mission Support Forces) category. It should be noted that the terms, "Headquarters" and "Command" are not synonymous, as the following discussion indicates.

1. Non-Service Organizations

These organizations include international, unified, and specified headquarters and associated administrative support and special activities. The Services provide manpower to these organizations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Services, determine the number required. Manpower requirements are based upon annual validations of manpower programs by the JCS and periodic manpower surveys. Included are:

a. International Military Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of allied nations in combined military operations. They are primarily elements of the military component of NATO. NATO headquarters included are: NATO Military Committee, Supreme Allied Commander-Atlantic, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Allied Forces-Northern Europe, Allied Forces-Central Europe, Allied Forces-Southern Europe, and their subsidiary headquarters. Other headquarters included are: Central Treaty Organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, North American Air Defense Command, and United Nations Command (Korea).

b. Unified Command Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of all Services in unified and coordinated activities under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included are the headquarters of: Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Readiness Command.

c. Specified Command Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces assigned, primarily from a single service, in activities under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, these headquarters also serve as Service management headquarters. Included are the headquarters of: Aerospace Defense Command and Strategic Air Command.

d. International and Unified Headquarters Support Activities - These organizations include airborne command posts, communication centers, special intelligence activities, and administrative support activities dedicated to and under the control of commanders of international or unified commands.

2. Service Management Headquarters

These headquarters provide Service command and control of deployed (or deployable) forces and forces tasked with the defense of the United States. The headquarters elements of the following organizations are included: U.S. Army-Europe, U.S. Army Forces Command and CONUS Numbered Armies, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces-Europe, Numbered Fleets, Navy type Commands (i.e., Naval Air Forces, Submarine Forces, Surface Warfare Forces and Fleet Marine Forces), Strategic Air Command*, Alaskan Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command*, Tactical Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Military Airlift Command, and Numbered Air Forces. The support squadrons associated with the above Air Force major air command headquarters are also included.

3. Service Operating Commands

These organizations provide operational and administrative control of operating forces. Organizations included are: Navy task groups, ship squadrons, operating control areas, fleet air commands, fleet air wings, and carrier air wings; and Air Force air divisions.

*SAC and ADC are Specified Commands performing dual roles as a Service Management Headquarters.

4. Service Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform administrative support activities, such as personnel, finance, data processing, judge advocate (legal), inspection, safety, etc. These organizations are differentiated from headquarters and operating commands (which also have people performing some of these functions) in that they have no control over any force units.

5. Special Activities

The Command category also includes the following organizations:

- a. Combat Developments Activities - These activities are engaged in the development, testing, and evaluation of new concepts, tactics, organization structure and equipment requirements, policies, usages of equipment, etc.
- b. Ceremonial Activities - These activities consist of Service bands and are primarily associated with unit morale, recruiting and public relations.
- c. Mission Operations/Control Activities - These organizations operate airborne command posts, tactical warfare centers, special communications activities, specialized security activities, tactical intelligence activities and reconnaissance interpretation activities.
- d. Logistical Support Activities - These organizations operate special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions activities, aircraft delivery groups, and materiel support activities.

Command (Mission Support Forces) (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	45.7	44.1	44.1	42.8
Reserve Components	13.7	15.8	15.8	10.3
<u>Civilian</u>	9.9	9.3	9.3	9.1

The reduction of military manpower from FY 76 to FY 77 is due to reductions in Air Force management headquarters and the transfer of Air Force Mission Evaluation Squadrons and operational control activities to the Strategic Forces category. The reduction in civilian manpower can be attributed to the aforementioned Air Force actions and a reduction in Navy management headquarters. The reduction in reserve manpower is due to the shifting of most Navy reservists in this category from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve.

E. FY 1978 Mission Support Forces Manpower

The following table displays the Mission Support Forces manpower required for FY 78 compared to FY 77.

Mission Support Forces Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Active Military		Reserve Components		Civilian	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Reserve Components Support	13.8	14.1	2.5	2.5	18.6	18.6
Base Operating Support	185.8	184.8	19.9	19.9	181.8	182.0
Force Support Training	34.9	35.6	1.8	2.2	3.0	3.2
Command	42.8	43.1	10.3	11.8	9.1	9.1
Total DoD	<u>277.4</u>	<u>277.7</u>	<u>34.5</u>	<u>36.3</u>	<u>212.5</u>	<u>212.9</u>

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES

Central Support Forces provide those essential services and goods which are necessary to the proper functioning of the DoD and which are most efficiently provided by a centralized organization, either within DoD or within the Services. Since the support is provided in a centralized manner, it is difficult to attribute a specific amount of a good or service to a specific Defense mission. In a sense, the Central Support Forces are the "overhead" of DoD. Central Support Forces are, for the most part, based on specific workload measures, such as personnel to be trained or number of ships to be overhauled. Thus, once the workloads have been determined, computation of the manpower requirements is a fairly straightforward matter.

Central Support Forces includes such activities as depot level supply and maintenance, individual training, "fixed-site" medical facilities, service management headquarters, and support services to all Defense manpower, and to other persons (e.g., retirees) and organizations (e.g., the Coast Guard). By its nature, Central Support Forces manpower is not a direct function of mission force manpower or even total active duty military manpower. For example, depot maintenance manpower repairs equipment for the Reserve Components and allies, and maintains war reserve stocks, in addition to serving active forces requirements.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the sub-categories of Central Support Forces:

1. Base Operating Support.
2. Medical Support.
3. Personnel Support.
4. Individual Training.
5. Command.
6. Logistics.
7. Federal Agency Support.

The following table summarizes Central Support Forces manpower by sub-category.

DoD Central Support Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Base Operating Support	52.6	44.7	44.8	41.1
Medical Support	90.0	86.5	86.5	84.6
Personnel Support	33.2	30.9	30.7	30.9
Individual Training	124.2	115.4	115.4	108.5
Command	35.7	35.3	35.3	33.2
Logistics	20.8	18.9	18.9	18.6
Federal Agency Support	3.0	3.4	2.9	2.9
Total DoD	<u>359.4</u>	<u>335.1</u>	<u>334.6</u>	<u>319.8</u>
Reserve Components				
Base Operating Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	-
Medical Support	12.6	9.6	9.6	8.3
Personnel Support	0.9	0.8	0.8	-
Individual Training	47.8	45.1	45.1	45.7
Command	2.9	2.4	2.4	0.4
Logistics	7.5	6.5	6.5	0.8
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-
Total DoD	<u>71.9</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>55.2</u>
<u>Civilian</u>				
Base Operating Support	105.4	101.9	101.5	94.4
Medical Support	42.9	44.4	44.7	43.9
Personnel Support	11.0	12.1	19.9	19.8
Individual Training	42.7	42.2	42.1	41.0
Command	58.7	59.2	59.0	56.2
Logistics	385.5	370.0	367.9	361.3
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	0.1
Total DoD	<u>646.2</u>	<u>629.7</u>	<u>635.0</u>	<u>616.7</u>

A. Base Operating Support.

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower provides the same wide range of services as the Base Operating Support manpower discussed in Mission Support Forces. The primary distinction between these two manpower categories is in the "who" is supported rather than the services that are being provided. Therefore, the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower in Central Support is a function of the same workload factors as Base Operating Support manpower in Mission Support Forces.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower.

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	52.6	44.7	44.8	41.1
Reserve Components	0.2	0.2	0.2	-
<u>Civilian</u>	105.4	101.9	101.5	94.4

The reduction in civilian and military manpower is primarily a result of proposed installation realignments. The Reserve Components reduction reflects the transfer of Naval Reservists from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve.

B. Medical Support

Medical Support provides the resources for the operation of the DoD military direct-care medical system. The medical manpower component of this system consists of those individuals required to provide a nucleus around which to build our wartime medical force. The medical care demands of the Active Duty force in peacetime are less than the delivery capability of the medical manpower nucleus. Therefore, other DoD beneficiaries are encouraged to use the direct-care system to maximize the peacetime use of this nucleus of medical manpower.

This medical manpower is located routinely in fixed-site medical activities such as hospitals and clinics, and in operational billets, on submarines and shipboard fleet support, and in field medical battalions. Medical support personnel provided in tactical medical activities are utilized in fixed-site facilities when not performing their tactical mission.

Approximately one million beneficiaries receive health care from civilian providers under CHAMPUS rather than in military hospitals, due to distance, preference, or limited capacity within military facilities. The cost of the CHAMPUS program has been increasing significantly in recent years due to inflation, increasing utilization, increased intensity of the health care being provided by the industry, and by increases in the eligible population, and reductions in military facility resources.

The following table summarizes Medical Support manpower:

	<u>Medical Support</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	90.0	86.5	86.5	84.6
Reserve Components	12.6	9.6	9.6	8.3
<u>Civilian</u>	42.9	44.4	44.7	43.9

The active military and civilian decreases in FY 77 are due to realignments and general support savings at medical activities. The reserve decrease is primarily attributable to the transfer of Naval Selected Reserve spaces, other than those in Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units to the Individual Ready Reserve.

C. Personnel Support

Personnel Support includes manpower to provide several varied services to active duty military personnel. The major functions in this category are: Recruiting and Examining; Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities; Overseas Dependents Education Programs; and Other Personnel Support.

1. Recruiting and Examining

Recruiting and Examining manpower operates about 4,800 recruiting offices, manages the recruiting program, and operates 66 Armed Force Entrance and Examination Stations. In FY 77 approximately 22,000 military and civilian personnel are associated with recruiting and examining as compared to 24,700 in FY 76.

2. Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities

Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities manpower performs investigations of applicants for Defense positions requiring security clearance, and operates various programs designed to prevent the compromise of classified information. Included is the manpower for the operation of the Defense Investigative Service.

3. Overseas Dependent Education Program

Overseas Dependent Education Program manpower operates the elementary and secondary school systems for the children of military and Defense civilian personnel stationed outside of the United States.

Beginning in FY 76, Overseas Dependents Education personnel are shown in the Defense Agency strengths rather than the individual Departments. About 2,100 of these civilians work year round and appear in the FY 76 end strength. Another 7,800, who work only during the school year, first appear in end fiscal year strength for FY TQ, when the fiscal year end changes from June to September.

4. Other Personnel Support

Other Personnel Support manpower is involved in the operation of Armed Forces reception centers, disciplinary barracks (including rehabilitation and retraining activities), centrally funded welfare and morale programs, and the Armed Forces Information Program. In FY 77 this category contains approximately 5,000 military personnel and 1,800 civilians.

The following table summarizes Personnel Support manpower.

<u>Personnel Support</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	33.2	30.9	30.7	30.9
Reserve Components	0.9	0.8	0.8	-
<u>Civilian</u>	11.0	12.1	19.9	19.8

The civilian increase in FY 19TQ and FY 77 is caused by the new fiscal year end: teachers are on the rolls on September 30, but were not on June 30. The Reserve Component reduction reflects the transfer of Naval Reservists from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve.

D. Individual Training

Individual Training includes the manpower of the organizations conducting and supporting the formal training and education of officers, enlisted personnel, Service academy cadets and midshipmen, and civilian students in ROTC and similar programs. The purpose of individual training is to impart required skills and knowledge to individuals so that they are prepared to apply these skills in later assignments as qualified members of operational organizations. This focus on the individual distinguishes Individual Training from Force Support Training, a sub-category of Mission Support Forces, and training conducted by operational units in order to achieve and maintain their combat readiness. This section presents only a short overview of Individual Training in

the Department of Defense. A detailed analysis of Individual Training conducted by the active training establishment is to be presented to the Congress as required by 10 U.S.C. 138(d)(2) in the Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1977.

A smoothly functioning, efficient, and ready military establishment must be manned with the right number of properly trained personnel. Producing these trained personnel is the task of the training establishment. The number of personnel which must be trained in a given skill is a function of projected skill requirements versus projected skill inventories. If the inventory of qualified personnel in a skill is forecast to be less than the need, replacements must be trained in advance to fill the vacancies.

Reserve Component manpower devoted to Individual Training provides for mobilization augmentation of the active training establishment. Included are both units and individuals. An Army National Guard Infantry brigade would activate a training center and mobilization designees from other Reserve Components would provide augmentation staffing for existing centers.

In the active training establishment, Individual Training is subdivided into five categories, each of which is briefly described in the following paragraphs. In addition, manpower which is related to more than one type of training is considered to be overall training support.

1. Recruit Training

Recruit training includes all basic introductory and indoctrination training given to all nonprior service enlisted personnel immediately after entrance into a Service. Reserve enlisted personnel coming on active duty for initial training also undergo recruit training and form a considerable proportion of the training workload. The length of recruit training varies from six weeks in the Air Force to eleven weeks in the Marine Corps. Most graduates of recruit training advance to initial specialized skill training, where they learn the basic skills associated with a particular military specialty and become qualified to be productive members of operational units at the apprentice level.

2. Officer Acquisition Training

This category includes all types of education and training leading to a commission in one of the Services. The associated manpower includes the faculties and staffs of the Service academies, ROTC instructors, and instructors and staffs in officer candidate schools.

3. Specialized Skill Training

Specialized skill training provides individuals with initial, or when appropriate, higher degrees of skill in military specialties to match specific job requirements. Participants include graduates from recruit or officer acquisition training learning skills at the basic level and, at the more advanced level, officers and enlisted personnel with some operational experience who are being prepared for jobs of greater responsibility or technical complexity.

4. Flight Training

Flight training includes all training of pilots and navigators, exclusive of force support training and that training carried out in the units themselves. Course lengths vary considerably according to the needs of each Service and, in the case of pilot training, the type of aircraft -- jet, propeller-driven, or helicopter -- the student is being trained to fly.

5. Professional Development Education

This category includes educational courses conducted at the higher-level Service schools or civilian institutions to broaden the outlook and knowledge of senior military personnel or to impart knowledge in advanced academic disciplines to meet Service and joint requirements. Almost all of the associated manpower is involved in operating the intermediate and senior Service and Joint schools (i.e., command and staff colleges and war colleges and the National Defense University) and Service graduate schools (i.e., Air Force Institute of Technology, Navy Postgraduate School).

Individual Training manpower includes only manpower of organizations involved in the conduct or support of training. Active manpower undergoing training -- trainees, students, and cadets -- is carried under Individuals. Requirements for those personnel are discussed in Chapter IX. Personnel undergoing training on a part-time or additional duty basis are carried in the category of their permanent assignment.

The requirement for Individual Training manpower is based on the total number of personnel to be trained full-time, part-time, and on an additional duty basis. The number of personnel required to instruct and support a given student/trainee load is based on work measurement studies and historical experience, codified into staffing guides and other manning documents. The overall size of the active training establishment which is required is sensitive to the number of new active and Reserve accessions and the rate of retention of experienced personnel.

The following table summarizes Individual Training Manpower.

<u>Individual Training Manpower 1/</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	124.2	115.4	115.4	108.5
Reserve Components	47.8	45.1	45.1	45.7
<u>Civilian</u>	42.7	42.2	42.1	41.0

1/ Excludes active military and reserve component trainees and students, and Service Academy and ROTC Cadets (see Chapter IX).

The reductions shown in the table reflect the continuing management emphasis within the Department of Defense upon economizing valuable training manpower resources. The year to year fluctuations also are affected by the changes in training workloads to be accomplished, primarily because of shifts in non-prior service enlistments.

If comparisons are to be made between Individual Training manpower and Service training workloads in terms of student loads, certain accounting differences should be considered in the calculation.

- The 4,000 military personnel and 1,000 civilians in ROTC programs support training not included in requested student loads, and should be excluded.

- The Individual Training category currently includes some manpower which performs missions other than the training of individual students, trainees, and cadets. This situation is particularly evident in the Army because of the multiple missions of its Training and Doctrine Command. In addition to conducting the bulk of the Army's training of individuals, this command also develops operational and organizational doctrine for the Army as a whole and provides training assistance to Army units in the field. Over 20 percent of Army Individual Training manpower (active military and civilian) is utilized in missions which do not contribute to the training of individuals in the Army's centralized training system.

- In contrast to the practice of the other Services, the Navy manpower accounting system places the majority of base operating support of training installations in Individual Training rather than in Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces). Navy Individual Training manpower (active military and civilian) would be about 20 percent lower if its accounting conventions were the same as those of the other Services.

Like other military activities, the training establishment receives a share of support provided by other Central Support Forces, such as Command and Operating Support. An analysis of the total manpower associated with the training mission and the functions the manpower performs will be included in the Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1977.

E. Command

Command (Central Support Forces) differs from Command (Mission Support Forces) only in the type of forces managed. Manpower in this category is provided for: (1) Non-Service management headquarters; (2) Service management headquarters; (3) Service Administrative activities; and (4) Special activities.

The following subsections describe in greater detail the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Central Support Forces) category. As previously noted, the term headquarters and command are not synonymous.

1. Non-Service Management Headquarters

The category contains manpower assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). These headquarters are engaged in the overall policy formulation; planning, programming, and budgeting; and administration and operational control of the Department of Defense. The Services provide military personnel to the organizations, but the requirement is established by OSD/OJCS.

2. Service Management Headquarters

These headquarters provide overall policy formulation; planning, programming, and budgeting; and administration of the entire Service. Also included are headquarters which are responsible for the administration of individual training and depot-level logistics activities.

3. Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform centralized administrative support activities, such as: personnel; finance; data processing; judge advocate (legal); inspection; safety; etc.

4. Special Activities in Command

The Command category contains miscellaneous organizations which, because of the nature of the mission of the organization or the overall organizational structure of the Services, do not fit into any other category. Included are:

a. Ceremonial Activities - The requirements for this manpower are primarily related to public interest in specific activities.

b. Civil Air Patrol - The Department of the Air Force has the mission of providing support to the Civil Air Patrol. The requirements for manpower in this activity are related to the organization of the Civil Air Patrol, currently one wing for each state.

c. Criminal Investigation Activities - These organizations investigate crimes committed on DoD property (including leased space) and assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in investigations of alleged crimes involving defense personnel. The manpower requirements are a function of workload and the geographic dispersion of defense installations.

d. Postal/Courier Activities - These organizations transport classified and official correspondence among military installations world-wide.

e. Intelligence Support Activities - Included is the Air Force Intelligence Service which provides specialized intelligence services to Headquarters USAF and USAF commanders world-wide.

f. Logistic Support Activities - Included for the Air Force are special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions maintenance activities, explosive ordnance disposal activities, and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center. Included for the Navy are organizations which support the Naval District of Washington. The Army activities include general support, munitions maintenance, and explosive ordnance disposal.

g. Operational Evaluation Activities - Included is the administration and operational evaluation of new Navy weapon systems. These services are performed by the Operational Test and Evaluation Force.

The following table summarizes Command (Central Support Forces).

<u>Command (Central Support Forces)</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	35.7	35.3	35.3	33.2
Reserve Components	2.9	2.4	2.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	58.7	59.2	59.0	56.2

Both military and civilian manpower continue to decline as further headquarters reductions are accomplished. The Command category is reduced by 2,600 military and 1,700 civilian personnel from end FY 75 actual strength to end FY 77 planned strength. This is in addition to headquarters reductions made during FY 1975 as a result of the October 1973 DoD Headquarters Review. All reserve manpower in this category is in Naval Reserve. The 2,000 reduction in FY 77 is due to the transfer of spaces, other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units, to the Individual Ready Reserve.

F. Logistics

Logistics includes those centrally managed supply, maintenance, and support activities needed to: (1) procure equipment and supplies; (2) store supplies used by the combat forces and keep centralized inventory control of major equipment and spare parts; (3) maintain the approved equipment inventory by repairing, modernizing and overhauling military end items and components; (4) provide support services such as traffic management and transportation services, technical documentation, printing, and industrial preparedness planning.

The cost and manpower needs of DoD central supply and maintenance programs depend on the size and activity of our combat forces, the quantity and quality of supply and maintenance support provided to the operational forces and the technical complexity and reliability of equipment and components. An adequate logistics capability is essential to maintaining the combat capability of the operational forces.

Central Support Forces Logistics manpower accomplishes logistics operations for the DoD. This function involves managing the 3.8 million items in the supply system, processing approximately 28 million demands on the supply system annually and controlling a supply inventory with a value of about \$57 billion. This system is maintained through an investment of \$19 billion in spares, repair parts, and supplies, and \$6 billion in depot maintenance costs annually. About \$4 billion are expended each year to move 34 million short tons of materiel. These functions are managed at 20 National Inventory Control Points, 159 storage activities, and 50 maintenance activities.

1. Supply Operations

a. The personnel employed in supply operations are required to buy, store, distribute, manage, and control the supplies and spare parts used by the Services. In FY 1977 approximately 118,000 men and women will perform these operations (7,000 military and 111,000 civilian). The size of the in-use equipment inventory, the amount of maintenance being performed on these inventories, operating programs, facilities support and personnel strengths determine the amount of supply and maintenance activity at the depot and field levels. Using standard work measures the Services translate this supply and maintenance activity into manpower needs to manage and control the DoD supply system.

b. Since FY 1969 (peak-Vietnam), the number of civilian employees needed for supply operations has been reduced. The FY 77 supply operations civilian manpower level of 111,200 is 37% below the FY 1969 level.

2. Maintenance Operations

a. The personnel employed in maintenance operations are required to repair, overhaul, and modify the Services' end items of equipment and components. In FY 77, approximately 223,000 men and women will perform these operations (8,500 military, 214,400 civilians, and 400 reservists). Maintenance operations manpower requirements are based both on the size and activity of the in-use equipment inventories and the maintenance repair/overhaul criteria established for each type of equipment. Each of the Services has criteria which state the frequency of overhaul/repair for each piece of equipment based on engineering standards and past experience. The total demand for maintenance manpower is determined by summing the individual maintenance demands for all equipment to be repaired or overhauled by the Services during the year.

b. Since the peak-Vietnam year (FY 69), maintenance operations manpower requirements have been reduced. The FY 77 maintenance operations civilian manpower level of 214,400 is 25% below the FY 69 level.

3. Logistics Support Operations

These support personnel perform a wide variety of tasks throughout the logistics establishment. Major tasks include traffic management and transportation services, development and publication of technical documentation operation of printing facilities, operation of various engineering and testing facilities in support of logistics functions and industrial preparedness activities. Civilian employees perform the basic work; military personnel manage and supervise the various service organizations. In FY 77, approximately 39,000 men and women will perform these operations (3,000 military, 36,000 civilians, and 400 reservists).

The following table summarizes FY 75-77 logistics manpower by type of logistics operations:

Logistic Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Supply</u>				
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.1	7.5	7.5	7.4
Reserve Components	-	0.8	0.8	-
<u>Civilian</u>	127.6	116.6	115.8	111.2
<u>Maintenance</u>				
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.5
Reserve Components	4.0	3.8	3.8	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	221.7	217.0	215.9	214.4
<u>Logistics Support</u>				
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.7
Reserve Components	3.5	1.9	1.9	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	36.3	36.3	36.1	35.6
<u>Total Logistics</u>				
<u>Military</u>				
Active	20.8	18.9	18.9	18.6
Reserve Components	7.5	6.5	6.5	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	385.5	370.0	367.9	361.3
(To be added)		(0.3) 1/	(0.3) 1/	

1/ Additional Army civilian spaces needed to slow phase-down of in-house R&D effort as directed by the House Armed Services Committee (see Chapter VI, paragraph C).

Logistics manpower is being reduced during this period as a result of vigorous management actions to achieve economies in the operation of the supply and maintenance complex.

G. Federal Agency Support

The Department of Defense assigns military personnel to DoD and non-DoD agencies or activities in support of various non-DoD functions. Military personnel are so assigned when it furthers the interests of DoD or when authorized by law and consistent with the provisions of 31 USC, 686, which provides for the use of an existing capability of a Federal agency to support another agency not possessing that capability. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis. However, there are some assignments which, while in support of other agencies, constitute a part of the mission given to DoD and are nonreimbursable.

The following table summarizes the numbers of DoD personnel assigned to support other Federal agencies:

Federal Agency Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.0	3.4	2.9	2.9
<u>Civilian</u>	-	-	-	0.1

The number of personnel reported in this category decreases substantially because Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Military Missions, and other similar activities are transferred to the Support to Other Nations subcategory of Auxiliary Forces effective 1 July 1976. The civilians beginning in FY 77 represent Air Force support to NASA transferred from other categories.

H. FY 1978 Manpower Requirements

The following table shows Central Support Forces military and civilian manpower requirements for FY 78 compared with FY 77.

Central Support Forces Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Active Military</u>		<u>Reserve Components</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Base Operating Support	41.1	40.6	-	-	94.4	94.1
Medical Support	84.6	84.8	8.3	8.3	43.9	43.9
Personnel Support	30.9	30.9	-	-	19.8	19.8
Individual Training	108.5	106.6	45.7	45.5	41.0	41.2
Command	33.2	33.2	0.4	0.4	56.2	56.2
Logistics	18.6	18.7	0.8	0.8	361.3	361.4
Federal Agency Support	2.9	2.9	-	-	0.1	0.1
Total	<u>319.8</u>	<u>317.6</u>	<u>55.2</u>	<u>55.0</u>	<u>616.7</u>	<u>616.7</u>

CHAPTER IX

INDIVIDUALS

A. Discussion

Military manpower can be separated into two broad categories: force structure manpower and individuals. This chapter discusses the differences between these two types and describes the Individuals category. There is no Individuals account for civilian manpower.

Force structure manpower is that authorized to the units of a Service. Whereas a force is an aggregation of units to accomplish a common mission, a unit is a combination of resources organized to accomplish work. From the manpower requirements viewpoint, a unit may be viewed as a discrete set of jobs to be done. The number of jobs, or manpower spaces, in each unit depends on the unit role and mission, actual or potential workload, and resource constraints. These factors determine the authorized, or peacetime, strength of each unit. The sum of the authorized strengths of each unit in a force is the force structure manpower for that force. All of the previous discussion in this report has dealt with force structure manpower. Individuals are necessary over and above the force structure manpower to assure that the units of the force actually have the personnel they are authorized.

The following hypothetical case illustrates the requirement for Individuals. Suppose that the Services were authorized only enough manpower to fill their structure or force requirements, and that all of these people were fully trained and present in units. Under these assumptions, the Services would have enough people to perform their assigned missions. But this would be a snapshot, a moment in time, and military forces are dynamic organizations. A man completes his overseas tour and returns home; both he and his replacement are unavailable to perform unit missions while they are traveling. Another man is injured and admitted to a hospital; still another is sentenced to confinement; another is recruited to replace a man leaving service and assigned full-time to a Service school to be trained. To not recognize these personnel requirements would result in shortages within force structure units and adversely affect readiness. Each Service has Individuals accounts comprising Transients, Patients and Prisoners, Trainees/Students, and Service Academy Cadets.

An important difference between force structure manpower and individuals is that while the structure may be planned in advance, Individuals accounts can only be estimated. Those estimates are based partly on historical data (e.g., average days per move, or casualty rates) and partly on current manpower plans (e.g., number of enlistments by month). Therefore, while structure can be planned with precision, Individuals must be estimated using factors.

Individuals are not a subset of support. In fact, since the Services draw on their Individuals accounts to replace people in each of the types of forces, shortages in the Individuals accounts will result in manpower shortages in both mission and support force units.

The following table summarizes Individuals military manpower.

<u>Individuals</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active</u>				
Transients	94.6	92.6	89.7	88.0
Patients/Prisoners	9.7	9.8	10.0	9.3
Trainees/Students	200.8	196.4	225.6	211.4
Cadets	10.7	11.6	12.9	12.9
Total DoD	315.9	310.5	338.1	321.5
<u>Reserve Components</u>				
Trainees/Students	25.8	24.4	23.5	24.3

B. Transients

Transient requirements are largely a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Leave taken enroute accounts for approximately 50% of Army, and 70% of Navy and Air Force Transient manpower requirements. PCS move requirements are driven primarily by annual losses, imbalances between the supply and demand of specific skills, and manpower levels. Secondary PCS move determinants are tour length policies (particularly for unaccompanied tour zones), career development objectives, and equity considerations.

The following table summarizes Transients military manpower.

<u>Transients</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	94.6	92.6	89.7	88.0

Projected Transient strength for FY 76, 77, and beyond are based upon historical experience for the average enroute time per PCS move and the projected PCS move program for the fiscal year. The FY 75 Transient strengths reflect those persons reported as Transients by the Services' personnel systems on the last day of the fiscal year. The general downward trend is due to continuing DoD actions to reduce unnecessary personnel turbulence and stabilize length of tours. These actions include reducing the number of PCS moves through improved planning and programming in personnel reassignments.

C. Patients and Prisoners

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset time lost to units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods. Patient requirements are based upon historical incidence of non-combat casualties and illness relative to the total active duty manpower.

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset time lost to units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days. Prisoner requirements are based upon historical incidence of confinement resulting from a conviction and sentencing by a court martial relative to the total active duty strength.

The following table summarizes Patients and Prisoners military manpower.

<u>Patients and Prisoners</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.7	9.8	10.0	9.3

The drop in FY 77 largely reflects a reduced Navy prisoner requirement based on an anticipated improvement in the quality of recruit accessions.

D. Trainees, Students and Cadets

The number of Trainee and Student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. There is no structure authorization in the Reserve Components for individuals; however, there is a requirement to account for personnel on initial active duty for training. These individuals are undergoing the same training as active duty personnel and are thus classified as Trainees. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of Trainee and Student loads is included in the FY 77 Military Manpower Training Report.

The following table shows active and reserve Trainee and Student strengths.

Trainees & Students (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	200.8	196.4	225.6	211.4
Reserve Components	25.8	24.4	23.5	24.3

The dip in the active strength for FY 76 is due to a drop of 10,000 in Navy trainees. This is due primarily to underprogramming as explained in the Navy manpower requirements chapter.

The active military increase at the end of FY TQ reflects the pattern of accessions immediately preceding that time. The increase results in part from the change in the end date of the fiscal year from June to September, following the most active recruiting months.

The Active decrease in FY 77 is due primarily to a decrease in Army trainees of 10,600. This is the result of the Army's improved ability to project the trainee account, and of such initiatives as one-station training.

The following table displays Cadet/Midshipman strengths.

Cadets/Midshipmen (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	3.0	3.0	4.3	4.3
Navy	3.3	4.2	4.4	4.4
Air Force	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2
Total	<u>10.7</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>12.9</u>

Each of the academies is authorized an enrollment of 4,417. The apparent enrollment differences between services, and between years for the individual services, are caused by differences in enrollment dates and reporting procedures.

E. Force Structure Manpower Deviation

The Army and Navy have begun using a new accounting entry, the force structure manpower deviation. This is an estimate of temporary overstrength or understrength in units. This adjustment is necessary because force structure manpower may be programmed precisely, while Individuals must be estimated using averages or ranges. The Individuals accounts fluctuate during the year due to accession and loss patterns. The number reported for the last day of the fiscal year may be different from the average number required to support a given force structure. If the Individuals reported are higher than necessary to support the force structure, the real effect is a temporary understrength in units. If Individuals are lower than average (new soldiers arrive in units before those they are replacing separate from the service) the real effect is a temporary overstrength in units.

F. FY 1978 Manpower Requirements

The following table compares FY 78 Individuals accounts with those of FY 77:

	<u>Individuals</u>			
	(End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>Active Military</u>		<u>Reserve Components</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Transients	88.0	83.1	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	9.3	9.4	-	-
Trainees/Students	211.4	201.6	24.3	27.7
Cadets	<u>12.9</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total DoD	321.5	307.0	24.3	27.7

The drop in Transient strength from FY 77 to FY 78 is the result of recent DoD budget decisions aimed at continuing reductions in personnel turbulence. An example is the direction to all Services to assure that first term personnel serving for three or four years will be given no more than one assignment following initial training unless required to serve a short overseas tour (e.g., Korea) in which case they will be given no more than two assignments in different locations.

The significant drop in the Active Trainee/Student account from FY 77 to FY 78 is largely due to reductions in the Army. This reflects the final effect of the elimination of the two-year enlistment.

The increase in the Reserve Trainee/Student account from FY 77 to FY 78 is due to a programmed increase in Army National Guard recruitment in FY 77. This is part of an effort to achieve a more equal balance in the Guard between Prior Service and Non-Prior Service enlistees by FY 80.

PART B - Manpower By Component

Part B describes the manpower requirements and achievements of each of the individual services and the defense agencies.

- Chapter X - Army Manpower Requirements
- Chapter XI - Navy Manpower Requirements
- Chapter XII - Marine Corps Manpower Requirements
- Chapter XIII - Air Force Manpower Requirements
- Chapter XIV - Defense Agency Manpower Requirements

CHAPTER X

ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

To support National objectives, the Army must have sufficient combat power to provide an effective deterrent to war, or, should deterrence fail, to achieve conflict termination on terms acceptable to the United States. The Army must be able to field a modern, well-trained, and well-equipped force wherever and whenever the President and the Congress deem necessary. The Army must have a highly-ready active component capable of dealing effectively with situations not involving mobilization and capable of providing a sound basis for rapid expansion in a mobilization. The Army must have trained and equipped reserve units, with highly motivated personnel, to augment the active forces rapidly for major situations necessitating partial or full mobilization. The Army must have a support base sufficient in peacetime to recruit, train, and maintain the Total Force and sufficient in wartime to sustain the combat operations of that force.

The Army's manpower program for FY 1977 is designed to:

-- Complete the buildup to 24 division forces. Two active brigades will be added in FY 1977 to provide the full 16 active divisions. Four of the 16 active divisions will each have two active brigades and one from the Selected Reserve.

-- Support an additional deployed brigade. A brigade of the 4th Mechanized Division will be deployed to Germany starting in March 1976 just as a brigade of the 2d Armored Division deployed in 1975.

-- Continue the success of the Peacetime Volunteer Army. Recruiting goals have been achieved in quantity. Quality poses some concern as more and more constraints are placed on recruiting resources.

-- Provide stability to manpower strengths to reduce turnover and turbulence, improve morale and quality of life, and increase combat capability and readiness.

-- Emphasize the inclusion of civilian manpower in the Total Force for both wartime and peacetime needs. Army civilians are an indispensable part of total manpower resources and cannot be viewed apart from the military programs in which they are thoroughly integrated.

The Army request for military and civilian personnel end strengths for Fiscal Years 1977 and 1978 is as follows:

Army Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Active Military	790.0	790.0
Army National Guard	400.0	400.0
Army Reserve	219.0	219.0
Civilian	378.4	378.4

2. Major Force Structure Changes

Compared with FY 75 and FY 76, FY 77 will be a year of relative force structure stability in the Active Army. The addition of the second active Army brigade to the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 24th Infantry Division is programmed for FY 77. The activation of these two brigades will complete the major organizations for the 24 division program.

During the three year period FY 76 - FY 78, the Army has programmed numerous changes in the Reserve Components force structure. Over 300 units, determined not to be required in the manned component, will be replaced by about 500 required units.

Three of the ARNG divisions have been realigned. The 28th Infantry Division, previously split between Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, was realigned entirely within Pennsylvania. The realignment of the 42d Infantry Division consolidated elements in New York that were previously split between New York and Pennsylvania. The 50th Armored Division was realigned into a two-state configuration between New Jersey and Vermont by inactivating units in New York and activating them in New Jersey. One armored cavalry regiment was inactivated.

3. Manpower Determination

a. General. Army manpower requirements are derived from three basic factors: the force level; Army organization and doctrine; and resource constraints. These factors interact in an iterative process to establish the total size of the Army and the mix of Army manpower among active military, reserve military, and civilian personnel.

b. Force Levels. The President, on the advice of the Secretary of Defense, establishes the force level of the Army, which is the number of division force equivalents (DFE) the Army is to have. This force level determination establishes the basic combat power of the Army. The force level is determined with due consideration of national objectives, the threat, and the national military strategy. The number of DFE the Army is to have sets the overall size and shape of the total force manpower program.

c. Combined Arms Organizations. The Department of Defense establishes, within the approved force level, the numbers and kinds of combined arms organizations to be in the Army. Combined arms organizations are major groupings of units of the several combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery, and engineer) together with organic command and control and support capability. Combined arms organizations are divisions, separate combat brigades, and armored cavalry regiments. The Department determines the mix of these combined arms organizations among the active and reserve components and establishes the number of each type.

d. Nondivisional Combat and Tactical Support Units. Once the combined arms organizations have been established, the Army determines the other combat units and the tactical support units required within the division forces. Significant additional combat units are necessary outside the combined arms organizations to achieve maximum land combat power. About half of the field artillery support is grouped at corps level for maximum flexibility in the application of supporting fires. Air defense and surface-to-surface missile capability is also placed for the most part at Corps level as is about two-thirds of the combat engineer support.

The number and mix of additional combat units and tactical support units is determined by the Army's Total Force Analysis process. This analysis simulates the deployment of a force, war games the force using a European scenario, and develops the nondivisional combat and tactical support structure (by types and numbers of units) needed to develop fully the forces' combat power. Requirements for tactical support units are dependent on the intensity and duration of the conflict which, in turn, determine the consumption rate of resources. Replacement of consumed resources and provision of essential services determine the numbers, types and deployment dates for tactical support units.

Staff estimates are made to project modernization of the forces (US, Allied, and enemy) to include programmed levels of weapon inventories, war reserves, resupply rates, mobilization factors, and personnel replacements. Host nation support agreements, which influence the number of support units required, are considered. Lift assets

available for Army forces deployment are determined and used. Support forces not needed early in the deployment sequence are delayed so that additional combat power can be deployed earlier. The product is a time-phased blend of combined arms organizations, non-divisional combat, units, and tactical support units arranged in order of required arrival time in theater. This prioritized listing is used as a basis for determining the component (Active, Reserve, Unmanned) to which units will be assigned.

Total Force Analysis allows the Army to allocate its constrained resources better and to phase units properly into and out of the force structure. Early deploying tactical support units are in both the active and the reserve components. Efforts are underway to integrate early deploying units of the Reserve Components into deployment plans and to improve their readiness posture. However, certain types of units (e.g. nuclear missile units) require such specialized training and equipment that they must be in the active force.

Tactical support units such as certain engineer, smoke generator and headquarters units which cannot be accommodated in the Active or Reserve Component force structure are placed in an unmanned category. This category consists of units which can be activated after mobilization and subsequently deployed. Placing more of our required tactical support forces in the unmanned structure is recognition of the emphasis on creating combat units at the expense of tactical support. However, there is risk associated with unbalancing combat and support forces. The point where the risk becomes unacceptable is of continuing concern.

e. Sustaining Base. The sustaining base is composed of units and manpower tailored to perform specific missions. The manpower for these specially tailored units is determined using staffing standards, staffing guides, work analyses, and manpower surveys based on workload and tasks necessary to accomplish the unit's mission. Typical workload of a sustaining base unit might be reflected by the number of trainees to be trained, tons of supplies to be moved, number of vehicles to be overhauled, or the number of patients to be cared for in CONUS. The sustaining base is located primarily in the United States. Its wartime missions differ from those in peacetime only in volume of workload and scope of management. Upon mobilization, the training base must be able to handle more trainees; the depots, more supplies; and hospitals, more patients.

As the Army continues to reorganize and reduce headquarters and support forces, refinements in sustaining base operations are being made. The dichotomy between peacetime needs and a wartime sustaining base, which is expandable to accommodate mobilization workload, is a prime consideration as attempts are made to determine proper sustaining base manpower requirements.

f. Manpower Requirements Within Units. The development of manpower requirements for each individual Army unit is accomplished and documented through one of two separate but related management systems - the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) system and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). Both the TOE and TDA system are governed by definitive analytical techniques for the development of manpower and equipment requirements.

The TOE system governs the development and processing of the complete organizational manual for a standard type unit for the Army. The TOE provides specific organizational data required for organizing, equipping and training a type TOE unit for accomplishing its specified mission. The manpower requirements for a TOE type unit are determined essentially as follows:

(1) The mission and desired capabilities of the type TOE unit are determined and the functional entities required to assure mission accomplishment (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams) are identified.

(2) The number of combat type positions required in a TOE are dictated by the firepower desired or number of weapons included. Each weapon has a set number of operators, i.e., one man per rifle in rifle squad, and nine men per field artillery firing section (105mm). Rifle teams or firing sections are aggregated to produce the desired combat capability.

(3) The number of personnel required for service and support activities (mess, maintenance, supply) are determined by application of standard staffing criteria. These criteria are based on engineering data, tests, and experience. For instance, the criteria for mechanical equipment maintenance is expressed in terms of annual maintenance manhours (AMMH) required per item of equipment. The number of such equipment is multiplied by the appropriate AMMH factors, and the results are totaled and divided by a standard manhour availability factor to determine the number of maintenance personnel required.

(4) Leadership and supervisory positions are added based on span of control considerations and other experience data.

For example, a table of organization for a Field Artillery 155mm firing battery with six howitzers consists of the following:

Field Artillery 155mm Towed Howitzer
Firing Battery

<u>Functional Area</u>	<u>Spaces</u>
Battery Hqs (Admin, Mess, Maint, etc.)	16
Firing Battery Hqs (Opns, Fire Control)	14
Six Howitzer Sections	66
Ammunition Section	9
Communications Section	<u>6</u>
Battery Total	111

Aggregate tactical support requirements (i.e., maintenance and supply) are determined for units within the force (both within the divisions and support increments) and additional units assigned to the force based on these requirements. For example, 155mm ammunition for the cited Field Artillery battery must be shipped, handled, and transported to forward depots so as to be available for firing by this and all similar 155mm batteries in the force. Transportation terminal service and truck companies are included in the force to provide this ammunition handling and moving capability. Requirements for other support units are similarly determined.

TDA requirements are developed using similar analytical techniques, but each TDA is unique to the specific requirement for which it is developed. For example, the TDA for Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, will be different than the TDA for Headquarters, Army Communications Command. The manpower requirements, however, are determined in the same manner. Work analyses and manpower surveys, based upon the missions and tasks to be performed, are used to develop a specific TDA. Once these documents are developed, they become the basis upon which the responsible commander rests his demand for Army personnel, both military and civilian. Each such commander submits his demand for personnel to Headquarters, Department of the Army under the rules of the Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS) in order to establish his organizational structure and his requirement for personnel, equipment, and operating funds.

B. Significant Trends

1. 24 Division Program. The 24 Division Program was undertaken in response to an assessment of the world environment and the capabilities of our forces and those of our potential adversaries. During the past few years, the size of the Army has decreased, while the land forces of the Warsaw Pact have increased. Nuclear parity with the Soviet Union means that an increase in the Army's conventional capability is required if the nation is to have a ground force able to meet the challenges of the 1970s. A force consisting of 16 Active and 8 Reserve Component divisions is a prudent risk force.

The Army's program is achieving the needed increase of three active divisions and selected non-divisional combat units, without further increase in the authorized active strength of the Army. Through the elimination or reduction of headquarters and selected support units, made possible through reorganization actions designed to create a lean and flexible force, approximately 50,000 internal manpower spaces have been reprogrammed to increase combat capability.

Using the three brigades that were activated during FY 75 as building blocks, the program to create the new divisions continued in FY 76. The 7th Infantry Division is stationed at Fort Ord, California, and will consist of two active Army brigades and a Reserve Component brigade. This division will be fully structured by end FY 76. The 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and will consist of two active Army brigades and a Reserve Component brigade. During FY 76, the division headquarters and division base were activated; the second Active Army brigade is to be added during FY 77. The 24th Infantry Division is stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. It also will consist of two Active Army brigades and a Reserve Component brigade. During FY 76, the division headquarters and division base were activated. A second Active Army brigade will be added during FY 77. The 194th Armored Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia, originally programmed to be part of the 5th and 24th Infantry Divisions, will remain as separate brigades. These units will be capable of independent operations or employment as part of a larger force.

The Army has placed an increased reliance on the Reserve Components by making them an integral part of the new divisions. Meeting the concomitant requirement to increase the readiness of the Reserve Components will improve the overall combat capability of the Army.

2. Increased Reliance on Reserve Components. The Reserve Components contain combat divisions, separate brigades and regiments, non-divisional combat units, and tactical support units needed at mobilization to insure that the Army can accomplish its mission. It was only through reliance on the Reserve Components that the Army could achieve 16 active divisions. A major factor allowing this reliance is improvement in the deployment capability of Reserve Components through the affiliation program.

The affiliation concept is sound and will be applied wherever possible in the future. There currently are 92 Reserve Component battalions in the Army affiliation program. These battalions are in addition to the Reserve Component brigades which roundout active Divisions. Five other active divisions are rounded out with additional Reserve Component combat battalions to achieve standard configuration. The Army has demonstrated the importance it attaches to the readiness of these roundout units by assigning them priority for the issuance of equipment which is equal to that of the Active Army unit which they complement.

The Army is aligning unit structure with mobilization and deployment requirements and developing a manning methodology which mans units selectively based upon the time-phased required availability and postmobilization training time considerations. Authorized paid drill strength may be adjusted to be consistent with the readiness levels required for the validated ARNG and USAR unit structure.

3. Initiatives.

a. Management.

(1) Reduction in Support Activities. The Army is committed to eliminating support activities that do not pass the test of military necessity, and to reducing the size and grade structure of the remainder. Significant reductions in support manpower have already been achieved through the elimination of five Army commands and seven Army management headquarters. The drive for improved operating efficiency and a properly balanced force continues. Army support activities are undergoing an examination to identify further opportunities to contract in-house functions where such action is found to be cost effective and advantageous to the government. Resources recovered through these initiatives will be reprogrammed to further improve the combat readiness of the Army.

(2) Central Management of Army Commissaries. Army has initiated a realignment of commissary resale functions that will centralize the management and operation of resale stores under the Troop Support Agency (TSA), Fort Lee, Virginia. This realignment will be accomplished on a phased basis. Under Phase I, TSA assumes responsibility for the commissary resale function within CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, Japan, and Korea. Phase I will be completed by 30 June 1976. Phase II, involves the transfer to TSA of commissaries currently controlled/supported by USAREUR and will be completed by 30 September 1976. This realigned commissary resale function will be managed through five regional field offices, four in CONUS and one in Europe. When the reorganization is completed, approximately 800 manpower spaces will be eliminated and annual savings of \$6.5M (FY 76 dollars) realized.

b. Training.

Effective training of soldiers is directly linked to readiness. The Army is taking several actions to improve training. One such action is the establishment of training extension courses. The Army plans to capitalize on the expertise that exists in the formal training establishment and provide training materials to Active and Reserve Component units. A survey of 1,800 soldiers who completed the courses indicated that their performance in the use of weapons improved by 44 percent.

Another new concept in training, that is not only a significant shift from the past but seems likely to yield major dividends in readiness, is the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The priority for training readiness can vary depending on the location and mission of each unit. Under this program each unit is evaluated according to the degree of proficiency required.

Another effort is the implementation of the One Station Training/One Station Unit Training concept (OST/OSUT). These training initiatives are designed to minimize turbulence for the trainee, capitalize on the doctrinal expertise of the various branch schools, improve the training product, and streamline the training establishment. The Army is currently undergoing additional testing of the OSUT concept at the request of Congress and will report results by 30 November 1976. Extensive analysis of a complete cycle of Infantry One Station Unit Training was completed in December 1975, and feedback from field commanders on the performance of recent graduates is being studied. Similar tests will be conducted for Artillery, Armor, Air Defense, Signal, and Engineer skills.

All these measures tend to improve readiness, which ultimately will yield better battlefield effectiveness. The Army views battlefield effectiveness as a function of weapons, crew proficiency, and tactics. In a major future war, weapons between the two sides will probably be comparable, as was the case in the most recent Mideast War. Given our potential opponent's numerical superiority, the key to success has to rest with good training and professional employment of our units. The Army depends heavily on the formal training establishment to produce a well trained soldier equipped with the skills necessary to contribute to his unit's fighting capability immediately upon joining it. The new training initiatives to improve individual and collective training in units support a major objective of the Army.

4. Military Manpower

a. General. Last year the Army requested a strength increase from 785,000 at end FY 76 to 793,000 at end FY TQ and FY 77. The Army's current authorization request is adjusted to 782,000 at end FY 76 and 790,000 at end FY TQ (and FY 77) to reflect the Army's portion (3,000 spaces) of the FY 76 Congressionally directed authorization reduction.

The Army accomplished the FY 76 Congressionally directed reduction by using spaces earmarked for the two brigades programmed to be activated in FY 77. These spaces were generated as a result of: reduced Thailand force levels; reductions in training, logistics, and personnel support; and headquarters reductions. Adjustments in personnel policies, which become effective in FY 77 are expected to reduce the Individuals category, thereby replacing the spaces required for the activation of these two brigades in late FY 77.

b. Enlisted Procurement

Recruitment. Recruiting goals are shown below for the period indicated:

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Non-Prior Service	184,680	180,500	57,100	177,600
Prior Service	24,235	12,500	1,500	6,000
Total	208,915	193,000	58,600	183,600

Desired non-prior service (NPS) quality goals for FY 76 and FY 77 enlistees include having 65% with high school diplomas and 65% in Mental Category I-IIIA (upper 50th percentile of the population). Higher quality soldiers produce increased retention, motivation and effectiveness. Term of enlistment goals aim for 25% of enlistees having a four-year or more term. This goal is being achieved in FY 76 thus helping to reduce accession requirements in later years. Early in FY 76, management of new accessions was refined to match accession flow with skill distribution requirements. Significant improvement has been realized, reducing turbulence and increasing skill match and readiness.

c. Officer Procurement

Procurement goals for active commissioned and warrant officers are shown below:

Active Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
9,224	9,282	4,146	10,778

Army active authorized officer strength declined in fiscal year 1975 and again in fiscal year 1976. Procurement of new officers in fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1976 has been less than losses to the extent necessary to reduce the officer corps to its authorized end strengths. Army authorized officer end strength is not programmed to decrease in fiscal year 1977; therefore, procurement will equal programmed losses. This accounts for the increase in officer procurement goals in FY 77 as compared to FY 75 and FY 76.

The active Army procures officer personnel from three major sources: USMA, ROTC and OCS.

Active Officer Accessions

<u>Source</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Percent of Total</u>
USMA	8.5
ROTC	35.8
OCS	4.6
Other <u>1/</u>	51.1

1/ Includes Recall to Active Duty, Direct Appointment, Medical and Dental Officers, Nurses, Army Medical Specialists, and Warrant Officers.

5. Civilian Manpower. The Army seeks to achieve in the manpower determination process the best balance of military and civilian manning, compatible with effective mission accomplishment. The general policy is to employ civilians rather than military personnel, except where prohibited by law, or where military personnel are required for training, security, discipline, rotation base, or combat effectiveness reasons. These determinations are a primary function of the mission to be accomplished at the installation level.

Civilians perform essential support tasks for intelligence, communications, research and development, training, administration, Reserve Component support, and medical and logistical support. They bear the brunt of installation operations requirements and do most of the essential depot maintenance, and distribution of equipment. With military and civilian salaries generally comparable, and with less of a Service-funded training requirement for civilians, they are frequently less costly to employ. Although exceptions exist, such as in the technical fields of research and development, other than required military incumbency must be determined case-by-case, based principally on economic considerations and availability of skilled personnel. The problem of determining the comparable cost is complicated by separate military and civilian strength ceilings. These constraints may inhibit or preclude transferring incumbents for particular jobs since the transfer would involve obtaining authority to change the total Service military or civilian end strength.

An alternative to civilian in-house employment is contractor performance of functions. The problems of determining true cost and strength constraints which complicate the problem of whether to employ a military or civilian also complicate the decision to contract. Additionally, there may be the problem of finding a contractor who is both capable and willing to perform the function.

The Army recognizes the need to reduce the cost of manpower within the total Budget and has taken steps to do this. Civilian employment levels have gone from an end FY 64 strength of 453,000 to an end FY 75 strength of 401,000 and are projected to be further reduced to 378,000 by the end of FY 77. These reductions have occurred during a period of many increasing civilian missions, such as the civilian KP program and the civilization programs, which converted 49,000 military positions to civilian positions. In last year's Budget the Army requested 408,000 for a civilian strength at end FY 77. The 15,800 reduction in this year's Budget for FY 77 will require the curtailment of considerable workload and will necessitate intensive realignment and consolidation throughout the installation structure. The requested level of Army civilian manpower is a minimum. Further reductions would have serious adverse impacts, leading to an imbalance in the manpower mix, increased turbulence, and degradation of readiness.

In accomplishing reductions, there are three alternatives:

-- First, curtail less essential and eliminate unessential missions.

-- Second, where missions cannot be reduced because of criticality to National objectives and continuing workload, borrow military manpower from their primary tasks of soldiering to perform the jobs vacated by the civilian work force reduction. The effects of this "borrowing" are generally not good. Unit readiness suffers, because of lost training time; the soldier's morale suffers, particularly when the diversion is not related to his military skill. Last year some 25,000 soldiers were diverted daily from their principal jobs to support base operations. This is the equivalent of more than five combat brigades.

-- Third, accept the undesirable effect of not performing the required work by leaving vacancies unfilled. This results in build-up of backlogs in equipment and facilities needing repair, thus lowering our readiness.

C. Army Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category.

The following tables display by DPPC Army manpower for the period FY 75 - FY 78. This section describes the significant features of the FY 76 - FY 77 program. Section D will describe the FY 78 program.

ARMY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	0.6	0.5	0.3	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>444.3</u>	<u>465.9</u>	<u>466.7</u>	<u>476.0</u>	<u>479.1</u>
Land Forces	<u>443.7</u>	<u>465.3</u>	<u>466.1</u>	<u>475.5</u>	<u>478.6</u>
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>35.5</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>26.0</u>	<u>26.1</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>17.9</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communications	8.9	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.4
Research & Development	7.2	7.6	7.6	7.3	7.3
Support to Other Nations	1.3	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>47.3</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>41.9</u>
Research Components Support	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Base Operating Support	30.5	26.7	26.7	25.2	25.2
Force Support Training	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Command	10.7	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>142.1</u>	<u>123.4</u>	<u>122.8</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>119.5</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>24.1</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>
Medical Support	34.6	31.1	31.0	30.2	30.2
Personnel Support	15.3	14.7	14.6	14.5	14.5
Individual Training	50.8	44.4	44.4	43.9	43.8
Command	8.9	8.5	8.5	7.6	7.6
Logistics	7.9	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Federal Agency Support	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>113.8</u>	<u>125.2</u>	<u>137.7</u>	<u>128.9</u>	<u>119.5</u>
Transients	<u>23.4</u>	<u>32.5</u>	<u>28.6</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>27.3</u>
Patients & Prisoners	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2
Trainees & Students	84.2	86.6	101.7	91.1	84.7
Cadets	3.0	3.0	4.3	4.3	4.3
Over/Under Strength		<u>-3.9</u>	<u>-8.4</u>	<u>-3.0</u>	<u>+3.3</u>
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>783.9</u>	<u>782.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Strategic Offensive				
Strategic Defensive				
Strategic Control and Surveillance				
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>367.2</u>	<u>353.0</u>	<u>353.9</u>	<u>370.8</u>
Land Forces	<u>367.2</u>	<u>353.0</u>	<u>353.9</u>	<u>370.8</u>
Tactical Air Forces				
Naval Forces				
Mobility Forces				
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence & Security				
Centrally Managed				
Communications				
Research & Development				
Support to Other Nations				
Geophysical Activities				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.7</u>
Reserve Components Support				
Base Operating Support	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.7
Force Support Training				
Command				
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>7.1</u>
Base Operating Support				
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support				
Individual Training	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.8
Command				
Logistics				
Federal Agency Support				
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>13.5</u>
Transients				
Patients & Prisoners				
Trainees & Students	11.9	11.9	11.0	13.5
Cadets				
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>394.7</u>	<u>380.0</u>	<u>380.0</u>	<u>400.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

**ARMY RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Strategic Offensive					
Strategic Defensive					
Strategic Control and					
Surveillance					
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>165.7</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>161.5</u>	<u>161.0</u>
Land Forces	<u>165.7</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>161.5</u>	<u>161.0</u>
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence & Security					
Centrally Managed					
Communications					
Research & Development					
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities					
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>6.9</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.9
Force Support Training					
Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>45.7</u>	<u>43.5</u>	<u>43.5</u>	<u>44.5</u>	<u>44.4</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support	6.4	6.1	6.1	6.2	6.2
Personnel Support					
Individual Training	39.3	37.4	37.4	38.3	38.2
Command					
Logistics					
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.7</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	6.6	5.0	5.0	6.1	6.7
Cadets					
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>225.1</u>	<u>212.4</u>	<u>212.4</u>	<u>219.0</u>	<u>219.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>45.8</u>	<u>44.6</u>	<u>44.6</u>	<u>44.9</u>	<u>44.9</u>
Land Forces	<u>42.1</u>	<u>41.0</u>	<u>41.0</u>	<u>41.3</u>	<u>41.3</u>
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>29.1</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communications	3.9	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2
Research & Development	22.6	22.1	22.0	21.9	21.9
Support to Other Nations	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Geophysical Activities					
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>101.4</u>	<u>107.1</u>	<u>106.0</u>	<u>102.4</u>	<u>102.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	<u>10.9</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.0</u>
Base Operating Support	86.7	92.5	91.3	87.7	87.7
Force Support Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Command	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>222.9</u>	<u>211.7</u>	<u>209.3</u>	<u>201.4</u>	<u>201.5</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>46.3</u>	<u>43.4</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>38.1</u>
Medical Support	25.1	26.2	26.5	25.1	25.1
Personnel Support	6.0	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2
Individual Training	18.3	18.5	18.3	18.7	18.7
Command	23.1	23.2	23.1	21.8	21.8
Logistics	104.1	96.1	94.2	93.5	93.5
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>401.1</u>	<u>394.2</u>	<u>390.2</u>	<u>378.4</u>	<u>378.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1. Army Strategic Forces.

a. Strategic Defensive Forces

The following table displays Army Strategic Defensive Forces manpower:

Strategic Defensive Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.6	0.5	0.3	*
<u>Civilian</u>	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.1

Army Strategic Defensive Forces manpower is devoted to the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Program. The reductions from FY 76 to FY 77, reflected in both military and civilian manpower, result from the decision to limit the Army's role in ballistic missile defense.

b. Control and Surveillance Forces

The following table displays Army Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces manpower:

Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5

Army Control and Surveillance Forces manpower is devoted primarily to the support of national level command centers.

2. General Purpose Forces

a. Land Forces

The following table displays Army Land Forces manpower:

<u>Army Land Forces Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	443.7	465.3	466.1	475.5
Reserve Components				
ARNG	367.2	353.0	353.9	373.4
USAR	165.7	157.1	157.1	161.5
<u>Civilian</u>	42.1	41.0	41.0	41.3

This category includes the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units. The continuing increase in Land Forces is a result of the Army's efforts to complete the attainment of a 24 division force.

In FY 77, with the addition of the second Active Army brigade to each of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 24th Infantry Division, the three new divisions that were started during FY 75 will be complete.

The change from the FY 76 to the FY 77 data contained herein reflects an increase of 316 ARNG and 437 USAR technicians. These increases were offset by other changes in this category. The overall increase in this category amounts to a net change of approximately 300 civilians.

Changes in Reserve Component manpower reflect requested adjustments in paid drill strength to match requirements.

COMBINED ARMS ORGANIZATIONS IN LAND FORCES END FY 77

<u>DIVISIONS</u>	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
Armored	4	2	6
Mechanized	5 1/	1	6
Infantry	5 1/	5	10
Air Assault	1		1
Airborne	1		1
	<u>16</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>24</u>

1/ Three active Infantry Divisions and one Infantry Division (Mech) will each be rounded out by one Reserve Component separate brigade. This will mean that these four active divisions will each have two active brigades and one Reserve Component brigade in FY 77.

COMBINED ARMS ORGANIZATIONS IN LAND FORCES END FY 77 (Continued)

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Separate Combat Brigades</u>			
Armored	1	3	4
Mechanized		6	6
Infantry	4	7	11
	5	16*	21
<u>Air Cavalry Brigade</u>	1	0	1
<u>Armored Cavalry</u>			
<u>Regiments</u>	3	3	6

*4 additional Reserve Component Brigades (roundout) counted with divisions. Does not include the 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) which is provided for school support.

b. Mobility Forces

The following table displays Army Mobility Forces manpower:

Army Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6

Army manpower required for Mobility Forces is for operations of Department of Defense water ports, which provide traffic management services for moving DOD cargo and passengers within CONUS to overseas command.

3. Auxiliary Forces

a. Intelligence and Security

Intelligence and Security manpower requirements are displayed in the following table:

Army Intelligence and Security Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	17.9	10.1	9.6	8.6
<u>Civilian</u>	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.9

This category includes manpower in the Consolidated Cryptologic Activities (CCP), the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), Army Support to the Defense Intelligence Agency and Army support to the National Security Agency.

The large difference between FY 75 actuals and FY 76 is due to the transfer of approximately 2700 intelligence training spaces to Individuals and approximately 4200 tactical signal intelligence spaces to Land Forces. These transfers were reflected in the FY 76 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. The reductions in the Active Army military and civilian manpower requirements from FY 76 to FY 77 are due to the transfer of specific intelligence collection activities to other cryptologic agencies and from the reductions of headquarters and support activities.

b. Centrally Managed Communications

The following table displays Army support of Centrally Managed DOD Communications Activities:

Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.9	8.3	8.4	8.3
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	4.3	4.3	4.2

This category includes manpower in support of Defense Consolidated Telecommunications and the Worldwide Command and Control System. It excludes Communications in support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and that which is involved in installation support (included in Base Operations Support). The military increase at end FY TQ is due to rounding (actually a 23 space difference). The civilian decrease from end FY 76 to end FY 77 is part of the overall reduction in Telecommunications support.

c. Research and Development

The following table displays Army Research and Development manpower:

Army Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.2	7.6	7.6	7.3
<u>Civilian</u>	22.6	22.1	22.0	21.9
		(0.4) 1/	(0.4) 1/	

1/ Additional spaces needed to slow phase down of in-house RDTE effort.

Army manpower is allocated to Research and Development to: (1) direct contractor efforts and carry on in-house programs in the areas of basic and applied research; (2) engineer, design, and fabricate experimental prototype articles and systems; (3) conduct testing and evaluation; and (4) operate and maintain Army R&D facilities.

The reduction in military manpower represents a nominal adjustment predicated upon base realignments during FY 77. The downward trend in civilian manpower results from management reorganizations and contracting for new projects in the research and exploratory development categories rather than undertaking them as in-house projects.

The FY 76 Manpower Requirements Report showed an anticipated reduction between FY 75 and FY 76 of 2,100 spaces. This reduction was overstated by 600 spaces due to an accounting adjustment in the Army R&D program. Additionally, the FY 75 end strength was reduced by about 900 spaces. The military and civilian strengths in the table above are based on the Army budget for FY 77. Subsequent to the preparation of the budget 447 additional spaces will be added to the RDTE program of the Army in order to slow the planned phase down of in-house laboratories in accordance with Conference Report #94-334. An additional 319 spaces will be needed for R&D work being performed by the Missile Command (MICOM) and Armaments Command (ARMCOM). MICOM and ARMCOM are industrially funded activities, primarily engaged in efforts other than RDTE, and are therefore shown in the Manpower Requirements Report under Logistics. The total additional civilian spaces needed at end FY 76 and FY TQ to accommodate this RDTE program revision is 766.

d. Support to Other Nations

Army manpower contained in the Support to Other Nations category is shown below:

Army Support to Other Nations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.3	1.1	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2

Army manpower in this category includes international military headquarters and agencies, Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG), missions and military groups, and such activities as the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the School of the Americas. The apparent military increase reflected from FY 76 to FY TQ was the result of the transfer of foreign military sales support from the Federal Agency Support category to the Support to Other Nations category.

e. Geophysical Activities

The manpower in this category is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency. The table below reflects a constant level of support.

Army Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	-	-	-	-

4. Mission Support Forces

a. Reserve Components Support

The following table displays Army Reserve Components Support manpower:

Army Reserve Components Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.6
<u>Civilian</u>	10.9	10.9	11.0	11.0

The manpower in this category consists of active military and civilian personnel who provide training, administrative and logistical support to the Reserve Components. Technicians who support reserve units with a Land Forces mission are shown in that category.

Included in this category for the first time for end FY 77 are Reserve Component personnel on special tours of active duty, active duty for extended periods, or statutory tours of active duty. This accounting change is the reason for the increase in military strength from end FY TQ to end FY 77. The increase in civilian personnel during the FY 76 to FY TQ time period is associated with base operations support to the Reserve Components.

b. Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)

Base Operating Support manpower is displayed in the following table.

Army Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	30.5	26.7	26.7	25.2
Reserve Components				
ARNG	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.7
USAR	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.9
<u>Civilian</u>	86.7	92.5	91.3	87.7

Active Army military and civilian manpower in this category is in support of the Army's mission commands - US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth Army Korea, and US Army Forces Command. The military reduction from FY 76 to FY 77 is primarily the realignment of support responsibilities in the Pacific and approximately 700 personnel reductions in CONUS representing notional adjustments predicated on base realignments during FY 77.

Reserve Component military manpower in this category are mobilization base units. Changes in manpower reflect an adjustment in paid drill strength to match requirements.

Civilian reductions from FY 76 to FY 77 are the result of a 3,200 space reduction associated with the Pacific realignment, and a 1,600 space reduction from proposed CONUS installation realignments.

c. Force Support Training

Force Support Training manpower is displayed in the following table:

Army Forces Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

Army manpower in this category includes the Army's Jungle Warfare School in the Panama Canal Zone and the Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska. A constant level of effort is planned.

d. Command (Mission Support Forces)

Command manpower is displayed in the following table:

Army Command (Mission Support) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	10.7	10.5	10.5	10.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5

This category includes Army elements of international military headquarters and agencies, joint headquarters, and major Army mission commands.

5. Central Support Forces

a. Base Operating Support

Army manpower committed to Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) is displayed in the following table:

Army Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	24.1	17.9	17.9	17.1
<u>Civilian</u>	46.3	43.4	42.9	38.1

This category includes the base support for the Army's support oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Command, and US Army Communications Command. The military reduction from end FY 76 to end FY 77 of approximately 800 spaces represents a notional adjustment predicated upon base realignments during FY 77. The civilian decrease in FY 77 is the result of 3,600 spaces in proposed installation realignments, a 100 space reduction in Washington area support, a 300 space reduction in other support personnel reductions, and a 300 space reduction for centralized management of commissaries. (The remaining commissary decrement of approximately 500 spaces is dispersed throughout other categories.)

b. Medical Support

The medical support manpower displayed in the following table includes all Army non-tactical medical care activities:

Army Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	34.6	31.1	31.0	30.2
Reserve Components				
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	6.4	6.1	6.1	6.2
<u>Civilian</u>	25.1	26.2	26.5	25.1

Army Medical Support military and civilian strength decreases for FY 77 are primarily based on an assumed transfer of Tripler Army Hospital, Hawaii, to the Navy. The Secretary of Defense subsequently reassessed the entire question of military health care resources in Hawaii, with special attention to the desirability of continuing the existing relationship between Tripler Army Medical Center and the University of Hawaii. The final decision was not to transfer Tripler Hospital to the Navy. Appropriate manpower changes will be made at a later date. Other reductions are associated with general decreases in medical activities. The increase in Army Reserve manpower for FY 77 reflects adjustments in paid drill strength to match requirements.

c. Personnel Support

The manpower displayed in the following table includes primarily the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities, and Army Personnel Centers.

Army Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.3	14.7	14.6	14.5
<u>Civilian</u>	6.0	4.3	4.3	4.2

The military reduction is due to reduced Army support of the Defense Investigative Service. The civilian decrease is the result of reductions in recruiting activities.

d. Individual Training

Manpower required to conduct Individual Training is displayed in the following table. The individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Student Trainee account of the Individuals category.

Army Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	50.8	44.4	44.4	43.9
Reserve Components				
ARNG	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.9
USAR	39.3	37.4	37.4	38.3
<u>Civilian</u>	18.3	18.5	18.3	18.7

The military reduction from FY 76 to FY 77 reflects an approximate 500 decrease resulting from training base savings accrued from the implementation of innovative training programs.

The increase in Reserve Component manpower for FY 77 reflects adjustments in paid drill strength to match requirements.

The decrease of civilian manpower between FY 76 and FY TQ reflects reductions related to the one station unit training program. The increase reflected between FY TQ and FY 77 was the result of providing TRADOC 400 additional spaces for training management.

e. Command (Central Support Forces)

This category includes the Department of Army Headquarters, Army support of Defense agencies, major Army support related headquarters, and the criminal investigation function.

The following table displays Army Command (Central Support Forces) manpower:

<u>Army Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.9	8.5	8.5	7.6
<u>Civilian</u>	23.1	23.2	23.1	21.8

The decrease in active military manpower between FY 76 and FY 77 is the reduction in Army-wide headquarters, Army manpower in OSD and JCS Headquarters and field operating agencies of the Department of Army.

The civilian reduction in this category reflect part of the Army's continuing efforts to reduce headquarters.

f. Logistics

Army manpower in this category is required for centralized logistics management. It includes primarily the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and various logistic units at installation level. The following table displays Army manpower committed to these activities.

Army Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.9	6.0	6.0	6.0
<u>Civilian</u>	104.1	96.1	94.2	93.5
		(0.3) <u>1/</u>	(0.3) <u>1/</u>	

1/ Additional spaces needed to slow phase down of in-house RDTE effort.
See paragraph C.3.c.

The civilian decrease is the result of reductions in supply, maintenance, and logistical operations to meet strength ceilings. These reductions may lead to an undesirable build-up in the backlog of equipment and facilities needing repair and in supplies waiting delivery to using units.

g. Federal Agency Support

The following table reflects military manpower assigned outside the Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis.

Army Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3

The reduction in this category from FY 76 to FY TQ is the transfer of foreign military sales support to the Support to Other Nations category.

6. Individuals

a. Transients

The following table summarizes Army transient manpower requirements:

Army Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	23.4	32.5	28.6	30.3

Projected transient strengths for FY TQ and FY 77 are based upon recent experience, modified to reflect policy decisions aimed at reducing turbulence. Projections consider the average enroute time per PCS move and the permanent change of station (PCS) move program for the fiscal year. The end FY 75 transient strength includes those persons reported by the personnel system on the last day of the fiscal year. The reported strength is lower than projections due to curtailment of PCS moves during the last quarter of FY 75. The decrease in transient strength at end FY TQ and end FY 77 from the end FY 76 level is due to the seasonality of PCS moves. Fewer moves occur in September than in June because of summer cycles and school start dates. The increase from FY TQ to FY 77 reflects the increase in the number of PCS moves caused by the removal of overseas tour length extensions imposed in FY 75 and programmed to run through FY 76 and FY TQ. Revocation of the extension policy is programmed and budgeted for FY 77.

b. Patients and Prisoners

The following table displays the reported programmed levels of patients and prisoners:

<u>Army Patients/Prisoners Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2

The apparent increase in FY TQ and FY 77 is due to rounding. The actual increase is only 33 spaces.

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Reported and projected strength requirements for these accounts are shown in the following table:

<u>Army Trainee, Students and Cadet Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Trainees/Students	84.2	86.6	101.7	91.1
Cadets	3.0	3.0	4.3	4.3
Reserve Components				
ARNG Trainees	11.9	11.9	11.0	10.8
USAR Trainees	6.6	5.0	5.0	6.1

The increase at end FY TQ reflects the seasonality of accessions and late summer inputs to schools. The 10,600 space decrease in Trainees/Students from FY TQ to FY 77 represents decreased turnover resulting from the phase out of two-year enlistees on 30 June 1977.

Reserve Component personnel in this category are assigned to units in other categories but are not yet trained assets to those units. These personnel will be undergoing initial active duty training at the end of the fiscal year. The Army normally displays these personnel within the unit strengths.

The increase in West Point cadets in FY TQ reflects all four classes being in session on 30 September (end FY TQ and FY 77). Only three classes are enrolled on 30 June (End FY 76).

d. Force Structure Manpower Deviation

Army Temporary Over (+) or Understrength (-) In Units
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Active	N/A	-3.9	-8.4	-3.0

The Army introduced in the FY 76 Defense Manpower Requirements Report a manpower accounting entry to adjust for anticipated strength fluctuation in the units of the Army's force structure. This force structure manpower deviation is the difference between the number of authorized spaces in Army units and the number of people projected to be in those units on the last day of the fiscal year. This difference occurs because the arrivals of replacements at the units do not exactly offset losses. Thus units may be temporarily undermanned or overmanned due to the flow of replacements from the training organizations.

The number of trainees in the individuals account varies with the pattern of losses and accessions -- a situation over which the Army has limited control. The number of trainees in the Army on a given date depends on the losses of people from the Army in the months preceding that date, the number of recruits enlisted to offset those losses, and the capacity of the training base. On a given date, the trainee account may be either larger or smaller than needed to provide exactly the right number of trained personnel to the units of the force structure. Units will be either undermanned or overmanned due to fluctuations in the trainee account, and the force structure manpower deviation measures this difference.

D. FY 1978 Army Manpower Requirements

The following table displays Army manpower requirements for FY 78 compared to FY 77.

Army Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Active Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Defensive Forces	*	*	0.1	0.1
Control & Surveillance Forces	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>476.0</u>	<u>479.1</u>	<u>44.9</u>	<u>44.9</u>
Land Forces	<u>475.5</u>	<u>478.6</u>	<u>41.3</u>	<u>41.3</u>
Mobility Forces	0.6	0.6	3.6	3.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>26.0</u>	<u>26.1</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>29.1</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Centrally Managed Communications	8.3	8.4	4.2	4.2
Research & Development	7.3	7.3	21.9	21.9
Support to Other Nations	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.2
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	-	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>102.4</u>	<u>102.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.0</u>
Base Operating Support	25.2	25.2	87.7	87.7
Force Support Training	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.2
Command	10.5	10.5	3.5	3.5
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>201.4</u>	<u>201.5</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>17.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>38.1</u>
Medical Support	30.2	30.2	25.1	25.1
Personnel Support	14.5	14.5	4.2	4.2
Individual Training	43.9	43.8	18.7	18.7
Command	7.6	7.6	21.8	21.8
Logistics	6.0	6.0	93.5	93.5
Federal Agency Support	.3	.3	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>128.9</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	<u>30.3</u>	<u>27.3</u>		
Patients & Prisoners	3.2	3.2		
Trainees & Students	91.1	84.7		
Cadets	4.3	4.3		
Trained Strength Deviation	-3.0	+3.3		
<u>Total Active Duty Military</u>	<u>790.0</u>	<u>790.0</u>	<u>378.4</u>	<u>378.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

Army Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Army National Guard</u>		<u>Army Reserve</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>373.4</u>	<u>370.8</u>	<u>161.5</u>	<u>161.0</u>
Land Forces	373.4	370.8	161.5	161.0
Mobility Forces				
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security				
Centrally Managed				
Communications				
Research & Development				
Support to Other Nations				
Geophysical Activities				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>6.9</u>
Reserve Component Support				
Base Operating Support	8.7	8.7	6.9	6.9
Force Support Training				
Command				
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>44.5</u>	<u>44.4</u>
Base Operating Support				
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	6.2	6.2
Personnel Support				
Individual Training	6.9	6.8	38.3	38.2
Command				
Logistics				
Federal Agency Support				
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.7</u>
Transients				
Patients & Prisoners				
Trainees & Students	10.8	13.5	6.1	6.7
Cadets				
Temporary Over (+) or Under strength (-) in Units				
<u>Total</u>	<u>400.0</u>	<u>400.0</u>	<u>219.0</u>	<u>219.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

In FY 77 the Army achieves its primary restructuring goal of fielding a 24 division force with 16 Active Army divisions. The affiliation program roundout brigades for active divisions will continue to be a major factor in improving the deployment capability of Reserve Component units.

Force changes programmed for FY 78 will be oriented toward improving the Army's combat capability within the resources available. The Army continues to find it difficult to make dramatic reductions in other force categories without incurring a high probability of weakening the support base. While efforts to increase the number of personnel in the General Purpose Forces category will continue, the majority of restructuring actions will take place within this category. Units not critical to the development of early combat power are being shifted to the Reserve Components or, in some instances, to an unfilled requirements (unmanned) category, thereby permitting the activation of more urgently needed units.

FY 78 activations include air defense batteries for the new divisions and units to improve the Army's electronic warfare capabilities. Personnel resources for these activations will come from the inactivation of tactical support units not required during the early phases of conflict.

CHAPTER XI

NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

This chapter describes the Navy's military (active and reserve) and civilian manpower requirements for FY's 1977 and 1978. It depicts manpower requirement trends over these fiscal years and discusses the rationale underlying significant changes in manpower requirements from year to year. Finally, the chapter describes the missions and functions of Navy elements within the various Defense Planning and Programming Categories.

The Navy requests authority for the following active duty military, reserve military, and civilian personnel end-strengths for the Fiscal Years 1977 and 1978:

Navy Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	544.0	543.8
Reserve Components	52.0	52.0
<u>Civilian</u>	300.6	300.6

Navy's active military manpower requirements are fundamentally related to the size and composition of the active fleet and other forces required to carry out the assigned missions of the Navy. The size of the active fleet has been steadily declining from a Vietnam-era level of 976 ships in FY 68 to a low of 480 in FY 76. Paralleling this drawdown in the active forces over the same period has been a steady decline in active military strength from just over 764,000 to the FY 76 level of 524,600. Recent years have witnessed the steady phase-out of obsolescent World War II hulls from the active inventory and the programmed introduction of highly sophisticated modern weapons platforms. After FY 76 the number of new ships scheduled to enter the active fleet begins to rise steadily into the 1980's, bringing to an end the downward trend of recent years in fleet size. Navy's active military manpower requirements are programmed to parallel this rise in force units.

Despite the programmed increase in the size of the active Navy, it is fully recognized that accomplishment of Navy's wartime and contingency missions requires a strong and ready Naval Reserve force. The Navy relies upon the Naval Reserve to bring the Navy to its total force and to attain the maximum capability of its equipment inventory which consists primarily of ships and aircraft. Individual Ready Reservists, Fleet Reservists, Standby Reservists and a limited number of retirees provide for the majority of the Navy's buildup requirements. Additionally, the Selected Reserve, which is discussed in this chapter, provides for those requirements which demand continual peacetime training in order to provide ready combat and support units for the initial stage of wartime expansion.

The civilian request reflects a continuing decline in the size of the Navy's shore establishment. Included are several base restructuring actions and a reduction in Navy management headquarters activities. However, allowance has been made for selected high priority program increases, including TRIDENT and naval shipyards.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The following major force structure changes are scheduled to occur in FY 77:

- Total active and reserve warships will increase from 540 in FY 76 to 553 in FY 77.
- Navy attack carrier levels will remain constant at 13 for FY 77 with the deactivation of F.D. ROOSEVELT and commissioning of EISENHOWER.
- Active and reserve Navy fighter and attack squadrons will increase from 74 in FY 76 to 75 in FY 77. Navy ASW squadrons will increase from 67 to 70.
- The attack submarine force will increase from 75 in FY 76 to 80 in FY 77 with the commissioning of 5 nuclear submarines.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination

The Navy employs a systematic process to determine structure manpower requirements for both the operating and support forces. A brief description of the processes for developing operating force requirements is presented below, followed by a description of the shore-based support manpower requirements determination system.

a. Operating Force Manpower Requirements

The determination of operating force manpower requirements is embodied in the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document (SMD/SQMD) programs. These programs use industrial engineering and statistical techniques to determine the workload required to achieve a level of required operational capabilities.

Navy operating force manpower is hardware and mission dependent. Force levels and mission requirements in the form of Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) statements serve as the independent variables in manpower determinations. Detailed ROCs provide objective criteria for workload measurement. Additional criteria include the specification of the operating tempo and environment as well as detailed hardware maintenance requirements.

The analytical determination of force manpower is based on three functional areas:

Operational Manning is manpower needed to operate essential operating stations during specific periods.

Maintenance Manning is manpower needed to perform preventive and corrective maintenance functions.

Own Unit Support is manpower needed to perform administrative, resupply, and logistic functions.

The methodology incorporates job task analysis, work study, activity sampling and analysis of system input data such as obtained from the Navy's Maintenance and Material Management (3M) system. The conversion of workload into billet requirements is accomplished with the application of Navy's standard workweek criteria. Workweeks specify the standards of individual performance in a particular environment. The workweek "at sea", for example, averages 70 hours in length; the workweek for shore duty is 40 hours long.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) program has been in operation since 1966 and has succeeded in documenting the requirements for 467 Navy ships. Much of this documentation has been conducted as part of the original program process of producing single documents for a class of ships. More recently, a revision of this process, termed SMD II, has been implemented to document the specific requirements of individual ships within a class. SMD II has been applied to 93 ships in FY 75, with 71 more planned in FY 76. SMD II production is geared to the ship's overhaul cycle during which most hardware changes are made. This schedule provides for an SMD update every 3 to 5 years for each ship.

The Squadron Manpower Documentation (SQMD) program relates aviation manpower requirements to operating tempo. This program has documented the manpower requirements of 117 of the Navy's squadrons since its establishment in 1968. An additional 65 SQMD's are currently undergoing final review. Coverage of all squadrons will be achieved in FY 77. SQMD's are updated every 24 months.

b. Shore Base Support Manpower Requirements

A dynamic and predictive methodology for determining military and civilian support manpower requirements has been implemented to replace the manpower survey program and the variety of workload planning systems used by industrial activities. This program, entitled Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS), comprises a standard tasking subsystem and a corresponding set of Navy-wide staffing standards. Development of the tasking subsystem is essentially complete. The initial phase of staffing standard development, scheduled for completion in FY 81, will encompass the shore establishment less headquarters and management functions. This will provide documentation of about 75 percent of the Navy's support manpower ashore. To date standards have been developed for NROTC Training, Recruiting Training, and BOQ staffing. Standards for general training, communications, berthing, and supply are currently under development.

c. Selected Reserve Manpower Requirements

(1) The System. The basic display of the Navy's mobilization manpower requirements is in the Mobilization Manpower Requirements Plan (M-MARP). The M-MARP is a compilation of the military billets, by activity, which would be required in the first twelve months of a general war. Every billet depicted is identified by billet title, grade, skill, additional qualification designations, function area code, time phasing, and all other data necessary and suitable for order writing. The individual billets are verified as a requirement by the commanding officer, the major manpower claimant and the cognizant manpower sponsor. Each specific billet in these M-MARP "requirements" is reviewed and screened by the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations to validate which military requirements are necessary to support the current Defense Planning and Policy Guidance (DPPG). These validated military mobilization manpower requirements are further screened to determine which ones meet the test of Selected Reserve Requirements - a demonstrable need and service capability to provide peacetime training.

(2) Constraints. Mobilization billets are constrained in several ways. Based on programmed forces, the mission, tasking, and workload in support of a specific operations plan, contingency plan, or logistics support and mobilization plan determine the manpower required. The mobilization workweek and task phasing, in conjunction with the facilities and equipments planned to be available, determine the manpower time phasing which is required. Combat units are authorized organizational manning immediately, or as soon thereafter as planned facilities, equipment, and tasking dictate. Organizational manning for support activities is normally phased through the first three months of mobilization, as facilities and equipments are scheduled to become available. Organizations which are not manned with active duty personnel in peacetime are phased in to meet war plan requirements.

(3) Full Mobilization. The mobilization manpower requirements plan provides for full mobilization to be reached essentially at M+3 months. Manpower increases beyond M+3 months are based primarily on total mobilization planning; e.g., Inactive Ships in Naval Custody (ISNAC), increased student loads, and military manning of certain Military Sealift Command ships. The time phasing of manpower for full mobilization provides certain preparatory measures which are essential for further expansion in the event of total mobilization.

(4) Selected Reserve. Only those mobilization requirements for which there is a demonstrable need and capability for peacetime training are assigned to the Selected Reserve. The remainder of the mobilization requirements are filled by Individual Ready Reservists, Standby Reserve, Retired Reserve, Fleet Reserve, and new accessions. Navy's Selected Reservists provide complete units with organic equipment to expand the combat and combat support capabilities of the Navy and trained units to augment the crews of regular ships, squadrons and afloat staffs to the level of manning necessary for operations and maintenance over sustained periods of high operational readiness and activity. Prior to FY 77, the Selected Reserve also provided the initial augmentation for commands and activities of the shore establishment, which require wartime expansion as the result of increased operational activity.

B. Significant Trends

1. Contributions of the Naval Reserve

a. Naval Reserve Mission.

The mission of the Naval Reserve is to maintain trained, ready, and available Reserve units and personnel for employment in the active forces in order to increase the capabilities of the active forces upon the outbreak of hostilities, declaration of an emergency, or when otherwise authorized by law.

b. Additional Reserve Capabilities.

As the implementation of Navy's Total Force Policy continues, the integration of Naval Reserve capabilities into the regular naval establishment becomes more complete. Evidence of this sharing of responsibility is seen in the assignment of additional

missions to the Reserves. Some of these newly acquired missions place sole or major responsibility for a particular capability in the hands of the Reserves.

(1) Naval Forces - Amphibious. Two Light Attack Helicopter (HAL) Squadrons are programmed for establishment in FY77. This is an additional mission for the Reserves and is the total Navy capability in this mission area.

(2) Naval Support Forces. Four Fleet Ocean Tugs (ATFs) are transferred to the Naval Reserve Force in FY77. These units will provide an additional mission to the Reserve and will increase its inventory of serviceable ships.

c. Hardware Modernization

The potential economy of Reserve forces brought to and retained at appropriate readiness is recognized. However, units which are not properly manned, equipped, trained, or supported do not make an economic contribution even if they are inexpensive. To ensure that Naval Reserve units are properly maintained and upgraded, newer hardware with greater capabilities is programmed:

(1) Reserve Fighter Squadrons (VF). In FY 77, an additional Reserve F-8 squadron and associated SRU will transition to F-4N aircraft.

(2) Reserve Early Warning Squadrons (VAW). Significant modernization of Reserve Early Warning Squadrons occurs in FY 77 as the two VAW squadrons, the four VAW SRUs, and the two VAW (OMA) SRUs are transitioned from E-1B to E-2B aircraft.

(3) Maritime Patrol Squadrons (VP). The modernization of Reserve Maritime Patrol Squadron (VP) aircraft continues at an accelerated rate. The transition of all VP squadrons to P-3 aircraft is expected to be complete by FY 80. One VP squadron is added to the Naval Air Reserve Force in FY TQ.

(4) Direct Support Squadron-Aircraft (VR). Modernization of Reserve VR Squadrons continues with the addition of a second VR (C-9) squadron to the Naval Air Reserve Force.

d. Consolidation of Airlift Capability

All airlift requirements are being consolidated in late FY 77 with the Military Airlift Command under the management of the Air Force. The Naval Reserve will continue providing the service unique base and support function requirements with two Air Transport Support Squadrons utilizing C-9 aircraft.

2. Management Initiatives

Within the limitations of reduced military strengths, the Department of the Navy has undertaken measures to increase combat structure and combat readiness by reductions in the support establishment, including headquarters, that are not critical to overall national security. Combat readiness is being improved by retirement of obsolescent hulls and replacing them with new, multi-mission modern weapons platforms, reversing the downward trend in fleet size after FY 76.

Active military manpower requirements will parallel this increase in fleet size. Officer strength requirements, however, are programmed for continuing reductions, resulting in an improving officer-to-enlisted ratio during this period as shown in the table below.

Active Navy Officer to Enlisted Ratio

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Officer:Enlisted	1:7.17	1:7.19	1:7.30	1:7.52

Similarly, a significant improvement in the active Navy's combat-to-support balance is also projected during this period. If the total Individuals category is excluded from this computation as not properly distributable to either element, the Navy combat percentage rises as indicated below:

Active Navy Combat and Support Percentages

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Combat</u>	57.5	58.3	58.5	61.1
<u>Support</u>	42.5	41.7	41.5	38.9

3. Military Manpower

a. Active Military

(1) Enlisted. In FY 1975 Navy was successful in its recruiting efforts and met the authorized end strength. Accession requirements in FY 76 are relatively lower than FY 75, due to a decreased authorized end strength and improved retention. With the aid of economic conditions the FY 76 goals will be met while maintaining exceptionally high quality standards. As Navy strength increases in FY TQ and FY 77, accession requirements will also increase.

Active Navy Enlisted Non Prior Service Recruiting Goals
(Includes USN and USNR)

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
101,139	94,338	33,280	108,052

For FY 1976 and beyond, a minimum of 85% of non prior service enlistments will be for four or more years. The remaining 15% who are enlisted for three years are the USNR enlistees on active duty.

(2) Officers. Active officer procurement goals are shown in the following table:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
7,663	6,638	1,903	6,782

The active officer force decreases by 438 between the end of FYTQ and end FY 77. This reduction, plus the small number of losses projected for FY 77, dictates an accession level slightly below that necessary to meet first tour requirements in every officer community. However, the program provides for retention of quality officers, maintains a normal promotion flow, and permits approximately 100% manning of fleet requirements.

Officer input into the Naval Reserve comes from both civilian applicants and active duty reserve officers who complete their initial active duty obligation.

b. Reserve

The reduction from a projected strength of 101,378 on 30 September 1976 to 52,000 on 1 October 1976 is the result of a proposal to: (1) transfer all Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Unit (ORU) personnel from their drill pay status to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) on the basis that sufficient training can be accomplished in an annual two week period of Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA); and (2) reduce the number of Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions (CBs) from the current 17 to 8. The strength reductions are more apparent than real, since these IRR personnel will be trained and will be available upon mobilization. The IRR category does not provide for paid drills, and IRR personnel are not included in strength authorization totals. ORU's provide required wartime augmentation of operational staff groups, base support, training, technical management, administration, and other activities of the shore establishment. In general, these units contain trained personnel who, as an adjunct to their annual premobilization training, can provide valuable peacetime support to the active forces.

The continuing implementation of the Ship and Squadron Manpower Documentation Programs in the active Navy will diminish somewhat the requirement for Selected Reserve augmentation of fleet ships and squadrons. Additionally, various analyses of manning levels of active versus Selected Reserve manpower are being conducted to determine the feasible manning ratios for naval ships.

4. Civilian Manpower

From a level of 411,000 at end FY 69, Navy civilian employment declined to 306,000 at end FY 75, a decrease of over 105,000, or 25.6%. Due mainly to the elimination of Thailand staffing requirements and the continuing drawdown in RDT&E employment begun in FY 75, civilian employment will decline by 1,600 positions to 304,400 at end FY 76, with a further decline to 303,800 by the end of FYTQ.

There is a further decline in FY 1977 to a strength of 300,600 at the end of that fiscal year. This reduction is greater than appears because the strength includes net functional transfers of 1,200 personnel from other Services. Limited resources and the need to improve combat readiness have made it necessary for the Navy to continue reductions in the shore establishment. In order to maintain a viable base structure with lower funding and manpower levels, a number of base restructuring actions are required. In addition, the Navy is reducing management headquarters activities in FY 77. At the same time, high priority program increases for TRIDENT support and naval shipyards have been accommodated within the requested end FY 77 strength.

C. Navy Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category

The following tables display by DPPC Navy manpower requirements for the period FY 1975 to FY 1978. This section describes the significant features of the FY 76-FY 77 program. Section D will describe the FY 78 program.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>22.4</u>
Strategic Offensive	17.6	18.3	18.5	19.7	20.6
Strategic Defensive	-	*	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.1	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>231.2</u>	<u>238.5</u>	<u>239.4</u>	<u>255.1</u>	<u>256.6</u>
Land Forces	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9
Tactical Air Forces	62.4	65.0	64.9	68.8	68.8
Naval Forces	165.8	170.3	171.3	183.1	184.6
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>28.2</u>
Intelligence & Security	10.4	9.6	9.6	9.3	9.2
Centrally Managed					
Communications	9.8	10.9	10.9	10.5	9.8
Research & Development	6.6	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.6
Support to Other Nations	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
Geophysical Activities	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>70.6</u>	<u>68.8</u>	<u>68.9</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>65.3</u>
Reserve Components Support	7.5	7.9	8.0	7.2	7.5
Base Operating Support	37.5	35.7	35.7	32.4	32.6
Force Support Training	12.9	13.0	13.0	12.8	12.8
Command	12.7	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.4
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>84.6</u>	<u>86.1</u>	<u>85.8</u>	<u>82.2</u>	<u>81.1</u>
Base Operating Support	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Medical Support	21.6	21.5	21.5	22.1	22.1
Personnel Support	8.1	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3
Individual Training	36.0	37.2	36.9	33.1	31.8
Command	8.2	9.0	9.0	8.7	8.7
Logistics	7.1	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.6
Federal Agency Support	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>100.4</u>	<u>83.6</u>	<u>93.7</u>	<u>93.3</u>	<u>90.3</u>
Transients	34.2	26.0	26.6	28.2	26.7
Patients & Prisoners	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.1	4.2
Trainees & Students	58.1	48.7	58.1	56.7	55.1
Cadets	3.3	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.4
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		<u>-2.1</u>	<u>-5.8</u>	<u>-1.6</u>	
Temporary Unit Understrength		-2.1	-5.8	-1.6	
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>534.9</u>	<u>524.6</u>	<u>531.8</u>	<u>544.0</u>	<u>543.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

**NAVAL RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Strategic Offensive	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>59.9</u>	<u>60.1</u>	<u>47.0</u>
Land Forces	1.3	3.0	3.0	2.0
Tactical Air Forces	5.0	4.9	4.9	7.2
Naval Forces	44.4	50.5	50.7	36.7
Mobility Forces	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence & Security	5.7	5.3	5.3	-
Centrally Managed				
Communications	1.5	2.0	2.0	-
Research & Development	0.5	0.4	0.4	-
Support to Other Nations				
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>20.4</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>
Reserve Components Support				
Base Operating Support	10.7	12.0	12.0	-
Force Support Training	1.6	0.4	0.4	-
Command	8.1	7.5	7.5	2.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>16.6</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Base Operating Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	-
Medical Support	3.9	1.4	1.4	-
Personnel Support	0.9	0.8	0.8	-
Individual Training	1.6	1.2	1.2	0.5
Command	2.9	2.4	2.4	0.4
Logistics	7.1	6.1	6.1	0.4
Federal Agency Support				
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Transients				
Patients & Prisoners				
Trainees & Students	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9
Cadets				
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>98.2</u>	<u>101.1</u>	<u>101.4</u>	<u>52.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

NAVY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 75 Actual	FY 76	FY 77 (FY 1977 Budget)	FY 78 Auth.
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.1</u>
Strategic Offensive	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.6
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-	-
Naval Forces	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5
Mobility Forces	5.1	4.9	4.9	5.1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>47.7</u>	<u>45.2</u>	<u>45.2</u>	<u>43.9</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8
Communications	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.5
Research & Development	38.7	36.2	36.2	35.5
Support to Other Nations	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.7
Geophysical Activities	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>31.1</u>	<u>30.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.8
Base Operating Support	26.3	26.0	25.6	25.3
Force Support Training	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Command	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>219.2</u>	<u>220.6</u>	<u>220.5</u>	<u>218.7</u>
Base Operating Support	20.4	20.7	20.6	20.0
Medical Support	10.0	10.2	10.2	10.9
Personnel Support	1.7	2.8	2.9	2.7
Individual Training	14.8	14.2	14.1	13.3
Command	15.7	16.4	16.4	15.7
Logistics	156.5	156.4	156.3	156.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>306.0</u>	<u>304.4</u>	<u>303.8</u>	<u>300.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1. Strategic Forces

Navy Strategic Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	18.8	20.0	20.2	21.5
Reserve Components	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.7	1.7	2.1

The active military manpower requirements for Strategic Forces are computed as follows:

Strategic Force Ship Manning

<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Number Of Ships 1/</u>	<u>Average Manning</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
SSBN	41	284 2/	11,138
Tenders	5	1,268	6,342

1/ Includes active ships in FY 77 and those in overhaul and under conversion.

2/ Reflects average manning of majority of SSBN class. Ships in overhaul and under conversion are manned at a lower level than active ships.

In addition to the ship's crews described above, additional personnel are needed for maintenance support systems, missile control systems, communications support, and dedicated weather reconnaissance support.

The increase in active military manpower between FY 75 and FY 76 is caused by increases in the TRIDENT program, the shift of WWMCCS support to this category, and variances between FY 75 programmed and actual on board totals. Active military manpower in Strategic Forces rises by approximately 1,400 and civilian manpower rises by 325 from FY 76 to FY 77. This trend is directly attributable to the TRIDENT program which is in its developmental stages. Increases are related to management and engineering support and establishment of the TRIDENT Support Site at Bangor, Washington. The decrease of 200 Selected Reserve personnel is part of the overall adjustment in the Naval Selected Reserve manning level.

2. General Purpose Forces

a. Land Forces

Navy Land Forces personnel consists of doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments, and air stations. The Marine Corps does not have such personnel. The following table shows Navy manpower committed to Land Forces.

Navy Land Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.9
Reserve Components	1.3	3.0	3.0	2.0

The increase of 200 in active military forces between FY 75 and FY 76 is entirely attributable to a variance between end FY 75 actual strengths and program requirements.

The decrease of 1,000 Selected Reserve personnel is part of the overall adjustment in the Naval Selected Reserve manning level.

b. Tactical Air Forces.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower 1/
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	62.4	65.0	64.9	68.8
Reserve Components	5.0	4.9	4.9	7.0

1/ Includes manpower for attack/multi-purpose carriers and associated air wings.

To perform the Navy's Tactical Air Force mission in FY 77, there are 13 aircraft carriers and 13 carrier air wings assigned to the active forces. Each carrier wing includes various types of aircraft.

At end FY 75, Tactical Air Forces were undermanned by approximately 6,000 personnel from the FY 75 programmed strength. This undermanning primarily stemmed from the unusually large student and training pipeline which normally exists at this time of the year. Therefore, the apparent increase in manpower required from the end FY 75 actual strength to the end FY 76 programmed strength is in reality a programmed decrease of manpower caused by the planned retirement of two aircraft carriers and various aviation squadrons. The increase between FY 76 and FY 77 results from full manning of CVN EISENHOWER and increases in manning of other multi-purpose carriers. Increases in aviation squadron manpower during this period result from improved manning of fighter and attack squadrons, retention of the CV FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT squadrons, and improved manning of other reserve, electronic warfare, and early warning squadrons.

The increase in Selected Reserve manpower is the result of changing fleet augmentation requirements and the introduction/transition to more complex aircraft, such as F4 and A7, requiring increased manning levels. This is part of the overall adjustment in the Naval Selected Reserve manning level.

c. Naval Forces

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	165.8	170.3	171.3	183.1
Reserve Components	44.4	50.5	50.7	36.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5

From the peak strength Vietnam years, Naval Forces have been steadily purged of obsolescent, World War II vintage ships. Because of these declining forces levels, Naval Forces manpower requirements have in the past likewise decreased. Between FY 75 and FY 76, the number of ships in the active fleet declines by 16 from a total of 496 to 480.

Programmed active military manpower for FY 75 was approximately 7,500 higher than actual end FY 75 strength. This 7,500 undermanning of Naval Forces at end FY 75 stems primarily from the unusually large student and training pipeline which normally exists at this time of the year. Therefore, the apparent increase in manpower between actual end FY 75 strength and programmed end FY 76 manpower requirements actually reflects a programmed decrease in Naval Forces manpower of approximately 3,000 between these two years. The increase of 12,800 in

Naval Forces manpower between end FY 76 and end FY 77 parallels an increase in the number of active ships from 480 to 489, including introduction of 20 new ships coupled with the transfer of 5 ships to the Naval Reserve Forces and the decommissioning of 6 other ships. ASW/Fleet Air Defense Force manning is scheduled to rise by 6,500. Amphibious force manning will increase by 3,300. Naval Support Forces will rise by approximately 3,100, largely reflecting the transfer of 2,800 Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group (FMAG) personnel from the Base Operating Support subcategory of Mission Support Forces. General improvements in force manning will occur during this period for existing ships and fleet support aviation units.

The reduction of 13,800 Selected Reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR (training category D) and the elimination of 9 Construction Battalions. Units affected by the transfer include augmentation for Amphibious Construction Battalions, Beachmaster Units, Naval Beach Group units, Mine Forces Support Group, and Special Combat Support Units.

d. Mobility Forces

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Reserve Components	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	5.1	4.9	4.9	5.1

The DoD relies heavily on sealift to move the bulk of equipment and supplies for other than the initial period of combat. To meet wartime needs, the Department of Defense relies heavily on U.S. commercial shipping which can be mobilized under Presidential authority. During a NATO contingency, the Department of Defense would also rely on the commercial shipping assets of our NATO allies. Specific agreements have been reached to provide U.S. commercial and NATO ships in contingency situations.

The reduction of 400 Selected Reservists in FY 77 is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Military Sealift Command offices and Port Terminal Transportation units.

The civilian increase of 200 in FY 77 is for increased manning of Military Sealift Command ships.

3. Auxiliary Forces

Auxiliary Forces carry out Department of the Navy programs which come under centralized DoD control. These various programs include Intelligence and Security, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, Support to Other Nations, and Geophysical Activities. The following sections display military and civilian personnel requirements for each of these programs.

a. Intelligence and Security

Navy Intelligence and Security Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active ^{1/}	10.4	9.6	9.6	9.3
Reserve Components	5.7	5.3	5.3	-
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8

^{1/} Active military in Defense Agencies are included in the above totals. Not included in the above totals are military personnel in combat or combat-related intelligence units.

The reduction of 800 active military personnel between end FY 75 and end FY 76 reflects the transfer of approximately 1200 military personnel engaged in the conduct of intelligence training from this category to that of the Individual Training sub-category of Central Support Forces. This shift is partially offset by a variance in programmed and actual strengths in this category at the end of FY 75.

The reduction of 5,300 Selected Reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units included in the Intelligence area are augmentations for Elint Center, Operational Intelligence, Ocean Information, Intelligence Area Analysis, Scientific/Technical Intelligence, Processing, Photo Interpretation Collection/Dissemination, Contingency, and Attache Systems units. Affected units in the Security Area include augmentations for Security Group, Task Group, Security Activity, Station, Data Communication, and Cryptologic Communications units.

b. Centrally Managed Communications

Navy Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.8	10.9	10.9	10.5
Reserve Components	1.5	2.0	2.0	-
<u>Civilian</u>	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.5

Actual active military personnel assigned to Centrally Managed Communications in FY 75 were lower than programmed. The decrease from FY 76 to FY 77 in active military and civilian manpower is primarily attributable to installation realignments.

The reduction of 2,000 Selected Reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Navy Communications Stations, Defense Communication System, and Security Group Communication Stations units.

c. Research and Development

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	6.6	6.8	6.8	6.7
Reserve Components	0.5	0.4	0.4	-
<u>Civilian</u>	38.7	36.2	36.2	35.5
		(1.3) <u>1/</u>	(1.3) <u>1/</u>	(0.5) <u>1/</u>

1/ Additional manpower needed to slow phase down of in-house RDT&E effort as directed by the House Armed Services Committee (see narrative).

The Navy's R&D community consists of headquarters, laboratories, RDT&E project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. The largest segment of the Navy's R&D establishment

consists of R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, since they must deal with land, sea, air, and undersea operations. In addition, the Navy is very equipment intensive and requires a substantial in-house RDT&E capability. In-house work is performed at 17 Navy RDT&E installations, including 10 medical laboratories and such industrially funded laboratories as the Naval Research Laboratory, the Navy Ship Research and Development Center, and the Naval Air Development Center.

The reduction of 400 Selected Reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Underwater Ordnance, Ordnance Test, Weapons Laboratory, and Biomedical Research Laboratory units.

As a part of a DoD policy to achieve savings in the R&D program and shift more R&D effort from military laboratories to civilian industry, a reduction of 3000 civilian employees was scheduled to take place between the end of FY 74 and the end of FY 76. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has directed a further reduction of 637 civilian end strength from Navy RDT&E activities in FY 77. The Navy, therefore, planned to reduce its in-house RDT&E workforce by 3637 between FY 74 and end of FY 77, a reduction of about 9%. However, the DDR&E has revised the reduction plan to stretch out the 3,000 civilian reduction at Navy RDT&E activities through FY 78 (vice end of FY 76). Although all the details of this stretch out plan have not yet been approved, the Navy will require additional civilians for RDT&E over and above the strengths requested in the FY 77 Budget, as shown in the table above.

d. Support to Other Nations

Navy Support to Other Nations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.7

Navy personnel in this category provide a wide range of administrative, supply and logistics support through the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and other Military Assistance Programs, including training for Saudi Arabian and Iranian naval forces.

Active military manpower increases between FY 75 and FY 76 because of the transfer of service support to the Military Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales Support personnel to this sub-category.

Civilian Foreign Military Sales support is also included in this category. These personnel represent continuing effort in administrative, clerical, financial, supply, and technical support of foreign military sales agreements. Their salaries are fully reimbursed by foreign governments either through a direct citation to the FMS agreement or through an administrative surcharge. Civilian manpower increases between FY 75 and FY 76 owing to the significant growth of the FMS program. Civilian support of FMS at industrial activities, totaling 800 man-years of effort, is included in the Central Support (Logistics) sub-category.

e. Geophysical Activities

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7Q</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9
Reserve Components	0.2	0.3	0.3	-
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4

The Navy's geophysical effort includes activities under the Naval Weather Service and Oceanographer of the Navy. Included in the Weather Service are professional meteorologists, meteorological technicians, technical specialists, and a small Departmental staff. The Oceanographic effort, under the Oceanographer of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, includes professional civilian oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, and engineers. These two commands are planned for consolidation in FY 77, with net savings of approximately 50 civilian spaces resulting from the consolidation and the planned relocation of the Naval Oceanographic Office to Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

The reduction of 300 Selected Reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for the Naval Weather Service and Oceanography units.

4. Mission Support Forces

Mission Support Forces consist of activities which are not organic to a specific kind of unit (e.g., squadron or ship) but directly support a group of complementary units that are dedicated to a common mission. The various categories of mission support forces consist of Reserve Components Support, Base Operating Support, Force Support Training, and Command.

a. Reserve Components Support

Navy Reserve Components Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.5	7.9	8.0	7.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.8

Reserve Components Support consists of those active duty military personnel and civilians who are dedicated to the overall administration of reserve component units, facilities, training programs, and personnel. Not included are active duty personnel directly supporting a specific Naval or Tactical Air Force reserve unit; they are counted in the appropriate mission categories.

The increase in active military manpower from FY 75 to FY 76 is attributable to increases in the Naval Reserve Readiness Commands and reserve base operations. The decrease between FY 76 and FY 77 reflects planned reductions in Reserve Component Support.

The civilian reduction in FY 77 is related to reduced support requirements for paid drill reservists, savings resulting from transfer of the Naval Air Station, Los Alamitos to the Army, and a reduction in Chief of Naval Reserve Headquarters.

b. Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)

Navy Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	37.5	35.7	35.7	32.4
Reserve Components	10.7	12.0	12.0	-
<u>Civilian</u>	26.3	26.0	25.6	25.3

Navy personnel in this category provide technical, maintenance and administrative support needed to operate naval stations, naval air stations, and related operating force bases around the world. Staffing requirements are influenced by the number of bases, their mission, geographical location, type and size of forces support, tempo of operations, and specific services provided.

The 1,800 reduction in active military manpower between FY 75 and FY 76 is caused primarily by numerous reductions in fleet air and port base operations. The reduction of active military manpower between FY 76 and FY 77 primarily stems from the transfer of 2,800 Fleet Maintenance Assistance Group personnel to the General Purpose Force category as well as a reduction of approximately 700 Sea Control Air Base Operations personnel mainly as a result of base closures and realignments. These reductions are partially offset by an increase of 600 spaces due to the transfer of manning of correctional centers from Marine Corps to Navy.

The reduction of 12,000 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected Units include augmentations for Naval Station, Naval Air Station, Naval Shore Activities, Intermediate Maintenance Activities, Base Telecommunications, Sub-Base Facilities, and Service Craft Units.

The small reduction of civilian strength between FY 76 and FY 77 is attributable to installation realignments and support reductions.

c. Force Support Training

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	12.9	13.0	13.0	12.8
Reserve Components	1.6	0.4	0.4	-
<u>Civilian</u>	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5

Force Support Training is conducted by units which provide training to or evaluation of organized crews and units in conjunction with the performance of a specific mission. Navy civilian support in this area consists primarily of maintenance and clerical support to Fleet Air Training Units located at Fleet Naval Air Stations.

The student pipeline programmed for Force Support Training is included in the Students sub-category of the Individuals category.

The reduction of 400 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all Other than Ship Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Underway Training and Fleet Training Group Units.

d. Command (Mission Support Forces)

Navy Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	12.7	12.2	12.2	12.2
Reserve Components	8.1	7.5	7.5	2.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.8

This category includes international and unified headquarters and support activities, Navy fleet management headquarters, fleet operating commands, and related support staffs and ceremonial and combat development activities.

The decrease in active military strength between FY 75 and FY 76 reflects general reductions in the Mission Support Forces Command structure including Fleet Commands, Mission Support Forces and Inshore Warfare Forces, Atlantic Command Operational Support Facility and USEUCOM, as well as transfer of WWMCCS manpower to the Strategic Forces category.

The reduction of 4,700 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. This reduces augmentees for Navy Staffs, i.e., Allied Command, Unified Command, Commander-In-Chief, Force Area Command, Construction Battalion Staffs, Air Type Command, Carrier Group, Light/Medium Attack Wing, Fighter Wing, Patrol Wing, ASW Wing, Destroyer/Submarine/Amphib Staffs, Mine Warfare Staffs, Tactical Support Wing, Special Warfare Staff, and Service Force Staff Units.

The civilian manpower levels, which are significantly lower than those in the FY 76 Report, reflect elimination of all spaces for the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, and USMACTHA! Support Group in Thailand. In addition, the FY 77 level reflects a reduction in those management headquarters activities included in this category.

5. Central Support Forces

Central Support Forces consist of those activities which are not easily associated with a single Navy mission, and are therefore centrally programmed and managed. The various categories of Central Support Forces consist of Base Operating Support, Medical, Personnel Support, Individual Support, Command, Logistics, and Federal Agency Support.

a. Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)

Navy Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6
Reserve Components	0.2	0.2	0.2	-
<u>Civilian</u>	20.4	20.7	20.6	20.0

Base Operating Support is composed of Public Works Centers, Construction Battalion Centers, Commissaries, and other support activities.

Navy Public Works Centers, which will employ approximately 13,500 civilians in FY 77, provide services which include utilities, housing, transportation support, engineering services, facilities planning, and other logistic support required by operating forces. An essentially level program is projected for the Public Works Centers. However, there are general support reductions of 100 spaces in Construction Battalion Centers and 500 spaces in Commissaries.

The reduction of 200 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Public Work Center Units.

b. Medical Support

The following table displays Medical Support manpower requirements.

Navy Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	21.6	21.5	21.5	22.1
Reserve Components	3.9	1.4	1.4	-
<u>Civilian</u>	10.0	10.2	10.2	10.9

The increase of 600 active military personnel between FY 76 and FY 77 results from the Navy assumption of responsibility for the former Army hospital in Okinawa and establishment of a Navy hospital in New Orleans coupled with reductions of Navy personnel in various Naval Hospitals and other medical care facilities throughout the world. Also included in this change are active military originally intended to compensate Navy for assumption of responsibility for the Tripler Army Hospital in Hawaii as explained below. This decision has since been reversed; appropriate realignment of resources will be made at a later date.

The reduction of 1,400 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Navy Regional Medical Center and Navy Regional Dental Center Units.

The civilian increase in FY 77 includes 200 positions for the new Naval Hospital at New Orleans and 1,300 spaces to assume responsibility for Pacific area medical support including 900 spaces for Tripler Hospital, Hawaii. The FY 77 Budget was prepared based on the assumption that Tripler Hospital would be transferred from the Army to the Navy. The Secretary of Defense subsequently reassessed the entire question of military health care resources in Hawaii. The final decision is not to transfer Tripler Hospital to the Navy. Appropriate manpower adjustments will be made to conform to this final decision. Also included in this category are reductions of about 800 spaces related to installation realignments and general medical support reductions.

c. Personnel Support

Navy Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.1	7.3	7.3	7.3
Reserve Components	0.9	0.8	0.8	-
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	2.8	2.9	2.7

The major components of this category are: Recruiting and Examining; Counterintelligence Activities; and Other Personnel Support.

The reduction in active military manpower from FY 75 to FY 76 primarily stems from a planned decrease of about 400 spaces in the recruiting and examining functions. Managerial efficiencies, based upon consolidation of enlisted personnel distribution functions, allowed further reductions of about 400 active military manpower to take place.

The reduction of 800 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Naval Investigative Service Team/Headquarters, and Investigative Operations Units.

The civilian increase in FY 76 reflects the transfer of the Naval Personnel Program Support Activity from Central Support Command as a result of a realignment of headquarters and field support functions. A decrease in FY 77 reflects other personnel support reductions.

d. Individual Training

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	36.0	37.2	36.9	33.1
Reserve Components	1.6	1.2	1.2	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	14.8	14.2	14.1	13.3

Included in the Navy Individual Training Manpower category are the individuals who staff designated Navy training activities. Some of these activities have secondary missions which are not related to training, but which are appropriate to the activity because of other considerations. Personnel being trained at these activities are not counted in Navy Individual Training Manpower in the table above. These personnel, if they are under permanent change of station (PCS) orders to training activities, are counted as "Individuals" in one of three categories -- "Students", "Trainees" or "Midshipmen". Individuals who are in a temporary additional duty (TAD) status while they are undergoing training are counted with their parent commands in the appropriate category. Personnel conducting training in the Navy Individual Training Manpower category work with both PCS and TAD personnel. An in-depth treatment of Navy Individual Training will be contained in the FY 77 Military Manpower Training Report.

Active military manpower declines by about 4,100 in this category between FY 76 and FY 77 primarily because of various reductions in flight training functions and support.

The reduction of 700 selected reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Recruit Training Processing Teams, Fleet Training Center, Combat Directions Center, Fleet ASW, Maintenance Training, Service Schools and Intelligence Schools.

The reduction of 800 civilians in FY 77 is due to installation realignments and support reductions.

e. Command (Central Support Forces)

Navy Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.2	9.0	9.0	8.7
Reserve Components	2.9	2.4	2.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	15.7	16.4	16.4	15.7

Navy manpower in Command (Central Support) consists primarily of Management Headquarters and Administrative Activities. Included are Navy military personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military and civilian personnel who staff the Navy Secretariat and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Other headquarters activities include the Naval Material Command Headquarters components, and headquarters of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Chief of Naval Education and Training. Also in this category are a number of field support functions, such as the Navy Safety Center, Naval Support Activities, Finance Centers and Audit Service Offices, and the Naval Command Systems Support Activity. Military personnel assigned to ceremonial activities such as the Navy Band, USS Constitution, and Ceremonial Guard are also included.

The relative increase of 800 active military between FY 75 and FY 76 largely reflects management efforts initiated within Navy to permit improved accountability of Navy personnel providing support to non-DoD agencies and other nations on a reimbursable basis, and to identify correctly total Navy management headquarters strength. Total Navy strength in this category rises because of a slight increase in identifiable Navy management headquarters strength and due to accounting changes. The decrease of 300 between FY 76 and FY 77 results from decreases in the OPNAV staff, other Washington area headquarters and support and elimination of Bicentennial support activities, along with a partially offsetting increase at the Naval Technical Training Center, Memphis, Tennessee.

The reduction of 2,000 Selected Reservists in FY 77 is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected units include augmentations for Naval Material Command Headquarters, Naval Systems Command Headquarters, CNO Support, Office of Naval Research, Office of JAG, Naval Education and Training Headquarters, DSA, Bupers Headquarters, Office of Information, Fleet Information Centers, and Recruit Processing Command Units.

Civilian increases in FY 76 are functional transfers from other categories. Civilian decreases in FY 77 reflect reductions in Navy management headquarters activities.

f. Logistics

Navy Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.1	7.5	7.5	7.5
Reserve Components	7.1	6.1	6.1	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	156.5	156.4	156.3	156.1

The increase in active military manpower between FY 75 and FY 76 is primarily caused by increases at Naval Weapons Stations Yorktown and Charleston and increases at various procurement activities.

The reduction of 5,700 Selected Reservists is the result of the transfer of all billets in Other than Ship or Squadron Reinforcement Units (ORU) to the IRR. Affected are augmentations for the Naval Supply Point and Inventory Control Point, as well as Petroleum/Oil/Lubrication, Transportation, Procurement, Aircraft Material Office, and Naval Air Weapons Systems Units.

The following table summarizes FY75-78 logistics manpower by type of logistics operations.

Logistics Manpower by Type of Operation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Supply	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
Maintenance & Production	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.1
Logistics Support	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.5</u>
Reserve				
Supply	0.7	0.8	0.8	-
Maintenance & Production	2.9	3.3	3.3	-
Logistics Support	3.5	1.9	1.9	0.4
Total	<u>7.1</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>0.4</u>
<u>Civilian</u>				
Supply	22.0	21.4	21.3	20.6
Maintenance & Production	125.0	125.5	125.5	126.7
Logistics Support	9.5	9.5	9.5	8.8
Total	<u>156.5</u>	<u>156.4</u>	<u>156.3</u>	<u>156.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

(1) Supply. In FY 77, approximately 1,400 military and 20,600 civilians will be employed in Supply Depots, Regional Procurement Offices, Inventory Control Points, and Contract Administration Offices, reflecting general program reductions of 700 civilians.

(2) Maintenance and Production.

- Naval Air Rework Facilities. The Air Rework Facilities perform depot level maintenance of aircraft and components, manufacture of critical nonavailable parts, and provide technical assistance to intermediate maintenance organizations. Staffing requirements are largely based on standard workload procedures for the types of jobs being performed. Aircraft and engine requirements are converted to man-hours by multiplying the number of units by negotiated program production norms. The applicable overhead hours associated with the direct hour base are then added to derive the total productive hours required. Productive hours required are then converted to manyears. A total of 152 military and 24,802 civilians are planned for end FY 77, representing a decrease of 1,000 civilians from end FY TQ.

Naval Avionics Facility. An additional eight military and 2,426 civilians are employed at the Naval Avionics Facility (NAFI) which conducts a variety of engineering and manufacturing functions. Engineering jobs being worked on at NAFI are not yet ready to be transferred to industry. The few manufacturing type jobs are there because of some emergency situation which precluded their being placed in industry in the first place. Capacity for this type of situation must be available to satisfy the need for a quick and flexible response. An essentially level program is planned.

- Missile Facilities. The Polaris Missile Facility, Atlantic, and Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, which employ 500 military personnel and 920 civilians, provide maintenance for the POLARIS/POSEIDON Fleet. The Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, which will also service the new TRIDENT Fleet, accounts for an increase of approximately 300 civilian positions in FY 77.

- Naval Shipyards. The Naval Shipyards, which employ 914 military and 65,000 civilians in FY 77, provide logistic support for assigned ships and service craft; perform authorized work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting of ships and craft; and perform manufacturing, research, development and test work.

-- The naval shipyard workload is determined and monitored on a three year cycle. Naval shipyard workload is developed from customer's budget dollars (including non-DoD customers) and distributed to the naval and private shipyards in accordance with homeport policy, shipyard capabilities and employment potentials. Based on the projected ship workload average many years of employment, end of fiscal year employment is determined for individual naval shipyards in terms of productive shop and support manpower requirements.

-- An increase of 2,072 civilians from the end FY 76-FY 77 level of 62,928 to the end FY 77 level of 65,000 is associated with significant increases in Naval Shipyard workload in the Fleet Repair and Alteration Programs. The primary emphasis is to reduce the Navy's ship overhaul deferral level, which currently exceeds 70 ships, to a more acceptable level during FY 77 and subsequent years.

-- Improvement in the material condition of Naval ships in future fiscal years is one of the priority programs of the Secretary of Defense. The increase in shipyard manpower is essential to accomplishing that objective.

- Ordnance Activities. Active military and civilian employment at ordnance activities, totalling 1,541 active military and 20,978 civilians in FY 77, will remain essentially level after several years of significant drawdowns following the Vietnam War.

- Pacific Fleet Logistics. 1,650 military and 9,900 civilians are located at Ship Repair Facilities, Naval Magazines, and other logistics support activities in the Pacific basin engaged in ship repair, ordnance storage and handling, and other maintenance and supply functions. Civilian employment will decline by approximately 250 positions in FY 77 as a result of installation realignments and support reductions.

- Naval Ship Engineering Center. The Naval Ship Engineering Center, which employs approximately 74 military and 2,386 civilians in FY 77, performs assigned engineering and material management functions for ship, system, equipment and material requirements in support of the Naval Sea Systems Command. A level program is forecast.

- Inactive Ship Maintenance Facilities. The Inactive Ships Maintenance Facilities are dedicated to the upkeep, support, and preservation of the Navy's 'mothball' fleet. There are 264 military and 224 civilian positions assigned to perform these functions.

(3) Logistics Support Activities. In addition to Supply and Maintenance and Production activities, Logistics Support also includes 1,000 military and 8,800 civilians in a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service, and technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, and Electronics Systems Commands. General program reductions totalling approximately 700 civilian positions are planned for FY 77.

g. Federal Agency Support

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0

Federal Agency Support includes Naval military manpower assigned to other Federal Departments and independent agencies, normally on a reimbursable basis.

6. Individuals

To this point, this chapter has discussed force structure manpower for the five force categories. Requirements for nonstructure manpower are in the Individuals account. Navy has an established set of

Individuals accounts so that the units of the force structure will be manned at their authorized strengths. The Individuals account consists of estimates of the numbers of transients, patients, prisoners, trainees, students, and Naval Academy midshipmen.

a. Transients

Navy Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Active	34.2	26.0	26.6	28.2

Transient requirements are a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel, which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Of these three factors, approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of Transient manpower requirements result from leave taken enroute.

Transient strength declines from FY 75 to FY 76 because of several factors. The Navy's programmed strength for the period FY 76 to FY 77 represents the projected average strength for each year as opposed to the FY 75 total which represents actual end FY strength. Because of a greater number of PCS moves during the summer months, actual end FY strength normally runs higher than programmed average strength. The reduced totals after FY 75 reflect improvements and modifications to Navy's personnel accounting and reporting systems to conform more closely with established definitions of the Individuals accounts, primarily in the area of Transients. These management initiatives include development of a new computer program to ensure accurate measurement of average strength in the Individuals accounts; development of more precise guidance in the reporting and accounting of Transients by field and headquarters units; and initiation of a new system of Transient reporting to isolate specific elements of transient requirements (i.e., travel, leave and temporary duty enroute) by type of move under the PCS move program. Further, it is anticipated that establishment of a Navy Transient Monitoring Unit on a full time basis will reduce total Transient requirements by on-site surveys designed to reduce personnel processing time at the activity level.

b. Patients and Prisoners

Navy Patients/Prisoners Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Active	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.1

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods.

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

During the period FY 76 - FY 77, patient strength is programmed to increase slightly reflecting the overall increase in the size of the active Navy. During the same period, the strength programmed in the Prisoner account will decline by approximately 500 largely reflecting an anticipated improvement in the quality of recruit accessions.

c. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen

Navy Trainee/Student/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Trainees/Students	58.1	48.7	58.1	56.7
Midshipmen	3.3	4.2	4.4	4.4
Total	61.4	52.9	62.5	61.1
Reserve Components				
Trainees/Students	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9

Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military training and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of trainee and student loads is included in the Military Manpower Training Report.

The decrease of 9,400 in the overall trainee/student account between end FY 75 and end FY 76 reflects significant underprogramming of this account by Navy rather than a diminished student/trainee requirement. To the extent feasible, billets have been internally reprogrammed to this account during the transition quarter and in FY 77 to offset partially past underprogramming of these accounts. In view of

the critical impact of continued underprogramming of the student/trainee account on fleet manning, Navy has initiated management efforts to determine possible corrective action within available resources. Intensive efforts are underway to identify specific student billet shortfalls by type and location. In view of increased fleet requirements for adequately trained personnel to man increasingly sophisticated shipboard systems, the entire issue of student billet shortfalls is being reviewed in Navy as a primary manpower issue in POM-78 deliberations. Navy has appointed a Student/Trainee account program manager to ensure effective coordination of all manpower and training issues related to this underprogramming and to develop a plan of remedial action in this area.

d. Force Structure Manpower Deviation

Navy Temporary Understrength in Units
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Active	-	-2.1	-5.8	-1.6

The force structure manpower deviation is the difference between the number of authorized spaces in Navy units and the number of people projected to be in those units on the last day of the fiscal year. This difference occurs because the arrivals of replacements at the units does not exactly offset losses. Thus units may be temporarily undermanned or overmanned due to the flow of replacements from the training organizations. By using this force structure manpower deviation, the Navy can display structure manning at authorized strength levels and, at the same time, show the difference between the number of personnel projected to be available and the force structure manpower requirements at the end of each fiscal year.

The number of trainees in the individuals account varies with the pattern of losses and accessions. The number of trainees in the Navy on a given date depends on the losses of people from the Navy in the months preceding that date, the number of recruits enlisted to offset those losses, and the capacity of the training base. On a given date, the trainee account may be either larger or smaller than needed to provide exactly the right number of trained personnel to the units of the force structure. Units will be either undermanned or overmanned due to fluctuations in the trainee account, and the force structure manpower deviation measures this difference.

D. FY 1978 Navy Manpower Requirements

1. Navy Manpower Requirements

The following table displays total Navy manpower requirements for FY 78 compared to FY 77:

Navy Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Active Military</u>		<u>Reserve Components</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>
Strategic Offensive	19.7	20.6	0.1	0.1	1.6	1.6
Strategic Defensive	*	*	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control & Surveillance	1.8	1.8	-	-	0.4	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>255.1</u>	<u>256.6</u>	<u>47.0</u>	<u>47.0</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Land Forces	2.9	2.9	2.0	2.0	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	68.8	68.8	7.0	7.2	-	-
Naval Forces	183.1	184.6	36.9	36.7	0.5	0.5
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	1.1	1.1	5.1	5.1
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>43.9</u>	<u>43.9</u>
Intelligence & Security	9.3	9.2	-	-	1.8	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	10.5	9.8	-	-	3.5	3.5
Research & Development	6.7	6.6	-	-	35.5	35.5
Support to Other Nations	0.6	0.6	-	-	1.7	1.7
Geophysical Activities	1.9	1.9	-	-	1.4	1.4
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>65.3</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>30.4</u>	<u>30.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	7.2	7.5	-	-	2.8	2.8
Base Operating Support	32.4	32.6	-	-	25.3	25.3
Force Support Training	12.8	12.8	-	-	0.5	0.5
Command	12.2	12.4	2.8	2.8	1.8	1.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>82.2</u>	<u>81.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>218.7</u>	<u>218.7</u>
Base Operating Support	2.6	2.6	-	-	20.0	20.0
Medical Support	22.1	22.1	-	-	10.9	10.9
Personnel Support	7.3	7.3	-	-	2.7	2.7
Individual Training	33.1	31.8	0.5	0.5	13.3	13.3
Command	8.7	8.7	0.4	0.4	15.7	15.7
Logistics	7.5	7.6	0.4	0.4	156.1	156.1
Federal Agency Support	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>93.3</u>	<u>90.3</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	28.2	26.7	-	-	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	4.1	4.2	-	-	-	-
Trainees & Students	56.7	55.1	0.9	0.9	-	-
Cadets	4.4	4.4	-	-	-	-
<u>Miscellaneous</u>	<u>-1.6</u>					
Temporary Unit Strength	-1.6					
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>544.0</u>	<u>543.8</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>300.6</u>	<u>300.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

2. Changes from FY 1977 Request

a. Overall. Active military strength is scheduled to decline slightly. A net decrease of some 200 is projected with general improvements in Strategic and General Purpose Forces, and a lesser increase in Mission Support Forces. This is offset by reductions in projected strength requirements in Auxiliary Forces, Central Support Forces and Individuals. Principal manpower changes in each of these categories are summarized below.

b. Strategic Forces. Strategic Forces strength will rise by approximately 1,000 from FY 77 to FY 78. All but 100 of this increase is directly attributable to programmed increases in TRIDENT program manpower. The remaining increase is programmed in manpower increases associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile system.

c. General Purpose Forces. The increase of approximately 1,500 in General Purpose Force strength occurs in Naval Forces manpower. Manpower associated with ASW and Fleet Air Defense forces will rise by about 1,500 due to force changes in this area. An increase of approximately 600 in Amphibious force manpower will be largely offset by a comparable decline in Naval Support Forces.

The four Selected Reserve VR (C118) squadrons and associated Squadron Reinforcement Units will be disestablished at the end of FY 77 with the Military Airlift Command assuming the Navy's airlift requirement commencing in FY 78. Increases in augmentation requirements for ASW patrol squadrons, surface combatants, and the introduction/transition to more complex aircraft offset the decreases.

d. Auxiliary Forces. The decline of 700 in programmed Auxiliary Force strength occurs largely in manpower requirements associated with the Centrally Managed Communications sub-category. Several communications base closure actions will permit a reduction of approximately 700 in this area. Lesser strength reductions of approximately 100 will be experienced in the areas of Intelligence and Security as well as in Research and Development.

e. Mission Support Forces. The increase of approximately 700 in Mission Support strength occurs because of minor increases in active military support of the reserve program (+300) and increases of approximately 200 each in Base Operations and Command requirements.

f. Central Support Forces. The decreased manpower requirement associated with Central Support Forces occurs primarily in the Individual Training subcategory. Individual Training manpower declines by about 1,300 primarily reflecting programmed reductions of this magnitude in flight training manpower.

g. Individuals. Individuals strength is programmed to decline by approximately 3,000 during this period. The currently projected decrease of some 1,600 Student/Trainee manpower requirements may require some adjustment in the future as a result of student billet underprogramming as described in the foregoing discussion of this account. Additionally, Transient strength decreases of approximately 1,500 based on Permanent Change of Station move program projections will be slightly offset by an increase of approximately 100 in combined Patient and Prisoner strength.

CHAPTER XII

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

The Marine Corps is unique among the four services in that the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of "...not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein...organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet...."

The Marine Corps has been assigned contingency missions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the national strategy and objectives. In addition, the Marine Corps is also charged by law to provide security for naval installations and to furnish guards for US embassies abroad.

While the minimum structure of the active Marine Corps is specified in law, the manpower requirement is not. The manpower required to fully man the Marine Corps to perform its assigned missions at what is considered an appropriate peacetime level totals 212,000 military and 21,000 direct and indirect hire civilians. The manpower levels being requested for Fiscal Years 1977 and 1978 have been fiscally constrained to a lower requirement as shown in the following table.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirement
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
Active Military	196.0	196.0
Marine Corps Reserve	33.5	33.5
Civilian Personnel	19.9	19.9

In the process of constraining the force to the requested level, selected units are manned at less than 100% of structure space requirements and low priority units are reduced to zero manning. Unmanned units are not eliminated from the total structure requirement, because in time of emergency, when force levels are increased, these units would be activated and manned.

The Marine Corps Reserve is maintained for the purpose of providing trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as national security may require.

The Selected Reserve of the Marine Corps provides the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces during time of emergency when national security requires additional capability beyond that available in the regular component. Such augmentation may comprise qualified individuals, effective combat and support elements, or a fourth division and aircraft wing with appropriate support.

The highlights of the FY 1977 manpower program are the manning of some previously unmanned combat units and increased emphasis on manpower quality.

2. Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps has taken action to upgrade the combat capability of its ground Fleet Marine Forces. Previously unmanned infantry, reconnaissance and artillery units will be returned to the manned structure in FY 1977. The armor and anti-armor capability of the ground combat forces will be upgraded in FY 1977 by increased anti-tank missile density and an additional tank unit.

Selected combat service support units from Marine Divisions, Marine Air Wings and Force Troops are being restructured into Force Service Support Groups, which will appreciably improve command and control of combat logistic support for Marine Amphibious Forces.

Similar force structure changes will increase the combat capability of the Marine Corps Reserve. Reserve combat service support units are being restructured into a Force Service Support Group. A second tank battalion is being retained, and additional anti-armor units are being equipped with modern anti-tank weapons.

An Infantry Training School will be re-established at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to provide high quality, standardized, combat skill training for Marines upon completion of recruit training at the Parris Island Recruit Depot. This action will significantly increase the level of training for East Coast ground combat units and their deployed forces thereby contributing to the readiness of these forces.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination

Determination of the Land Forces manpower requested starts with the establishment of the structure of the Marine infantry battalion, the smallest ground element which can be deployed independently for sustained combat operations. The process of designing the infantry battalion includes: research, field tests, equipment experiments and war games using manual and computer simulation. Although a variety of methodologies are used in this determination, the common goal of each is the development and testing of various organizations for the infantry battalion. Using a building block approach, alternative organizations are developed and tested to determine an appropriate organization and size for the battalion,

which is then subjected to controlled scenario troop tests, from the squad to battalion level, to investigate and validate computer model simulations.

Once the infantry battalion has been established, the number and type of other combat and support units to form the Marine division are determined. The objective is to provide an integrated combined-arms organization, including infantry battalions, artillery, reconnaissance, command and control, and support capability.

The other portions of the ground element, the Force Troops and Force Service Support Groups of the Fleet Marine Forces, constitute a pool of essential specialized units which are used to augment and support a combat force as required for a particular mission.

Manpower requirements for aviation units are derived by considering primarily the necessity to provide adequate support for the ground forces and, secondarily, the proper augmentation and size of an aircraft squadron. As an example, in the case of an AH-1J attack helicopter squadron, computer simulated war games and past historical data provide an estimate of the daily sorties required for the support of each infantry battalion. This requirement, combined with the sortie capability for that particular aircraft, generates data on the required number of attack helicopters. The crew ratio of 2.4 pilots per aircraft in wartime (2.2 in peacetime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors of 11.61 enlisted Marines for each aircraft establishes the manpower required to fly and maintain each helicopter. The desirable span of control and the necessity to provide forces in different geographic areas result in a determination of the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. In turn, this number provides the basis for the manpower that is required per squadron, after additional manpower has been added for command and control and support.

The determination of the manpower required for supporting activities is more complex than the process described above for the combat forces. This is due to the great variety of activities performed and the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist. Because of this diversity, the determination process for the support forces will be described in the appropriate DPPC category in Section C of this chapter.

B. Significant Trends

1. Management Initiatives

The Marine Corps is striving to upgrade the quality of personnel in its ranks. To this end, the Corps is seeking more high school graduates in its recruiting efforts. A goal of 75% high school graduates with the remaining 25% having completed the tenth grade has been set for the FY 1977 recruiting program. The Marine Corps recognizes that educational attainment is the best overall indication of quality as measured by factors such as retention, trainability, amenability to discipline, and social adaptability.

The recruiting service is being reorganized to give commanders of the recruit depots at Parris Island and San Diego direct, positive control over the process of accessing the new recruits they are responsible for converting into Marines. The commanding generals of the recruit depots will control the entire process from enlistment to recruit graduation by assuming the responsibility for implementing recruit quality and quantity standards through the recruiting activities of the Marine Corps Districts.

The purpose of this renewed emphasis on quality is to ensure that traditional high standards of professionalism and readiness for combat remain hallmarks of the Marine Corps. Upgrading the quality of personnel will improve training efficiency and combat readiness.

2. Military Manpower

a. Enlisted

After experiencing a recruiting and strength shortfall in FY 1974, the Marine Corps increased recruiting goals for FY 1975. This expanded quota was met, thus enabling a return to lower programmed recruit inputs in FY 1976 and beyond.

Active Marine Corps Enlisted Recruiting Goals

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
57,833	50,260	14,870	49,320

Increasing the term of enlistment will serve to help maintain reduced annual accession requirements. In FY 1975, 83% of all enlistments were for three years or more. For 1976 and beyond, all enlistments will be for three years or more, with 65% of enlistments for four years or more.

The Marine Corps has emphasized upgrading the quality of enlistments. The goal for FY 1977 is to have a Corps in which three out of four Marines will possess high school diplomas when they come in, the remainder having completed the tenth grade or better. This quality goal is tabulated below.

Active Marine Corps Recruit Quality

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Goal</u>
High School Graduates	59.1%	67%	75%

Similar quality goals are applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

Programmed recruit inputs for the Marine Corps Reserve are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Non-Prior Service)

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
7,340	7,348	2,060	7,200

b. Officer

The officer procurement objectives are shown in the following table:

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
2,368	2,175	323	2,175

The officer program for the budget period maintains a level officer force in terms of the total number of officers and grade levels. This program permits retention of the most promising officers, maintains a normal promotion flow, serves to maintain the effectiveness of the organization, and supports a rapid expansion requirement in time of emergency.

Officer input into the Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of two and one half years or more.

3. Civilian Manpower

Marine Corps policy is to utilize civilians to meet the manpower requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable consistent with Marine Corps requirements for the use of military personnel by reason of law, security, discipline, rotation, operational readiness, and cost. When functions need not be performed by military personnel and the use of civilian manpower is less expensive, then civilian manpower is programmed for that function. Additionally, the Marine Corps adheres to the policy of relying as much as possible on the civilian, non-Department of Defense sector of the economy for products and services rather than on in-house production. If the function need not be performed in-house, the Marine Corps conducts an analysis to determine the most effective and economical means of providing the service or products, i.e., in-house or contract, and acts accordingly. The Marine Corps has established stringent requirements on the type and scope of in-house operations, preferring to contract whenever economically advantageous.

C. Marine Corps Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category

The following tables display by DPPC Marine Corps manpower requirements for the period FY 1975 to FY 1978. This section describes the significant features of the FY 1976 - FY 1977 program. The FY 1978 program is described in Section D of this chapter.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	-	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*	*
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>110.3</u>	<u>113.7</u>	<u>109.6</u>	<u>112.1</u>
Land Forces	80.7	85.0	80.9	83.3
Tactical Air Forces	29.0	28.2	28.2	28.2
Naval Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Mobility Forces	-	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.9</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0
Communications	*	*	*	*
Research & Development	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8
Support to Other Nations	0.1	0.1	*	*
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>21.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
Base Operating Support	18.3	17.7	17.8	17.0
Force Support Training	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.6
Command	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>
Base Operating Support	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.5
Medical Support	-	-	-	-
Personnel Support	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.7
Individual Training	9.1	8.0	8.0	8.3
Command	4.7	4.3	4.3	4.1
Logistics	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>40.3</u>	<u>38.8</u>
Transients	11.6	11.5	11.6	11.2
Patients & Prisoners	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Trainees & Students	23.2	23.3	27.3	26.3
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

**MARINE CORPS RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Strategic Offensive				
Strategic Defensive				
Strategic Control and				
Surveillance				
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>30.7</u>	<u>30.8</u>
Land Forces	<u>21.6</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>22.8</u>
Tactical Air Forces	7.6	8.0	8.0	8.0
Naval Forces				
Mobility Forces				
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security				
Centrally Managed				
Communications				
Research & Development				
Support to Other Nations				
Geophysical Activities				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Reserve Components Support				
Base Operating Support				
Force Support Training				
Command				
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Base Operating Support				
Medical Support				
Personnel Support				
Individual Training				
Command				
Logistics				
Federal Agency Support				
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Transients				
Patients & Prisoners				
Trainees & Students	3.2	2.7	2.8	2.7
Cadets				
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>32.4</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>33.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Strategic Offensive				
Strategic Defensive				
Strategic Control and Surveillance				
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Land Forces				
Tactical Air Forces				
Naval Forces				
Mobility Forces				
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security				
Centrally Managed Communications				
Research & Development				
Support to Other Nations				
Geophysical Activities				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.1</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Base Operating Support	10.5	10.6	11.0	11.0
Force Support Training	-	-	-	-
Command	*	*	*	*
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Base Operating Support	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.6
Medical Support	-	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Individual Training	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4
Command	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9
Logistics	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>20.1</u>	<u>19.9</u>


Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

1. General Purpose Forces

The Marine Corps contribution to General Purpose Forces consists of Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. Over 110,000 Marines (56% of the Corps) will be in General Purpose Forces in FY 1977. Civilian manpower is not programmed for this category because of the need to keep these forces in a totally deployable, self-contained status. The following diagram displays the organization of Marine General Purpose Forces.


Marine Corps General Purpose Forces



The Marines in the Fleet Marine Forces provide the ground and aviation elements of three combined arms units called Marine Amphibious Forces, each of which consists of a Marine Division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and selected combat and combat service support units. The manpower requested will provide the Marine Corps sufficient trained personnel to commit two Marine Amphibious Forces immediately to combat operations, such as amphibious assaults or forcible entry against well-defended positions. Elements of the third amphibious force could be used as reinforcement, to provide assistance to allies, or in a sub-theater operation.

There are two Fleet Marine Force commands, one in the Atlantic, and the other in the Pacific. The organization of these two is depicted below:

The Fleet Marine Forces



1/ Composed of units from 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Troops FMF Pacific, and 3rd Force Service Support Group.

The Fleet Marine Forces are ready and mobile General Purpose Forces, capable of conducting amphibious operations and land based combat operations. Fleet Marine Forces are organized into balanced combined arms teams called Marine Air Ground Task Forces.

The Marine Corps Reserve is organized into a Division/Wing Team of a 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and appropriate combat support and combat service support elements. With the exception of those reserve personnel undergoing initial active duty for training, the entire Marine Corps Reserve contributes to General Purpose Forces.

a. Land Forces

As described above, active Land Forces include the three Marine Divisions, their supporting Force Troops, Force Service Support Groups, and supporting helicopter and air defense units from the Marine Aircraft Wings. Reserve Land Forces include a Marine Division, supporting Force Troops, Force Service Support Groups and FMF Augmentation Units, with supporting helicopter and air defense units from the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.

The following table displays Land Forces for FY 1975 - FY 1977.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	80.7	85.0	80.9	83.3
Reserve Components	21.6	22.8	22.7	22.8

The change in the end date of the fiscal year, from end June in FY 1976 to end September in FY 1977, highlights the dynamic and cyclic nature of the manpower program. In FY 1977 a heavy input of recruits during July, August and September causes 3,200 more Marines to be programmed as undergoing training at end September than at end June. With an essentially level total strength, this seasonal variation results in a temporary undermanning of the trained strength, and consequently, a smaller number of Marines expected to be in Land Forces on that particular day.

The increase of 2,400 Marines in Active Land Forces in FY 1977 over the FY 1977 level is a result of several factors: a decrease in the number of Marines programmed to be undergoing recruit training at end FY 1977, a reduction of the number of Marines programmed to be in a transient status at the end of FY 1977, and a reduction of Marines programmed for security duties.

b. Tactical Air Forces

The Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces manpower request is to support the fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons of the Marine Aircraft Wings. The request for Tactical Air Forces manpower is derived from an estimate of the number of aircraft that are required to support Marine ground elements committed to combat operations against a specified threat. The analysis deals with the type of weapons, the sorties required, aircraft and crew capabilities, and the necessity to control the airspace over the operating area. The number of squadrons, on the other

hand, is a function of the span of control, maintenance capability, and basing and deployment requirements. The establishment of a tactical squadron melds these two, resulting in the determination of manpower for each unit. The tactical aviation manpower request is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	29.0	28.2	28.2	28.2
Reserve Components	7.6	8.0	8.0	8.0

The above active manpower request will support a programmed level of 30 tactical squadrons in FY 1977. The request will also allow adequate manning of the air control units necessary to exercise control of the airspace over an amphibious operating area, the intermediate level aircraft maintenance activities, and expeditionary base operating support. It also includes Marine detachments on aircraft carriers. There will continue to be a Marine Aircraft Wing deployed on each coast of the United States and one in the Far East. Selected fixed wing squadrons will also be deployed on Navy carriers.

The reserve manpower requested will support eight tactical squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance and expeditionary support.

c. Naval Forces

The Marines request for Naval Forces include ships detachments (except those on aircraft carriers) and security detachments aboard submarine tenders. To assure consistency between the Navy and the Marine Corps accounting systems, detachments aboard aircraft carriers are accounted for under Tactical Air Forces. The Marine Corps furnishes these Naval Forces in accordance with a traditional mission, confirmed by law, to provide security in major Navy vessels, both at sea and in port. The following table shows a constant level of effort through the period.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5

2. Auxiliary Forces

The Marine Corps request for active duty military manpower in the Auxiliary Forces category is small, totaling approximately 1,900 military personnel, most of whom are in one of two areas: Intelligence and Security or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Forces category.

a. Intelligence and Security

The manpower requested under Intelligence and Security will assist the Navy in manning and providing security for cryptographic centers. The manpower request also provides for a small number of personnel (less than 50) who serve at various Naval Intelligence centers. The following table displays Marine Intelligence and Security manpower.

Marine Corps Intelligence and Security Manpower
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0

The Marine Corps contribution to the Intelligence and Security function represents an effort to use personnel in peacetime in a manner which will allow them to receive valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Under wartime conditions most of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

b. Research and Development

As the following table shows, Marine Corps participation in Research and Development activities is small and remains constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8

Most of the Marines who perform this function are assigned to the Development Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. The Development Center is located principally at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) is a tenant activity at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts encompass the development of organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Forces. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force in amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other services to avoid duplication and undesirable redundancy. These Marines conduct studies which identify required operational capabilities in view of threats and operational deficiencies, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned to developmental activities of the other services in a liaison capacity. The manpower requirement is based on current workload, and the number requested reflects the Marine Corps' best estimate of the number needed to conduct a useful research and development program.

c. Other Auxiliary Forces

In FY 1977 less than 50 Marines are in each of the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category are supporting the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communication Agency. Those in the Support to Other Nations category are in Military Assistance and Advisory Groups. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

3. Mission Support Forces

a. Reserve Components Support

The following table displays the manpower needed for the six district headquarters that manage the Marine Corps Reserve. Marines directly supporting a specific unit are reflected in the DPPC of the supported unit.

Marine Corps Reserve Component Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

b. Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)

The following table displays the manpower requirement for the period FY 1975 - FY 1977.

<u>Marine Corps Base Operating Support</u> <u>(Mission Support Forces) Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	18.3	17.7	17.8	17.0
<u>Civilians</u>	10.5	10.6	11.0	11.0

The Marine Corps sizes its requirements for base operating support manpower at its 15 installations using a fixed/variable support concept. The fixed portion, which is all that is requested here, consists of the functions and services which are required due to the existence of the base, but without regard to the Fleet Marine Force units that are based there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal.

The variable portion of the manpower, which is required solely due to the presence of the tenant units is provided by the tenant units themselves on a temporary basis under agreements worked out by the local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. This manpower augmentation remains assigned to the parent unit, and trains and deploys with the unit as an organized and effective combat force. As a result, this manpower is counted in General Purpose Forces. This method of operation allows the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain skills required upon deployment, when the parent unit must provide a substantial portion of its own support.

The Marine Corps reviews the base operating support manpower for each installation continually, and on-site inspections are conducted at least once every three years. Organizations, functions performed, and services rendered are analyzed to assure that the total manpower programmed is required and that grades and skill levels are appropriate.

The aggregate of the Base Operating Support manpower comes from a building block approach. The first task is to decide upon the functions to be performed, then upon the work unit required so that a measurement system may be devised. Staffing then becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished.

The Base Operating Support category also includes a request for 7,675 Marines assigned to security duties in barracks at 50 major Navy bases throughout the world in FY 1977. This requirement has

been reduced from the previous fiscal year by 780 Marines as a result of a transfer of staffing responsibility for Naval Correction Centers from the Marine Corps to the Navy. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory supply, mess and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and/or to meet other functional responsibilities assigned. The civilian increase in FY TQ is due to seasonal school teachers in CONUS appearing on the roles when the fiscal year end changes to September.

c. Force Support Training

The following table summarizes manpower required for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.6

Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to an operational squadron and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Air Training Groups are tasked with providing interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower request is based upon the projected student load and the necessity to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission. A reorganization of the Marine Air Training Groups will reduce manpower requirements by 200 Marines in FY 1977.

d. Command (Mission Support Forces)

The following table displays manpower in the Mission Support Forces Command category.

Marine Corps Command
(Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50.

The Marines in this category fill positions at the headquarters of the two Fleet Marine Forces and various international, combined, and unified command headquarters. Marine staff members at other service commands perform two important functions. First, they provide expertise to the commander on matters concerning amphibious warfare. Secondly, they provide a two-way conduit through which the Marine Corps is apprised of contingency planning and through which the staffs are aware of the capabilities and limitations of the Fleet Marine Forces. The manpower requested for the Fleet Marine Forces headquarters elements represents the necessary overhead structure required to administer and provide operational control over the Marine Corps General Purpose Forces.

4. Central Support Forces

a. Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)

	<u>Marine Corps Base Operating Support</u> <u>(Central Support Forces) Manpower</u> <u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.6

The manpower requested is used to support the logistic and training installations of the Marine Corps. Logistic installations supported in FY 1977 are the Marine Corps supply activities at Barstow, California, and Albany, Georgia. Two recruit depots located at Parris Island and San Diego and the training base at Quantico, Virginia, are the training installations supported.

b. Personnel Support

The Personnel Support manpower request shown below is almost exclusively for the recruiting service. Recruiting is a particularly critical service function in the Marine Corps because of the conditions created by the cessation of the draft and the marketing conditions prevailing under the volunteer force concept.

	<u>Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower</u> <u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

c. Individual Training

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.1	8.0	8.0	8.3
<u>Civilian</u>	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4

The manpower requested in the above table is required to conduct and support recruit training and the formal training and education of Marines. The training is conducted within Marine Corps schools and in the schools of other services, primarily the Navy. The increase of active military personnel in FY 1977 reflects the addition of the Infantry Training School at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, discussed previously.

d. Command (Central Support Forces)

Command manpower is displayed in the following table.

Marine Corps Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.7	4.3	4.3	4.1
<u>Civilian</u>	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9

The manpower requested under Command (Central Support Forces) is for Marine Corps headquarters, Navy headquarters support, and support of the Marine Corps, Navy, and other agencies. A reduction of 200 Marines and 111 civilians at these headquarters will take place in FY 1977.

e. Logistics

The Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and support activities. These activities procure material, maintain a centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other support services. A generally constant level of effort is programmed for the period FY 1976 - FY 1977.

Marine Corps Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9

f. Federal Agency Support

The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency Support.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3

The Federal Agency Support manpower requested by the Marine Corps consists almost exclusively of the 1,300 man Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion which furnishes embassy guards for the Department of State around the world.

5. Individuals

The Individuals accounts contain the Marine Corps estimates of the manpower required for transients, patients, prisoners, and students/trainees. The following table displays the manpower needed for these accounts.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Transients	11.6	11.5	11.6	11.2
Patients/Prisoners	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Trainees/Students	23.2	23.3	27.3	26.3
Total	36.2	36.2	40.3	38.8
Reserve Components				
Trainees/Students	3.2	2.7	2.8	2.7

The manpower shown in the Individuals accounts are estimates of the number of people who will be in a transient, trainee, student, patient or prisoner status at the end of the fiscal year. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. It is important to reemphasize that the Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, and that shortages in these accounts can only be made up by taking reductions with the combat or support forces.

The FY 1977 Transient end strength decrease from the FY 1970 level is a result of a decreased number of Permanent Change of Station moves.

The decline in the number of Trainees/Students at end FY 1977 from the 70 level results from lower recruiting requirements, which reduces the number of Marines undergoing recruit training.

Reserve Components in this category consist of enlisted manpower on initial active duty for training. These personnel are classified as trainees and are undergoing the same training as active duty Marines.

D. FY 1978 Marine Corps Manpower Requirements

The FY 1978 manpower levels requested by the Marine Corps, compared to FY 1977 are shown on the following tables.

A modest increase in General Purpose Forces has been programmed for FY 1978. This increase is allowed by a decrease in the trainee/student account of the Individuals category. Decreased recruiting requirements and a corresponding lower recruit training requirement contribute to this change.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Active Military		Reserve Component		Civilian	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	*	*	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>112.1</u>	<u>113.1</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>30.8</u>	-	-
Land Forces	83.3	84.2	22.8	22.8	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	28.2	28.4	8.0	8.0	-	-
Naval Forces	0.5	0.5	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	-	-	-	-
Intelligence & Security	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-
Centrally Managed						
Communications	*	*				
Research & Development	0.8	0.8				
Support to Other Nations	*	0.1				
Geophysical Activities	*	*				
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>21.4</u>	-	-	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.1</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.5	0.5	-	-	0.1	0.1
Base Operating Support	17.0	17.0	-	-	11.0	11.0
Force Support Training	2.6	2.5	-	-	-	-
Command	1.3	1.3	-	-	*	*
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>	-	-	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Base Operating Support	4.5	4.5	-	-	1.6	1.6
Medical Support	-	-	-	-	-	-
Personnel Support	2.7	2.7	-	-	0.1	0.1
Individual Training	8.3	8.3	-	-	2.4	2.4
Command	4.1	4.1	-	-	1.9	1.9
Logistics	0.8	0.8	-	-	2.9	2.9
Federal Agency Support	1.3	1.3	-	-	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>38.8</u>	<u>37.8</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.7</u>	-	-
Transients	11.2	10.6	-	-	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	1.3	1.3	-	-	-	-
Trainees & Students	26.3	25.8	2.7	2.7	-	-
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>196.0</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>19.9</u>

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

CHAPTER XIII AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

Within limited resources available for National defense, decisions have been made as to force levels, deployments, and activity rates which will permit the Air Force to maximize its combat capabilities. These decisions are reflected in the allocation of total available funds to forces, facilities, weapons system procurement, research and development, and manpower. This chapter provides the justification for Air Force active and reserve forces manpower levels requested for Fiscal Years 1977 and 1978 as summarized in the following table.

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	571.0	568.2
Reserve Components		
ANG	92.6	93.4
AFR	52.4	54.2
<u>Civilian</u>	257.1	257.1

The Air Force continues the incremental program to equip fully and flesh out the active force of 26 tactical fighter wings and modernize the Reserve force of 10 tactical fighter wings. This total air force of 36 wings will provide a capability to help meet requirements of a global conflict with the USSR.

Fiscal constraints make it difficult for the Air Force to procure an adequate number of modern aircraft each year and at the same time keep manpower strength at acceptable levels. Aircraft procurement in recent years has been well below the minimum average procurement of 200 aircraft per year we deem essential for force modernization. For FY 1977, we have made the difficult choice to reverse this procurement shortfall, and our plans call for procuring about 240 aircraft in FY 1977. In order to achieve this essential procurement goal, the Air Force has made numerous other program reductions, one of the most important of which is a reduction in active military and civilian manpower. The reductions programmed for FY 1977 will reduce Air Force manpower to a level which is 62,000 below the end of FY 1975.

Active force combat improvements started in FY 76 are continued in FY 77. Air crew ratios for the bulk of the tactical fighter force are increased from 1.1 to 1.21 per aircraft in FY 76 and to 1.25 per aircraft in FY 77. Tactical reconnaissance crew ratios are also increased from 1.1 to 1.25 in FY 77. These increases in trained aircrews will provide a significant improvement in capability for rapid deployment and greater staying power once in the combat area. Two tactical fighter training squadrons of F-5E aggressor aircraft are activated in FY 76, and an additional squadron is activated in FY 77 to provide more realistic combat training for aircrews. A program of complementary initiatives to increase strategic airlift capability, which includes increases to active force aircrew personnel for the C-5 force, has been developed.

Modernization of the air reserve forces continues in FY 77 with the transfer of additional KC-135 aircraft to the Air National Guard and the transfer of the initial increment of KC-135s to the Air Force Reserve. By end FY 77 the reserve forces will have eleven percent of the strategic tanker capability, over one-half of the tactical airlift capability, almost one half of the strategic airlift capability, over sixty percent of the airborne strategic defense capability, one half of the tactical reconnaissance capability, and over thirty percent of tactical fighter capability. Air Force Reserve units, operating WC-130 aircraft, will perform about seventy percent of the reimbursed aircraft reconnaissance of hurricanes and major East coast winter storms in support of the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce.

2. Air Force Structure

The force structure of the Air Force is the primary determinant of manpower requirements. Before addressing Air Force manpower requirements, it is necessary to discuss the force structure which generates these requirements. A comparison between the FY 77 and FY 64 force structures provides an insight into the changing complexion of the force in terms of numbers of aircraft, improved capabilities and performance, increased modernization of and reliance on reserve forces, and the requirement to maintain options for a "high-low mix" force of both sophisticated and highly capable but more austere tactical fighters.

As shown in the following table, the total force aircraft inventory has decreased by approximately 39% since FY 64. While this 5,975 reduction in aircraft inventory is significant, the loss in capabilities has been offset somewhat by the following actions. There have been revolutionary improvements in munitions and their delivery accuracies. The performance and capabilities of fighter aircraft have been greatly improved. The bomber force has been given enhanced penetration capabilities. There has been a conversion to an all-jet strategic airlift force.

Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Bombers	1,512	420
Tankers	1,060	710
Fighter/Attack/Interceptor	4,593	3,619
Recon	789	618
Cargo/Transport	3,273	1,325
Trainers	3,074	1,851
Other	<u>913</u>	<u>696</u>
TOTAL	15,214	9,239

While accommodating to reductions in total air force aircraft inventory, the Air Force has improved the balance between active and reserve components. The Air Force has based adjustments to this balance upon the needs and missions which these complementary forces are best suited to perform. Active forces are primarily required to support nonmobilization contingencies; the initial, premobilization defense of NATO; and to provide deterrence, forward deployments, and the rotation base to support these deployments. Reserve forces serve as effective complements to the active forces as augmentation for selected contingencies and for full mobilization. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are fully integrated into the total force. This integration is characterized by equipping the components with first-line aircraft--F-106s, A-7s, RF-4s, C-130s, and KC-135s. Beginning in FY 79, both active and reserve forces will be equipped with production line A-10s after the aircraft reaches initial operational capability.

a. Strategic Offensive Forces

Between FY 64 and FY 67, the strategic missile force grew from 821 to 1,054 ICBMs and has remained at that level. In the bomber force, there have been changes in both the size and mix. Since FY 64 the number of strategic bombers in the force will have been reduced from an active force inventory level of over 1,500 aircraft to 420 by end FY 77. In terms of mix, B-47s were phased out in FY 66, followed by the B-58 in FY 69. The FB-111 entered the inventory in FY 71. The strategic bomber force will decrease in FY TQ by one B-52G squadron. B-52D strategic bomber aircraft currently configured for mine laying operations will continue to support naval forces in the sea surveillance and control mission.

Total force tanker aircraft have been reduced 350 from FY 64 levels as the force has converted to an all jet tanker force. Within this total force decline, some KC-135 aircraft have been transferred from the active force to the reserve forces, beginning in FY 76 and extending through FY 79. As the reserve component units become mission ready, they will perform some day-to-day alert and will augment Strategic Air Command forces under generated alert conditions.

b. Strategic Defensive Forces

Air defense forces have undergone a significant change since FY 64. The number of active interceptors has been reduced dramatically as the emphasis on defense against a strategic bomber attack was reduced, and effort was directed to the missions of providing bomber attack warning and peacetime air-space surveillance and control. In FY 77, the active interceptor force remains at six squadrons, while the Air National Guard force is reduced to seven interceptor squadrons. Tactical F-4s augment this force to maintain minimum essential day-to-day U.S. coverage.

c. Tactical Air Forces

The inventory of active force tactical fighter aircraft has been reduced 104 below the FY 64 level. The active force tactical reconnaissance inventory has been reduced by 74 aircraft during the same period. The F-100 and RF-101 have been replaced in the active force, and the F-15 is being introduced in greater numbers.

The active tactical fighter force presently consists of 26 organizationally structured wings. However, because of combat attrition in Southeast Asia and limited production of new equipment, the 26-wing force is underequipped. The President's FY 77 Budget request continues the planned gradual increase in unit equipment within the 26 wings to bring them to full combat capability by FY 81. Although we are deploying highly capable aircraft, present crew resource limitations prevent us from achieving full system efficiency in terms of a capability to meet the high sustained sortie rates we would encounter in combat. Tactical fighter and reconnaissance crew ratio increases programmed for FY 77 will assist in correcting this situation.

The FY 77 program continues modernization of the Air National Guard by the continued transfer of A-7Ds and F-4s from the active force.

The requirement for an effective command and control system is satisfied, in part, by the various elements of the Tactical Air Control System. The present airborne element of this system is the C-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC). These aircraft, as well as the EC-135 Tactical Deployment Control Aircraft, will be replaced by the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

d. Airlift Forces

Major changes have occurred in the size and capability of the airlift forces since the early 1960s. In FY 64 the active strategic airlift force consisted primarily of propeller-driven aircraft and a few C-135 jets. The tactical airlift force consisted primarily of C-130s

and C-123s. By FY 68 the more capable C-141 had replaced most of the propeller-driven aircraft and the number of strategic airlift aircraft decreased. At the same time, the tactical airlift force was increased to accommodate SEA requirements. While the total FY 68 airlift force level remained about the same size as in FY 64, technological advances designed into the newer aircraft provided increased total airlift capability. The phase-in of the C-5 in the early seventies further increased this capability.

Within this total force decline in airlift aircraft inventory, the reserve forces have retired C-97, C-121 and C-124 strategic airlift aircraft. A cost effective concept of reserve associate units has now afforded the total force the ability to optimize existing bases and aircraft and to reduce support requirements. Presently, there are 13 Air Force Reserve squadrons associated with active C-141 units and four Air Force Reserve squadrons associated with active C-5 units. Reserve force tactical airlift assets have also been significantly improved. C-119s have been retired and replaced with C-7 and C-130 aircraft. The reserve force will continue to maintain the only short take-off and landing (STOL) capability in the total airlift force. In the 1980s, the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) is being considered as a replacement for the C-130 in the active force which would permit the phasing-out of the C-7/C-123 reserve force aircraft.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination Process

Since 1961, the active force has operated the Management Engineering Program as the principal means for determining manpower requirements. Experience and a conscientious effort to improve the program over the years have produced a dependable, objective, and accurate basis for documenting Air Force manpower requirements. These same techniques, and frequently the manpower standards developed by the active force, are used in the determination of reserve force manpower requirements.

As of 30 September 1975, more than 65% of total Air Force manpower requirements were based on standards. A description of the development of standards is presented below.

a. Standards Development

There are three distinct phases in a standards study: preliminary, measurement, and computation. (The steps that occur for each phase of a typical study are described below in general terms.)

(1) Preliminary Phase. An initial review is made of the function under study to document the kinds of work and tasks performed. From this, the function is divided into homogeneous work groupings or work centers and a detailed "work center description" is developed for each work center.

A Preliminary Report is prepared and reviewed by members of the Manpower and Organization staff and the staff activities being studied to insure that the description reflects essential and required work. The Preliminary Report also includes potential workload factors or units of measure that will be expressive of the production outputs or work performed in each work center. Additionally, the report contains a measurement plan and identifies the measurement techniques to be employed during the next phase.

(2) Measurement Phase. Many work measurement techniques are available and all are used to some extent. The two most commonly used in the Air Force are work sampling and operational audit.

Work sampling is employed by taking a large number of instantaneous samples of work being performed, according to the categories of work identified in the work center description. These observations are made at random times. The percentages of time observed in each category of work approach the percentages of time actually spent by the workers. This method is very accurate and is economical for measuring large cost, relatively stable functions with standard operations. Sufficient observations are taken during the study of a work center to insure a statistical confidence of 95% with plus or minus 3% accuracy.

Operational audit integrates four techniques into a systematic method for measuring work activity. Directed requirement recognizes that many activities and some positions are required by statute or Air Force directive. Good operator technique is based on the selection of a qualified individual and observing the amount of time taken by that person to perform a given activity. Historical experience draws on documented past experience as a source for frequency and time required to accomplish certain jobs. Best judgment employs the combined experience with judgment of the management engineering technician, the worker, and the work center supervisor to derive time and frequency estimates. This technique is used only in those cases where the required information is not attainable by any other means.

(3) Computation Phase. All data are analyzed and several tests are performed with different workload factors and statistical models to develop a standard which represents the most valid manhour to workload relationship.

The optimal statistical relationship between measured manhours and related workload volumes is determined by correlation and regression analysis which produces a manpower equation. This equation is used to predict manpower requirements for programmed workloads.

A final report with work center description, work measurement data, manning tables, and other supporting materials is prepared, reviewed by the major command manpower and functional staffs, then forwarded to Headquarters USAF for final review and approval.

The final study report usually includes standards for all work centers within a specific function. By using the results of all these standards, program estimating equations are developed which relate the aggregate command requirements to a programmable factor, such as base population or flying hours. As changes in programs are forecast, the standards allow corollary management actions to adjust manpower authorizations.

b. Manpower Guides

As previously stated, 65% of total Air Force manpower requirements are determined by manpower standards, developed according to the process just described. The remaining Air Force requirements are based on manpower guides, which employ various techniques including staff estimates, manpower surveys, desk audits, and contractor estimates. We expect that manpower guides will continue to be vital to determination of approximately 30-40% of Air Force manpower requirements. Guides are preferred when functions or systems have a known short-term life before phase-out or when it would not be cost effective to develop costly standards for small, one-of-a-kind, or specialized activities.

The application of both manpower standards and guides to forecast workload requirements provides the accurate, objective and consistent basis for resource managers at all levels of the Air Force to predict future manpower requirements. This process provides the Air Force the capability to insure that like activities throughout the Air Force receive required levels of manpower consistent with workload requirements. Further, when workload changes because of mission or force adjustments, accurate numbers of related manpower can be programmed with the changed mission or force level.

B. Significant Trends

1. Active Force. Fiscal year 1975 strengths in the President's FY 77 Budget already reflect a reduction below FY 64 pre-Southeast Asia levels of 304,000--or more than one fourth. The projected position for end FY 77 of 571,000 military and 257,139 civilians represents an additional reduction of 62,390 below FY 75 actual strengths.

Air Force Active Military and Civilian Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	612.6	584.1	584.0	571.0
<u>Civilian</u>	<u>278.0</u>	<u>264.8</u>	<u>264.6</u>	<u>257.1</u>
Total	890.6	848.9	848.6	828.1

2. Reserve Force. The relatively stable Selected Reserve strengths in the President's FY 77 Budget are an increase of almost 18,000 in the Air National Guard and more than 6,000 in the Air Force reserve over end FY 68 strengths. This increase results from a policy of increasing the roles and missions of the reserves and improving their ability to perform assigned missions by giving them modern weapons systems.

Air Force Selected Reserve Components
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 77 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Air National Guard	95.4	94.6	94.5	92.6
Air Force Reserve	<u>51.1</u>	<u>52.9</u>	<u>53.5</u>	<u>52.4</u>
Total	146.5	147.5	148.0	145.0

3. Management Initiatives.

The substantial support reductions already taken and programmed by the Air Force reduce the opportunity for realizing further strength savings of comparable magnitude. Therefore, the Air Force is emphasizing the benefits of productivity enhancing programs.

Substantial savings are programmed for the Air Force central logistics system through such actions as the Depot Plant Modernization Program; establishment of technology repair centers; and the merger of system management and item control functions. Installation of the Inertial Navigation System in C-141 aircraft will provide the capability to fly over specific routes without the previously required skills of a navigator. Installation of sensor system to provide security at certain locations will also reduce manpower requirements. The replacement of the Precision Approach Radar (PAR) system with the less manpower intensive Instrument Landing System at selected location is still another initiative which will save manpower resources. To assure continued and increasing emphasis on enhancing productivity in the Air Force, particularly in the weapons system area, a Productivity, Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (PRAM) program has been set up to develop and employ innovative management techniques.

Other economies are being effected. The Air Force is programming implementation of the Joint Air Defense Surveillance System, which features joint Air Force - Federal Aviation Agency use of improved equipment and facilities, and promises substantial savings. There are also substantial reductions in base operating support and significant reductions throughout the training establishment which are described in section C.

4. Headquarters. Cumulative reductions in Air Force management headquarters manpower since 1968 exceed 50% by the end of Fiscal Year 1977. These headquarters reductions are even more significant when compared to total Air Force strength reductions of 34% during the same period. One major action which significantly affected Air Force headquarters, involved revision of the Unified Command Plan. This affected two Air Force headquarters in addition to disestablishing two Unified Command headquarters. On 1 July 1975, Alaskan Command (ALCOM) and Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) were disestablished, and the Aerospace Defense Command was established as a specified command called ADCOM. The management and control functions of ALCOM and CONAD were merged with Alaskan Air Command and ADCOM respectively, with a savings in manpower.

As part of an Air Force program to improve efficiency and eliminate duplication, U.S. Air Forces Southern Command was disestablished on 31 December 1975. Tactical Air Command assumed major command responsibilities for Air Force activities in the Canal Zone and Central & South America.

During the summer of 1976, Headquarters Command, USAF, at Bolling AFB, Washington DC, will be inactivated. This will reduce manpower dedicated to headquarters activities and the number of personnel in the Washington area.

The Air Force intends to continue innovative efforts to find ways of converting headquarters and support manpower into combat resources without degrading the capability for command and control of the forces, and without reducing the capability to manage effectively the limited resources available for National defense. Significant actions are taking place, such as the Air Force plan to disestablish Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (AFCS) at Richards-Gebaur AFB. Implementation of this plan has been delayed by a federal court injunction. This development precluded the associated movement of AFCS to Scott AFB, Illinois, where it would have been merged with Headquarters, Military Airlift Command (MAC). An environmental assessment is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

5. Military Manpower

a. Enlisted

The Air Force has been successful in attaining 100% of its non-prior service procurement goals and plans to maintain a fairly constant level of procurement as reflected below:

Active Air Force Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Non-prior Service)

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
75,569	74,000	21,131	77,000

While the Air Force does not have a specific goal for the number of high school graduates, it is recognized that such individuals represent the greatest potential for successful performance. Hence, emphasis is placed on recruiting this resource, and success has been attained. In FY 75, 90.8% of Air Force recruits were high school graduates or equivalent. For the first half of FY 76, the rate was 96.5%.

Programmed recruit inputs for the Air Reserve Forces are as follows:

Air Reserve Forces Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Non-prior Service)

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
6,499	8,627	2,422	9,204	9,204

b. Officer

Active officer procurement goals are shown in the following table:

Active Air Force Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 75</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
7,958	6,063	2,146	6,507

The officer procurement program in the FY 77 President's Budget is a reflection of reduced rated requirements and the desire to minimize involuntary separation actions. However, this constrained procurement level could result in serious experience deficiencies in the out years if allowed to continue over time. Consequently, the reduction for FY 77 should not be considered a trend.

c. Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Category

The following tables display by DPPC Air Force manpower for the period FY 75-78. This section relates Air Force manpower requirements to force levels and describes the significant features of the FY 76-FY 77 program. Section D will describe the FY 1978 program.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>91.4</u>	<u>81.1</u>	<u>78.9</u>	<u>78.0</u>	<u>76.7</u>
Strategic Offensive	65.0	58.2	56.1	55.2	54.1
Strategic Defensive	15.0	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	11.4	10.2	10.2	10.0	10.3
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>112.9</u>	<u>114.1</u>	<u>114.6</u>	<u>120.9</u>	<u>122.9</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	71.4	76.4	76.9	81.0	83.1
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	41.5	37.7	37.7	39.9	39.8
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>70.6</u>	<u>66.7</u>	<u>66.6</u>	<u>65.9</u>	<u>64.7</u>
Intelligence & Security	22.6	21.2	21.2	20.7	19.5
Centrally Managed Communications	19.5	18.0	18.0	17.5	17.6
Research & Development	17.9	17.2	17.2	16.1	16.1
Support to Other Nations	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.6	2.6
Geophysical Activities	9.5	9.0	9.0	8.9	8.9
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>163.3</u>	<u>152.8</u>	<u>153.1</u>	<u>149.5</u>	<u>149.2</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Base Operating Support	124.8	114.8	115.0	111.2	110.0
Force Support Training	17.1	17.3	17.5	19.0	19.8
Command	20.5	20.1	20.1	18.8	18.9
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>108.8</u>	<u>103.9</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>96.3</u>	<u>95.3</u>
Base Operating Support	21.3	19.8	19.9	16.9	16.4
Medical Support	33.8	33.9	34.0	32.3	32.5
Personnel Support	6.6	6.1	6.0	6.4	6.4
Individual Training	28.3	25.8	26.1	23.2	22.7
Command	13.9	13.5	13.5	12.8	12.8
Logistics	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>65.5</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>66.4</u>	<u>60.4</u>	<u>59.4</u>
Transients	25.4	22.6	22.9	18.3	18.5
Patients & Prisoners	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7
Trainees & Students	35.3	37.8	38.5	37.3	36.0
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.2
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>612.6</u>	<u>584.1</u>	<u>584.0</u>	<u>571.0</u>	<u>568.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>16.8</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	3.6	4.5	6.1	8.7
Strategic Defensive	13.7	11.2	10.3	7.4	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>63.6</u>	<u>62.5</u>	<u>62.3</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>59.5</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces	50.2	48.0	47.8	46.2	44.0
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces	13.4	14.5	14.5	15.5	15.5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.2</u>
Intelligence & Security					
Centrally Managed					
Communications	9.9	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.6
Research & Development					
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.5</u>
Reserve Components Support	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2
Base Operating Support	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Force Support Training	2.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.0
Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support					
Personnel Support					
Individual Training					
Command					
Logistics					
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.4</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4
Cadets					
<u>Total Air National Guard</u>	<u>95.4</u>	<u>94.6</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>92.6</u>	<u>93.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 1/
(End Paid-Drill Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	1.3	1.7
Strategic Defensive	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>36.0</u>	<u>34.8</u>	<u>35.4</u>	<u>34.2</u>	<u>34.0</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.1	5.1
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces	30.9	29.4	29.9	29.1	29.0
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Intelligence & Security					
Centrally Managed					
Communications					
Research & Development					
Support to Other Nations					
Geophysical Activities	-	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>13.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
Base Operating Support	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9
Force Support Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Command	5.6	8.3	8.3	7.5	9.0
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Base Operating Support					
Medical Support	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Personnel Support					
Individual Training					
Command					
Logistics	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Federal Agency Support					
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6
Cadets					
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>51.1</u>	<u>52.9</u>	<u>53.5</u>	<u>52.4</u>	<u>54.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Selected Reserve.

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>8.0</u>
Strategic Offensive	0.6	1.5	1.7	2.6	3.4
Strategic Defensive	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.7	3.7
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>28.7</u>	<u>29.0</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>29.4</u>	<u>28.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	14.4	14.6	14.7	14.7	14.1
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	14.3	14.4	14.4	14.7	14.5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>31.4</u>	<u>31.4</u>	<u>31.3</u>	<u>31.3</u>
Intelligence & Security	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7
Centrally Managed					
Communications	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.1
Research & Development	22.8	21.6	21.6	20.3	20.3
Support to Other Nations	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.9	1.9
Geophysical Activities	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>76.1</u>	<u>71.0</u>	<u>70.8</u>	<u>68.7</u>	<u>69.0</u>
Reserve Components Support	5.5	5.0	5.0	4.7	4.7
Base Operating Support	64.2	60.0	59.8	57.8	58.0
Force Support Training	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5
Command	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>134.5</u>	<u>126.4</u>	<u>126.4</u>	<u>120.5</u>	<u>120.3</u>
Base Operating Support	30.2	29.6	29.8	28.5	28.2
Medical Support	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.7	7.7
Personnel Support	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Individual Training	7.2	7.0	7.1	6.4	6.4
Command	11.9	11.6	11.5	11.1	11.1
Logistics	75.7	69.0	68.9	65.4	65.5
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>278.0</u>	<u>264.8</u>	<u>264.6</u>	<u>257.1</u>	<u>257.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1. Strategic Forces. Air Force strategic forces are subdivided into offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces.

a. Strategic Offensive Forces. The following tables show Air Force strategic offensive forces.

Air Force Strategic Offensive Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Force:</u>				
<u>Bombers</u>				
B-52 (UE) 1/	330	330	316	316
FB-111 (UE)	66	66	66	66
<u>Tankers</u>				
KC-135 (UE)	615	583	575	543
<u>Missiles</u>				
Titan II	54	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces:</u>				
<u>Tankers</u>				
ANG KC-135 (UE)	0	32	40	56
AFR KC-135 (UE)	0	0	0	16

1/ Unit Equipment (UE) is the basis for manning aircraft equipped units. This is less than the Total Active Inventory (TAI).

Air Force Strategic Offensive Forces Manpower
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	65.0	58.2	56.1	55.2
Reserve Components				
ANG	-	3.6	4.5	6.1
AFR	-	-	-	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	.6	1.5	1.7	2.6

Strategic offensive forces consist of combat aircraft and inter-continental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to prevent nuclear war through its ability to deliver nuclear firepower to any part of the world,. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional (non-nuclear) weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 77, there are 21 B52 squadrons, four FB-111 squadrons, 33 active force and nine reserve force KC-135 tanker squadrons, six Titan missile squadrons and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the unit equipment (UE) shown in the above table. Also included are combat evaluation and strategic missile evaluation squadrons.

The active force manpower reductions in the above table are attributable to the following major changes in the operation of the strategic offensive forces. The first was a reduction in the proportion of the force to be maintained on ground alert from 40% to approximately 30%. The second is the incremental transfer of 128 UE KC-135 tankers from the active force to the air reserve components. Civilian manpower increases provide the reserve forces technicians required for this increased mission. The third change is associated with withdrawal of strategic forces from Southeast Asia. Additionally, a B-52 wing was inactivated in FY 76 and its resources consolidated with other active units. Another B-52 squadron is planned for inactivation in FY TQ in recognition of the requirement for more aircraft in non-operational (NOA) status for maintenance/modification. Because NOA aircraft are not programmed to include flying hours, aircrews and maintenance support, there is an attendant savings in these resources. Additional reductions in FY TQ reflect reduced Air Force operations at Goose Air Base, Labrador.

In FY 77 reductions associated with installation of security sensor systems and transfer of KC-135s to the reserve force are partially offset by the transfer of mission evaluation activities from the DPPC Mission Support Forces (Command).

The above bomber and tanker actions resulted in a decreased requirement for satellite air bases and they have been reduced. With the decrease in active force tankers and reduced day-to-day alert, it has been possible to consolidate some alert aircraft at selected main operating bases without decreasing operational capability.

The increases for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve reflect the phased transfer of KC-135 aircraft from the active force.

b. Strategic Defensive Forces. The following tables show Air Force strategic defensive force requirements.

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Interceptor Squadrons</u>				
Active Force	6	6	6	6
Air National Guard	14	11	10	7
<u>Early Warning Squadron</u>				
Air Force Reserve	1	1	1	1
<u>Defense System Evaluation (EB-57) Squadrons</u>				
Active Force	1	1	1	1
Air National Guard	2	2	2	2

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.0	12.7	12.7	12.7
Reserve Components				
ANG	13.7	11.2	10.3	7.4
AFR	.5	.6	.6	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.7

Air Force strategic defensive forces include the aircraft and radars of the Aerospace Defense Command, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. These forces are required for surveillance and control of air space. To perform this mission in FY 77, the Air Force will employ a force of six active Air Force and six Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, and one ANG F-4 squadron. The ground environment systems include seven Region Control Centers, three manual NORAD control centers, 66 surveillance radar sites and one Back Up Interceptor Control (BUIC) facility. There are also eight FAA/USAF joint use radar sites and three ANG radar sites used for strategic defense. Thirty-one Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

The active force manpower reductions occurring between FY 75 and FY 76 are attributable to the phase-out of the remaining six UE EC-121 Airborne Early Warning & Control squadron (four aircraft will be retained in the Air Force Reserve to augment their EC-121 squadron) and one manual NORAD control center. Other changes include reductions in ANG munitions storage, and reductions related to ANG force changes. Increases in FY 77 caused by the transfer of defense systems evaluation squadrons and radar evaluation squadrons from the DPPC Mission Support Forces (Command) are offset by the transfer of Space Support Program resources to the DPPC Auxiliary Forces (Geophysical Activities).

Changes in Air National Guard manpower are attributable: in FY 76 to the reduction of two F-102 squadrons and two F-101 squadrons offset by the addition of one F-4 squadron; in FY TQ to the reduction of one F-101 squadron; and, in FY 77 to the reduction of three F-101 squadrons.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	11.4	10.2	10.2	10.0
Reserve Components				
ANG	.7	.7	.7	.7
<u>Civilian</u>	.8	.9	.9	.9

Control and surveillance (C&S) forces employ the following aircraft: one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 27 Post Attack Command and Control System (PACCS) aircraft which are used by the Strategic Air Command for Airborne Command posts, communication relay and launch control centers, and three E-4A aircraft which are the National Emergency Airborne Command post aircraft located at Andrews AFB, MD. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American Continent; three Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites; six Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Detection and Warning sites; seven SPACETRACK sites consisting of radars and Baker-Nunn cameras, including the FPS-85 phased array radar at Eglin AFB, FL; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control & warning sites and portions of the national military command and control system. Finally, C&S forces include communications and command and control support equipment including the consolidation of WWMCCS ADP resources in this category.

Changes in FY 76 are primarily attributable to reductions associated with contracting-out Baker-Nunn camera sites, the reorganization of the Post Attack Command and Control System, savings realized with the application of manpower standards, savings associated with data processing equipment, inactivation of two radar warning sites for submarine launched ballistic missiles, and savings associated with the assumption of SAC communications workload by AFCS. FY 77 changes reflect reductions in base operating support.

2. General Purpose Forces. Air Force general purpose forces are subdivided into tactical air forces and mobility forces.

a. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical air forces primary mission manpower includes the air crews, aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel, and weapons systems security and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included are the personnel required for associated command functions, tactical air control systems, forward air control, and for air liaison officers necessary to support Army and allied ground forces.

Civilian resources are programmed in the tactical forces to perform those jobs that do not require military personnel. The majority support War Readiness Materiel storage or serve as Reserve forces technicians.

The following example, using the F-4E aircraft, is illustrative of the manner in which tactical air manpower requirements are derived:

Crews: The crew composition of the F-4E is two officers. The FY 77 required crew ratio based on combat readiness requirements is 1.25 per aircraft. The 1.25 crew ratio means that for a squadron composed of 24 aircraft, 60 officers would be required in primary crew positions.

Maintenance: The tactical fighter maintenance manpower requirements contained in the President's FY 77 Budget reflect the minimum necessary for wartime deployment requirements and aircrew combat capability. Maintenance manpower requirements for the F-4E were derived through simulation modeling based on inputs developed by employing industrial engineering techniques and experience gained during Southeast Asia operations.

The computer simulation model used was developed by the Air Force Logistics Command and the Rand Corporation and is called LCOM (Logistics Composite Model). LCOM was designed, as an essential element of the regularized Air Force manpower requirements determination process, to simulate a maintenance environment which can be used to accurately predict wartime maintenance manpower requirements. The simulation model is based on wartime planning requirements to support the national strategy. It considers the effect on maintenance manpower requirements of such factors as deployment/mobility operations, sortie rates, aircraft failure rates and spare parts availability. It also insures that sufficient maintenance manpower is provided to allow the Air Force to meet wartime requirements for deploying certain units to multiple locations.

Testing validated the capability of LCOM to accurately predict maintenance manpower requirements. In this test the flying schedule of an operational Air Force flying unit was input into LCOM to determine the unit's

maintenance manpower requirements. The unit was then manned to these requirements and the required flying schedule was flown. After careful review of the test results, LCOM was confirmed as a viable tool for determining aircraft maintenance manpower requirements and is being applied to all major tactical aircraft systems.

Using LCOM, the maintenance requirement for a 24 UE F-4E squadron has been determined to be 9 officers and 436 airmen.

Munitions. These requirements are based on management engineering statistical standards. Included in this area is the manpower required for: loading, unloading, arming and de-arming of committed munitions; inspection, testing and maintenance of all aircraft weapons release systems; maintenance, ammunition loadings, activation and deactivation of aircraft gun systems; and a 30-day capability for munitions maintenance, storage and handling. The factor for the F-4E is 6.44 manpower authorizations per aircraft.

Wing/Squadron Staff. These requirements are based on management engineering standards and manning guides. Included are the men required for squadron supervision and the squadron contribution to the wing staff. These personnel perform such jobs as command, operations, planning and scheduling, flying safety, quality control on aircrew training and proficiency. Each F-4E squadron requires 15 officers and 31 airmen.

Weapons System Security. These requirements are based on manpower standards. Security personnel are required for such jobs as entry control, close and distant boundary support and security alert teams. The requirement for an F-4E squadron varies by command, location and alert commitments. Approximately 36 airmen per squadron is a representative requirement.

Application of Factors

(Typical F-4E squadron of 24 aircraft with personnel working 10 hours per day, 6 days per week).

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	<u>Total</u>
Crew: 24x2x1.25	60	0	0
Maintenance: simulation model	9	436	445
Munitions: 24x6.44	3	152	155
Wing/Squadron	15	31	46
Weapons System Security	<u>0</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>36</u>
Primary Mission	87	655	742
Manpower requirement for typical F-4E Squadron			

Manpower requirements for other types of tactical air forces squadrons are calculated in a similar manner.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Force:</u>				
Air Force Tactical Wings (TFW)	26	26	26	26
Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons	12	9	9	9
<u>Reserve Forces:</u>				
Air National Guard Fighter/Attack Sq	29	28	28	30
ANG Reconnaissance Sq	7	9	9	9
Air Force Reserve Fighter/Attack Sq	7	7	7	7
Special Operations Sq	1	2	2	2

Air Force Tactical Air Force Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	71.4	76.4	76.9	81.0
Reserve Components				
ANG	50.2	48.0	47.8	46.2
AFR	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.1
<u>Civilian</u>	14.4	14.6	14.7	14.7

In FY 76 special operations squadrons in the active force are phased down and three squadrons of RF-4Cs and one squadron of A-7s are transferred to the Air National Guard from the active forces as part of the reserve force modernization program. Required improvements in tactical air forces capability are provided by the following actions. Crew ratios are increased from 1.1 to 1.21 per aircraft for most of the tactical fighter force. A tactical air control system has been established in Europe to provide improved command and control of United States and allied forces under Second Allied Tactical Air Force.

Other changes include increased manpower to maintain increased prepositioned war reserve material overseas, and to allow the Air Force to meet wartime requirements for deploying units to multiple locations. In the transition quarter, the initial Airborne Warning and Control Squadron (AWACS) cadre is established.

Changes between the transition quarter and fiscal year 77 reflect an additional incremental improvement in tactical air forces capability with increased crew ratios from an average of 1.21 to 1.25 for tactical fighter aircraft. (F-111s will remain at 1.1). This will fully restore the combat capability lost in fiscal year 1971 when the demands of other priority programs brought about the reduction from 1.25 to 1.1 in units outside Southeast Asia. Tactical reconnaissance aircrew ratios are also increased in fiscal year 1977. This restoration of trained fighter and reconnaissance aircrews and maintenance personnel represents a significant incremental increase in capability to support rapid deployment of our tactical forces and greater staying power once they are in the combat zone.

In fiscal year 1977, the capability of active force tactical air forces is increased with the initial increment of five unit equipment Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Increased emphasis is being placed on preparing Air Force personnel to be able to defend themselves against the increasing Soviet emphasis on development of chemical offensive weapons. FY 1977 requirements also reflect development of a sortie-oriented, event-centered aircrew combat capability improvement program to insure that Air Force tactical fighter aircrews are capable of being immediately introduced into combat with a qualitative advantage. This program, based on lessons learned during Southeast Asia operations, improves the combat skills and capability of aircrews by tailoring their flying activities to perform specific events that will qualify them to carry out their wing's mission. They are trained to excellence in the wing's primary mission (which could be air to air combat) and to a lesser degree for the wing's secondary mission (which could be air to ground). The compelling feature of the program is the capability to hone the cutting edge of this combat force within the same number, and in some instances, fewer flying hours. This program reinforces aircrew confidence and capability through increased sorties of shorter duration. Increased sorties lead to an increase in maintenance manpower requirements.

Other active force changes in FY 1977 are improvement in the tactical air control system for the Second Allied Tactical Air Force and increases in manpower to meet the demands of multiple deployments. In FY 77 reserve forces modernization continues with the transfer of three squadrons of active force A-7Ds and two squadrons of F-4Cs to the Air National Guard. The active tactical fighter force is retained at 26 wings, with a significant increase in capability, by the introduction of the A-10 and the continued procurement of F-15s.

Increases in Air National Guard strengths associated with acceptance of active force A-7 and F/RF-4 aircraft in FY 76 and FY 77 are offset by reductions or elimination of F-100, RF-101, F-104, KC-97 and Special Operations Forces aircraft and reductions associated with a reorganization of tactical control/mobile communication units.

b. Mobility Forces: Mobility forces manpower includes the crews, aircraft maintenance, aerial port, supply and weapons system security personnel as well as personnel to perform essential training, flying safety and command and control duties. The determination of these requirements is accomplished in a manner similar to procedures described in the sections on tactical air forces and the manpower requirements determination process. Civilian resources in the Mobility Forces are programmed to fill those requirements that do not require military personnel. In addition to maintenance specialists, the aerial port and terminal operations necessary to support the strategic airlift force also require large numbers of civilians. Reserve forces technicians employed in associate airlift units are also included in civilian totals.

Air Force Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Force:</u>				
Tactical Airlift Sq	16	15	15	15
Strategic Airlift Sq	17	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Sq	3	3	3	3
Special Mission				
Airlift Sq	2	2	2	2
Aerospace Rescue &				
Recovery Sq	9	7	7	7
<u>Reserve Force:</u>				
Tactical Airlift Sq				
(ANG/USAFR)	37	37	37	36
Strategic Airlift Sq				
(USAFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Sq				
(USAFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue &				
Recovery Sq (ANG/				
USAFR)	4	4	4	4

1/ Associate squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aero-med squadron, four C-5A squadrons and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	41.5	37.7	37.7	39.9
Reserve Components				
ANG	13.4	14.5	14.5	15.5
AFR	30.9	29.4	29.9	29.1
<u>Civilian</u>	14.3	14.4	14.4	14.7

Active force changes in FY 76 include reductions in C-141 maintenance manhour requirements, reductions in strategic aerial ports, retirement of rescue aircraft, and transfer of 40 UE C-130s to the Air National Guard. Civilian increases are primarily related to reserve force modernization requirements.

Active force manpower levels in the above chart are consistent with Congressional direction which requires that increases in strategic airlift capability be achieved to the maximum extent possible by employing Selected Reserve components. The Air Force can achieve the required strategic airlift mobilized C-141 crew ratio of 4.0 per aircraft and capability for 12.5 hour surge and 10 hour sustained utilization rates in FY 78. Since Air Force Reserve recruiting is not expected to achieve a 2.0 crew ratio for the C-5 by the end of FY 79. In the interim FY 77 reflects an increase from 2.0 to 2.25 crews per C-5 aircraft to allow the active force to meet this total force shortfall. This temporary increase will provide the required capability for sustaining a 9.5 hour per day utilization rate in fiscal year 1977 and achieving the required 10 hour rate in fiscal year 1978.

During fiscal year 1977, the transfer of an additional 18 UE C-130's to the ANG is offset by the transfer of "Red Horse" combat construction squadrons to this General Purpose Forces category to more correctly identify their direct combat support mission. Also, support airlift assets are consolidated under mobility forces and savings are realized from the implementation of the Dual Inertial Navigation System in C-141 aircraft.

Air reserve force changes in FY 76 and FY 77 reflect force modernization transfers from the active force of 58 UE C-130s to the Air National Guard and retirement of one squadron of C-123s. Air Force Reserve manpower changes reflect conversions of C-130 aircraft to KC-135s and crew ratio increases in the C-141/C-5 associate program as adjusted by Congressional direction in this area.

3. Auxiliary Forces. Auxiliary forces are subdivided into intelligence and security, centrally managed communications, research and development, support to other nations and geophysical activities.

a. Intelligence and Security. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Intelligence & Security Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	22.6	21.2	21.2	20.7
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7

Active force intelligence manpower levels in the above table primarily reflect reductions in FY 76 associated with Southeast Asia operations, reductions in reconnaissance and signal intelligence activities and the transfer of cryptologic training resources to the DPPC Central Support Forces (Individual Training). Reduced levels in FY 77 reflect reductions in support to intelligence activities.

b. Centrally Managed Communications. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	19.5	18.0	18.0	17.5
Reserve Components				
ANG	9.9	9.5	9.5	9.6
<u>Civilian</u>	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.1

The changes between FY 75 and 76 are attributable to realignment of Engineering Installation and Communication units; Southeast Asia support reductions; realignment of Air Force activities in the Pacific; a reduction of telecommunications manpower through military to civilian conversions and application of Air Force manpower standards. ADP support of WWMCCS was also transferred from Central Support (Command) in FY 76. Reductions in FY 77 are primarily attributable to reductions in support to communications activities. Changes in Air National Guard manpower reflect realignments in Mobile Communications activities.

c. Research and Development. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	17.9	17.2	17.2	16.1
<u>Civilian</u>	22.8	21.6	21.6	20.3

The decline in research and development manpower between FY 75 and FY 76 is primarily attributable to Air Force support reduction initiatives. These include reductions in management headquarters, the inactivation of one laboratory, inactivation of the Air Force Special Weapons Center and consolidation of AFSC test aircraft from six to three locations. Also occurring in FY 76 are military to civilian conversions. FY 77 changes reflect the transfer of Kirtland Air Force Base from this category to Central Support Forces (Base Operating Support), the transfer of support airlift resources to the DPPC General Purpose Forces (Mobility Forces), and the transfer of Foreign Military Sales resources to the Support to Other Nations category. These changes are partially offset by the transfer of flight-line maintenance functions at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base from Central Support Forces (Logistics & BOS) to this category.

d. Support to Other Nations. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Support to Other Nations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.9

The increases occurring in the above active force end strengths are primarily attributable to Foreign Military Sales (FMS). There are small increased workloads in FY 76 and the realignment of full-time FMS resources from other categories in FY 77. This FY 77 realignment was accomplished, consistent with Congressional interest, to highlight resources dedicated to FMS workloads. These fully-reimbursable authorizations primarily provide technical assistance and training in areas such as aircraft, ground radars, long-range automated defense systems, electronics, communications, logistics, basing and facilities, command and control and electronic warfare.

e. Geophysical Activities: Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

<u>Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.5	9.0	9.0	8.9
Reserve Components				
ANG	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
AFR	-	0.5	0.6	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3

Active force manpower reductions reflect the drawdown in base weather operations consistent with drawdown in forces and basing structure. In FY 76, seven WC-130s are transferred to the Air Force Reserve. The Air Force Reserve now shares the weather reconnaissance mission with the active force. Increases in civilians are attributable to requirements for Air Force Reserve technicians to support this increased mission. FY 77 reductions in Defense activities and reduction of three manual weather relays are partially offset by the transfer of space support program resources from strategic defensive forces to this category.

4. Mission Support Forces. Mission Support Forces are subdivided into reserve components support, base operating support, force support training, and command.

a. Reserve Component Support. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Reserve Component Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.5
Reserve Components				
ANG	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.2
AFR	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	5.5	5.0	5.0	4.7

Active force manpower accounted for in the Reserve Component Support category totals stated above are employed in activities with area responsibilities such as Air Force Reserve Regions and National Guard state headquarters; general administrative activities such as the Air Reserve Personnel Center; personnel associated with the operations and maintenance of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve air bases; manpower associated with the Office of the Chief of Air Force Reserve and Headquarters Air Force Reserve; and the Air Force portion of the National Guard Bureau.

Active force reductions in FY 76 reflect primarily the closing of Ellington and Hamilton Air Force Bases.

Reserve force changes in FY 76 primarily reflect the transfer of control of Ellington Air Force Base to the State of Texas and the closing of Hamilton Air Force Base. In FY 77 a slight increase in the mobilization augmentee program and increases to meet the increased requirements of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts are offset by the transfer of the ANG fighter training squadron to Force Support Training.

b. Base Operating Support. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	124.8	114.8	115.0	111.2
Reserve Components				
ANG	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
AFR	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.9
<u>Civilian</u>	64.2	60.0	59.8	57.8

These personnel are an integral part of the combat wing. They perform such functions as aircraft refueling, control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and facilities maintenance, fire protection and crash rescue, base security, supply and supply service and essential administrative management functions.

Active force manpower reductions in this category result from force reductions discussed in previous categories; Air Force Management initiatives to reduce support costs, base activity reductions, withdrawal from Southeast Asia, reductions in "counsellor" type positions, and support reductions to increase combat capability in Europe. FY 77 increases to this category include the transfer of Pacific support responsibilities from the Army, and USAFSO base operating support from Central Support Forces (BOS) and increases to meet the requirements of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. These are more than offset by support reduction initiatives, reductions in base support activities, the transfer of support airlift resources to General Purpose Forces (Mobility Forces), the transfer of "Red Horse" combat construction squadrons to General Purpose Forces (Mobility), and savings from conversion of the Precision Approach Radar at certain locations to the less manpower intensive and more effective Instrument Landing System.

c. Force Support Training. Manpower requirements for this category are:

<u>Air Force Force Support Training Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Military				
Active	17.1	17.3	17.5	19.0
Reserve Components				
ANG	2.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
AFR	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3

Active force increases in FY 76 are relatively small and are predominantly driven by force changes. Force support training includes the activation of two F-5E tactical fighter training (aggressor) squadrons to provide more realistic aircrew combat training than has been possible outside the actual combat environment. This improved combat environment will allow the development of maneuvers and combat tactics that will enhance the ability of aircrews to engage enemy forces. (The third

F-5E squadron, approved by Congress for activation in FY 76, will not be activated until FY 77 because of shortages in ground equipment.)

In FY 1977, increases are primarily associated with manpower to support the C-141/C-5 aircrew qualification training, phase-in of World-Wide Air Defense Enhancement (WWADE), and increased training aircraft and range equipment supporting tactical forces.

d. Command. Air Force manpower requirements for Command are:

Air Force Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	20.5	20.1	20.1	18.8
Reserve Components				
AFR	5.6	8.3	8.3	7.5
<u>Civilian</u>	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8

Changes in active force manpower levels in this category are primarily related to reductions in Air Force management headquarters and transfer of mission evaluation squadrons and Mission operational control activities to the Strategic Forces category.

5. Central Support Forces. Central support forces comprise base operating support, medical support, personnel support and individual training, command, logistics and federal agency support.

a. Base Operating Support. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	21.3	19.8	19.9	16.9
<u>Civilian</u>	30.2	29.6	29.8	28.5

Manpower levels have been reduced consistent with the changes in central support activities. In FY 1975 the impact of the SEA withdrawal is the primary reason for change. In FY 1977 the reductions reflect the transfer of USAFSO bases and Moody AFB to the Tactical Air Command (TAC), reductions in support, and the transfer of maintenance responsibilities at Wright-Patterson Air Force base to other categories. These reductions were partially offset by the transfer of Kirtland AFB from the R&D appropriation to O&M.

b. Medical Support: Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	33.8	33.9	34.0	32.3
Reserve Components				
AFR	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.7

In FY 76 and the transition quarter active force requirements reflect a slight increase for intensive care/cardiac care units and an adjustment in medical training requirements. Changes in FY 77 reflect reductions in medical support activities associated with the drawdown in total Air Force strength.

c. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	6.6	6.1	6.0	6.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.3

The Air Force operates about 990 recruiting offices. It also contributes 140 personnel to the 66 Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES). The Air Force has recently developed a manpower standard for this function based on capabilities to be provided by a new Procurement Management Information System (APDS-PROMIS) that incorporates results of a reorganization and reorientation of Air Force recruiting resources. Manpower savings will be sufficient to pay for the cost of

APDS-PROMIS, an automated system which will enable recruiters to communicate directly with the Air Force Personnel Data System to determine personnel vacancies and to be able to promise a potential recruit a job which will meet both his desires and the needs of Air Force. Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities are also included in this category.

Active force Personnel Support manpower changes in FY 76 reflect reductions in recruiting, and Defense Agencies, and, in FY TQ, elimination of Project HIRE. In FY 77, the phase out of the Bicentennial Commemorative Band and reductions in Defense Agencies are offset by the addition to the active force end strength of ANG and USAFR recruiters who previously performed this function on special tours of duty.

d. Individual Training. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Air Force Individual Training Active Manpower 1/

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	28.3	25.8	26.1	23.2
<u>Civilian</u>	7.2	7.0	7.1	6.4

1/ Does not include active trainees, students or cadets; Reserve Component trainees or students; or ROTC cadets in training in civilian status.

Active Force Individual Training manpower reductions are the net result of several actions. Undergraduate pilot training (UPT) and undergraduate navigator training (UNT) production have been reduced in FY 77 and FY 78 based on current aviator personnel inventories and reduction in the current aviator requirement projections. FY 76 end strengths reflect reductions in graduate education and the Airmen Education and Commissioning Program (AECF). Although technical training loads are greater for FY 77 than for FY 76, the FY 77 loads have been reduced from the levels previously programmed for that fiscal year.

Detailed justification of training requirements is in the FY 77 Military Manpower Training Report.

e. Command. The following table displays the military and civilian manpower associated with this function.

Air Force Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	13.9	13.5	13.5	12.8
<u>Civilian</u>	11.9	11.6	11.5	11.1

Changes in FY 76 active force manpower levels above are primarily attributable to reductions in Air Force management headquarters, transfer of WWMCS data processing support to Auxiliary Forces (Centrally Managed Communications) and Congressional direction to transfer workloads of CONUS-based postal activities to the United States Postal Service. Civilian reductions in FY TQ reflect savings associated with the move of the Air Force Accounting and Reserve Personnel Centers to Lowry Air Force Base. Further management headquarters reductions, the phase out of Joint Service Bicentennial Vans, savings associated with base level data automation activities, and continued implementation of the Joint Uniform Military Pay System are the primary reasons for reductions reflected in FY 77.

f. Logistics. Manpower requirements for logistics are:

Air Force Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.3
Reserve Components				
AFR	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	75.7	69.0	68.9	65.4

Air Force manpower needs for central supply and maintenance activities depend on the size and activity level of the mission force, the amount of logistics support provided at unit and installation level, depot maintenance repair rates, and the "cost effectiveness" trade-off between performing maintenance in service-operated facilities, including Army, Navy and Air Force, or by private industry (contract). These manpower requirements are based on aircraft and missile inventories and flying hours.

In FY 76 increased requirements for the tactical fighter crew ratio increase from 1.1 to 1.21, and activation of two F-5E tactical fighter training squadrons are offset by reductions reflecting management innovations such as the Depot Plant Modernization Program, establishment of Technology Repair Centers, and the merger of system management and item control functions. Reductions also result from reduced flying hours and changes in aircraft inventory.

Logistics manpower is again provided in fiscal year 1977 to support increased flying hours to allow a small number of surge aircrews to maintain basic skills in flying their aircraft of wartime assignment. These surge aircrews provide the capability to bridge the gap between the initially employed forces and the first crews graduated from accelerated combat training courses. The support functions in which surge aircrews perform during peacetime do not provide them the capability to maintain combat flying skills. Under this limited program, aircrews already possessing these skills are scheduled for a minimum number of training flights to insure that their current skills do not deteriorate--particularly those required in the very demanding fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. This increase in manpower is offset by the reductions related to changes in flying hours and aircraft inventory, the Depot Plant Modernization Program, the transfer of foreign military sales manpower to the Support to Other Nations category, the transfer of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base flight-line maintenance responsibilities to the Research & Development category, and consolidation of support airlift resources in the Mobility Forces category.

g. Federal Agency Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	-	-	-	0.1

The change in FY 76 reflects miscellaneous reductions in reimbursable military manpower assigned to other Federal Departments and agencies. The increase in FY 77 reflects the transfer of reimbursable NASA support manpower from other categories.

6. Individuals. The following table summarizes manpower requirements for Individuals (transients, patients, trainees, students and Air Force Academy cadets).

Air Force Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Transients	25.4	22.6	22.9	18.3
Patients	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.7
Trainees/Students	35.3	37.8	38.5	37.3
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2
Total	<u>65.5</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>66.4</u>	<u>60.4</u>
Reserve Components-				
Trainees/Students				
ANG	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.3
AFR	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.6

The reduction in transients and patients in the preceding table is consistent with the overall active duty military population reductions and reductions in the PCS move program. The variation in cadet requirements in FY TQ reflects a projected on-board strength as of 30 September 1976.

Increases in Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve trainees and students reflect improved recruiting of non-prior service personnel.

D. FY 1978 Air Force Manpower Request.

1. Authorization Request. In FY 1978 the Air Force requests 568,247 military and 257,139 civilians subject to ceiling. Within this relatively stable program, the Air Force is continuing to seek out areas where resources can be reduced and savings applied to improved combat capability. As new weapon systems are introduced, the Air Force expects to be able to fully man the 26 tactical fighter wings without an overall increase in active duty military personnel strength levels.

The FY 78 Air National Guard strength of 93,445 and Air Force Reserve strength of 54,191 reflect continued efforts to modernize reserve components through the introduction of newer weapon systems.

2. Reason for Change FY 1977 - FY 1978

The primary reason for the slight reduction in Strategic Forces is the transfer of additional KC-135 to the Air Reserve Forces. This same action accounts for the increase in civilian resources in this category. General Purpose Forces reflect an increase in military and a small decrease in civilians. These changes are primarily in the Tactical Forces category. Major reasons for change are an adjustment in active and ANG force mix, increased AWACS aircraft and higher levels of WRM materiel.

In Auxiliary Forces, the most significant change is a reduction in Intelligence and Security. Changes in Mission Support Forces (MSF) reflect basically the adjustments associated with support changes occurring from force realignments in Strategic and General Purpose Forces. In MSF Training, a slight increase in both military and civilian is due to increases in training aircraft and range support equipment. Central Support Forces and Individuals reflect adjustments in training and support levels associated with program changes in logistics and medical activities.

The following provides end strength comparison by Defense Planning and Programming categories for FY 77 to FY 78.

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>78.0</u>	<u>76.7</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>8.0</u>
Strategic Offensive	55.2	54.1	2.6	3.4
Strategic Defensive	12.7	12.4	3.7	3.7
Strategic Surveillance & Control	10.0	10.3	0.9	0.9
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>120.9</u>	<u>122.9</u>	<u>29.4</u>	<u>28.6</u>
Tactical Forces	81.0	83.1	14.7	14.1
Mobility Forces	39.9	39.8	14.7	14.5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>65.9</u>	<u>64.7</u>	<u>31.3</u>	<u>31.3</u>
Intelligence & Security	20.7	19.5	2.7	2.7
Centrally Managed Comm	17.5	17.6	5.1	5.1
Research & Development	16.1	16.1	20.3	20.3
Support to Other Nations	2.6	2.6	1.9	1.9
Geophysical Activities	8.9	8.9	1.3	1.3
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>149.5</u>	<u>149.2</u>	<u>68.7</u>	<u>69.0</u>
Reserve Component	0.5	0.5	4.7	4.7
Support				
Base Operating	111.2	110.0	57.8	58.0
Support				
Force Support				
Training	19.0	19.8	2.3	2.5
Command	18.8	18.9	3.8	3.8
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>96.3</u>	<u>95.3</u>	<u>120.5</u>	<u>120.3</u>
Base Operating Support	16.9	16.4	28.5	28.2
Medical Support	32.3	32.5	7.7	7.7
Personnel Support	6.4	6.4	1.3	1.3
Individual Training	23.2	22.7	6.4	6.4
Command	12.8	12.8	11.1	11.1
Logistics	4.3	4.3	65.4	65.5
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>60.4</u>	<u>59.4</u>		
Transients	18.3	18.5		
Patients	0.7	0.7		
Trainees/Students	37.3	36.0		
Cadets	4.2	4.2		
<u>Total</u>	<u>571.0</u>	<u>568.2</u>	<u>257.1</u>	<u>257.1</u>

Air Reserve Forces Manpower Requirements
(Selected Reserve End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Air National Guard</u>		<u>Air Force Reserve</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Strategic Offensive Forces	6.1	8.7	1.3	1.7
Strategic Defensive Forces	7.4	7.4	0.5	0.5
Strategic Control & Surveillance	0.7	0.7	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>59.5</u>	<u>34.2</u>	<u>34.0</u>
Tactical Air Forces	46.2	44.0	5.1	5.1
Mobility Forces	15.5	15.5	29.1	29.0
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed Communications	9.6	9.6	-	-
Support to Other Nations Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>13.4</u>
Reserve Component Support	2.2	2.2	0.3	0.3
Base Operating Support	0.4	0.4	3.9	3.9
Force Support Training	1.6	2.0	0.2	0.2
Command			7.5	9.0
<u>Central Support Forces</u>			<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Base Operating Support				
Medical Support			1.9	1.9
Personnel Support				
Individual Training				
Command				
Logistics			0.4	0.4
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Trainees/Students	2.3	2.4	1.6	1.6
<u>Total</u>	<u>92.6</u>	<u>93.4</u>	<u>52.4</u>	<u>54.2</u>

CHAPTER XIV

DEFENSE AGENCY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

This chapter addresses the manpower requirements of the:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
 - Staff
 - Operating Activities*
- Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)
- Office of Overseas Dependents Education (OODE)
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
- Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
- Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
- Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
- Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
- Defense Supply Agency (DSA)
- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

*Includes personnel assigned to the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, the US Court of Military Appeals, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.

These organizations, collectively called for the purposes of this report the Defense Agencies, perform specialized functions supporting the entire Department of Defense. The National Security Agency is excluded from this report for security reasons.

Beginning in 1960 with DCA, the Department has created Defense Agencies and augmented their missions wherever consolidation of similar functions offered improved management and increased efficiency. In many cases, significant manpower savings occurred in the initial consolidation. Moreover, consolidation creates a potential for further savings as the Agencies find additional opportunities for management improvements.

B. Manpower Requirements

The manpower requirements of the combined Defense Agencies are shown in the following table. All military strengths displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are included in Service strengths in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Defense Agency Manpower Requirements (End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	9.1	8.5	8.4	7.4
Civilian, Direct Hire and Indirect Hire	<u>73.3</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>82.7</u>	<u>79.8</u>
Total	<u>82.4</u>	<u>83.4</u>	<u>91.2</u>	<u>87.3</u>
Total without Overseas Dependents Education	(82.4)	(81.2)	(81.2)	(77.3)

Beginning in FY 76, civilian personnel associated with Overseas Dependents Education are in the Defense Agency strengths rather than the individual Departments. About 2,100 of these civilians work year round and appear in the end FY 76 strength. Another 7,800 who work only during the school year first appear on the roles in FY TQ when the fiscal year end changes from June to September.

Discounting the effect of the Overseas Dependent Education transfer, the total Defense Agency manpower requirement decreases 5,100 between end FY 75 and end FY 77. This reduction is largely attributable to the Department's effort to restrain the growth of manpower costs by streamlining the support structure.

The mission and associated manpower requirement of each Agency, along with overall manpower savings attributable to the Agency's existence are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined Defense Agency manpower requirement is displayed by DPPC.

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

a. Staff.

OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability, specialized expertise and administrative support necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department.

OSD manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

	<u>OSD Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength In Thousands)			
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5
Civilian	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6
Total	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.0</u>

The FY 77 reduction in OSD is part of a continuing effort to eliminate management layers and delegate appropriate responsibility to lower echelons.

b. Operating Activities of OSD.

"Operating Activities" comprises four separate organizations which do not directly support the Secretary of Defense but which, because of their relatively small size and for the sake of efficiency, draw upon the administrative resources of OSD rather than set up duplicative operations of their own.

These four small specialized organizations are as follows:

(1) The Office of Information for the Armed Forces (OIAF) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program including the dissemination of all internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of such programs.

(2) The US Court of Military Appeals serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction of every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, confinement for one year or more, and certain military justice cases of lesser penalties.

(3) The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is responsible for management of the DoD Security Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

(4) The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages the payment for medical care in non-military facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

The combined manpower requirement of these activities is shown in the following chart.

Manpower Requirements
Operating Activities of OSD
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Civilian	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
Total	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>

2. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).

OJCS provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. OJCS manpower requirements are as follows:

OJCS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0
Civilian	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Total	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.3</u>

The OJCS reduction in FY 77, like the reduction in OSD, reflects our continuing effort to streamline management headquarters.

3. Office of Overseas Dependents Education (ODE).

ODE administers the primary and secondary schools which are operated for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas.

In response to Congressional direction, management of all manpower resources associated with this mission was transferred in FY 76 from the Services to ODE. Manpower savings of over 200 spaces accompanied this consolidation. Those resources are depicted below.

ODE Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	-	*	-	-
Civilian	*	2.1	9.9	9.9
Total	<u>*</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.9</u>

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

The sharp increase in civilian strength in FY TQ is due solely to the change in fiscal year end from June to September. About 7,800 OODE personnel are employed only during the school year and are on the rolls in September but not in June.

4. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

DARPA directs and manages advanced research projects which are assigned to the Military Departments, other government agencies, or commercial or educational research institutions.

The following table shows DARPA's manpower requirements.

	<u>DARPA Manpower Requirements</u> <u>(End Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	*	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

DARPA, previously an activity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was established as a separate agency in June 1972. At that time, its total military and civilian manpower was 184. The total DARPA manpower requirement in FY 77 is 146, an overall reduction of 38 manpower spaces, since June 1972.

5. Defense Communications Agency (DCA).

The continuing responsibilities of DCA include:

- System design of military satellite communications.
- Engineering and management of the Defense Communications System.
- Technical Support of the National Military Command System.
- Systems engineering and ADP support of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System.

DCA's manpower requirements are shown on the following table.

DCA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4
Civilian	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
Total	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.1

DCA was established in July 1960, to control centrally the development of the increasingly complex communications systems. Total DCA manpower in FY 64, was 2,397, including 958 civilians. By FY 70, additional mission assignments along with advancing technology and increasing demands for telecommunications and information processing systems had increased the manpower strength to 3,663, including 1,731 civilians. Increases of at least this amount would have occurred in the Services, had the function not been consolidated. Efficiencies made possible by consolidation have allowed DCA manpower requirements to be reduced since that time, notwithstanding mission increases such as systems engineering and technical support of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The FY 77 manpower requirement is 3,098, about 15% less than in FY 70.

The civilian strengths for FY 76 and TQ reflect reductions recommended by Congress in their review of the FY 76 President's Budget. Military manpower requirements have also been significantly reduced (about 7%) from those shown in the FY 76 President's Budget.

6. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).

DCAA provides the procurement and contract administration activities of the Department with financial information and advice on proposed or existing contracts and contractors. The Agency's services are used in connection with negotiation, administration and settlement of contract payments and prices. DCAA also provides audit services to 27 other Federal departments and agencies. Prime among these is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

DCAA manpower requirements are as follows:

DCAA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Civilian Only	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4

DCAA was established in July 1965. At that time, 85 military and 3,964 civilian spaces were transferred from the Military Services to DCAA. Since then, additional mission assignments have added 967 civilian authorizations to DCAA and all 85 military spaces were converted to civilian. This total of 5,016 civilian spaces has been reduced, through consolidation, productivity improvements, and slight mission adjustments, to 3,355 in FY 77, an overall DoD savings of 1,661 manpower spaces.

7. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA).

DCPA's mission is to provide an effective and viable National Civil Defense Program in accordance with the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, and to provide planning guidance and assistance to local governments in consonance with the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, in their achievement of total disaster preparedness. Recognizing that State and local agencies have the basic responsibility for dealing with natural disasters, DCPA will focus its future efforts on nuclear disaster preparedness. This narrowing of mission reduced DCPA's manpower requirement in FY 77 as shown below.

DCPA Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	*	*	*	*
Civilian	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5
Total	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

DCPA was established in May 1972. At that time, 721 civilian spaces were transferred from Army to DCPA; in July 1974, the National Civil Defense Computer Facility and 62 civilians were transferred to DCPA from the Corps of Engineers. This total requirement, 783, was reduced through management improvements to 656 in FY 76, and by mission reevaluation in FY 77 to 463, an overall savings to the Department of 320 manpower spaces.

8. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

The primary mission of DIA is to produce for the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff foreign military intelligence products and estimates; determine information gaps and validate intelligence collection requirements; provide plans, programs, policies and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities; produce or manage the production of DoD scientific and technical intelligence; provide DoD current and indications and warning intelligence; serve as the J-2 of JCS; and operate the Defense Attache System.

The DIA supports the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified and Specified Commands, Military Departments, the National Security Council, various other departments of the Executive Branch, and Congressional Committees.

The table below shows DIA manpower requirements:

	<u>DIA Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.8
Civilian	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Total	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.4</u>

DIA was established in October 1961, with the transfer of 500 military and civilian personnel from the Services and was planned to grow over a period of a few years so that no gaps in the crucial intelligence collection/processing/dissemination cycle would occur. By end FY 68, DIA had grown to its peak total strength of 6,690. That FY 68 strength included 1,880 transferred from the Military Departments to form the Defense Attache System.

The FY 77 manpower requirement totals 4,374 - a 35% reduction from the FY 68 level. This significant reduction has been accomplished even though today greater amounts of raw intelligence data must be analyzed and more detailed products are required to support such important national interests as Strategic Arms Limitation and Mutually Balanced Force Reduction.

DIA strengths in FY 76 and TQ reflect the intent of the Congress that DIA end FY 76 strengths should not exceed those programmed for FY 75. The actual FY 75 end strength was 106 below program because of summer rotations of military personnel and the lack of certain skills within the Services' personnel inventory.

9. Defense Investigative Service (DIS).

DIS performs personnel security investigations for the DoD components to determine the suitability of an individual for employment in a position of trust within the Department or a facility performing under classified contracts. DIS also performs criminal investigations and crime prevention surveys for the Defense Supply Agency.

The following table shows the manpower requirements of the DIS.

DIS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.4
Civilian	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	<u>2.5</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>

When DIS became operational in October 1972, a total of 3,000 spaces (1,750 military and 1,250 civilian) were transferred from the Military Services. Another 161 military spaces were deleted from the Services as consolidation savings. Workload reductions and productivity improvements resulted in an FY 75 actual strength of 2,485. DIS is being further reduced in FY 76 to a total strength of 1,805.

In reviewing the FY 76 President's Budget, the Congress recommended significant manpower reductions in DIS and directed that civilians replace most of the current military manpower in the agency. The table above reflects the reductions which Congress recommended and the first phase of a civilian substitution program that will extend through end FY 79, at which time there will be 1,605 civilian and 200 military spaces.

10. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).

DMA produces and distributes aeronautical, hydrographic and topographic products for all DoD components and manages and coordinates all DoD mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) activities. The agency also executes DoD responsibilities under international and interagency MC&G agreements. Additionally, DMA has statutory responsibility for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data for all vessels of the United States.

DMA manpower requirements are depicted below.

DMA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4
Civilian	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.4</u>
Total	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>7.8</u>

When DMA was established in July 1972, a total of 8,803 spaces (1,019 military and 7,784 civilian) were transferred from the Military Services. Approved program increases brought the total strength in FY 74 to 8,793. Through improvements made possible by consolidating this function, the FY 77 DMA manpower requirement has been reduced to 7,795. Thus, DoD manpower savings from DMA total 998 spaces.

While making overall manpower reductions, DNA has also pursued a program of civilian substitution, thereby freeing military spaces for combat-related activities.

11. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA).

DNA is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. The agency also manages the nuclear weapon effects test and development programs. DNA manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

DNA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5
Civilian	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Total	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>

DNA, under its original name of Defense Atomic Support Agency, was established in July 1971 with a total manpower authorization of 1,597 (915 military, 682 civilians). Subsequently, DNA was assigned management responsibility of the Johnston Atoll facility (in 1973) and the environmental clean-up of Enewetak Atoll (in 1974). Eighty-five military spaces were transferred from the Services to DNA for the additional responsibilities. Along with the reduction in nuclear tests DNA has refined and improved its operation so that FY 77 manpower requirements have been reduced to 1,155, representing a savings of over 500 spaces.

DNA has also shifted the mix of its workforce from nearly 60% military at its inception to only 45% in FY 77.

12. Defense Supply Agency (DSA).

DSA provides common supplies and services to the Military Departments and other Defense components. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, and petroleum products. Common services rendered by DSA include contract administration and surplus property disposal.

DSA is the largest of the Defense Agencies, accomplishing its varied mission through 79 field activities located in the United States and overseas. The manpower required for DSA's extensive operations is displayed in the following table.

DSA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Civilian	<u>52.8</u>	<u>52.1</u>	<u>52.1</u>	<u>49.7</u>
Total	<u>53.9</u>	<u>53.3</u>	<u>53.3</u>	<u>50.8</u>

Just as DSA's size is comparatively large, so are the manpower savings attributable to its existence. DSA was established in 1961 with its basic supply distribution mission; in 1966, DSA's second major mission, contract administration, was consolidated from the Services. Those two functional consolidations yielded outright manpower savings of over 8,000 spaces. Various other functions have been consolidated into DSA since then. Not counting the initial 8,000 savings, a total of nearly 60,000 manpower spaces have been transferred from the Services to DSA. However, DSA's continuous effort to improve the productivity and efficiency of their workforce has resulted in a reduced manpower requirements of less than 51,000 in FY 77. Establishment and improved operation of DSA has saved the Department some 17,000 manpower spaces.

13. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS).

USUHS was created by PL 92-426 to provide the highest quality education programs in the health sciences to those selected individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees and may establish postdoctoral, postgraduate, and technological institutes. Programs in continuing education for military members of the health professions will also be established. The University will develop programs designed for maximum utilization of faculty, facilities, and equipment available within the three military medical departments.

The manpower requirements of this new and growing university are as follows:

USUHS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Military Students				
Included <u>1/</u>	(-)	(*) <u>2/</u>	(0.1)	(0.1)
Civilians	*	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Total	<u>*</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

- 1/ Medical students are included to depict the total manpower resources associated with USUHS. These students are exempted by PL 92-426 from statutory military strength authorizations.
- 2/ Since the President's FY 77 Budget was developed, the beginning date for class has been delayed until FY TQ.

The university is programmed to grow to a total of 525 students and 880 staff and instructors by 1980. The first class of 36 doctors will graduate in 1980.

C. FY 1978 Defense Agency Manpower Requirements.

Defense Agency total manpower requirements do not change substantially in FY 78. However, several individual Agency changes are programmed.

- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency manpower decreases by 190 civilians, reflecting increased reliance on State and local agencies to provide natural disaster relief.

- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences continues its programmed growth, increasing by 131 military and 137 civilians.

- Defense Investigative Service continues its Congressionally-directed civilianization program, shifting 100 spaces from military to civilian manpower.

D. Manpower Requirements by DPPC.

The following tables show the military and civilian requirements of the combined Defense Agencies, arrayed by DPPC.

DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY ^{1/} MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.6</u>
Intelligence & Security	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
Centrally Managed					
Communications	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Research & Development	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Support to Other Nations	*	*	*	*	*
Geophysical Activities	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.4
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support					
Force Support Training					
Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Medical Support	*	*	*	*	*
Personnel Support	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4
Individual Training	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Command	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.4
Logistics	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients					
Patients & Prisoners					
Trainees & Students					
Cadets					
<u>Total Defense Agencies</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Military strengths assigned to Defense Agencies are included in Service strengths.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1977 Budget)</u>	<u>FY TQ</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Strategic Offensive	-	-	-	-	-
Strategic Defensive	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces					
Tactical Air Forces					
Naval Forces					
Mobility Forces					
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.5</u>
Intelligence & Security Centrally Managed	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>
Communications	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Research & Development	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Support to Other Nations	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.3	7.3
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Reserve Components Support					
Base Operating Support					
Force Support Training Command					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>60.4</u>	<u>61.9</u>	<u>69.7</u>	<u>67.3</u>	<u>67.5</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.2</u>
Medical Support	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	1.5	3.5	11.3	11.5	11.5
Individual Training	*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
Command	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.7	5.7
Logistics	46.2	45.6	45.6	43.4	43.4
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total Defense Agencies</u>	<u>73.3</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>82.7</u>	<u>79.8</u>	<u>79.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

PART C - Special Analyses

Part C contains special analyses of three subjects related to the Defense manpower program.

- Chapter XV - The Cost of Manpower
- Chapter XVI - Women in the Military
- Chapter XVII - Manpower Data Structure

CHAPTER XV

THE COST OF MANPOWER

this chapter is organized into six sections:

- Manpower Categories and Cost
- Notes on DoD Manpower Costs
- Trends in Defense Manpower Costs
- Restraining Manpower Costs
- Components of Manpower Accounting
- Summary

A. Manpower Categories and Cost

There are several manpower programs within the Department of Defense. Some are covered by military appropriations, some are covered by other appropriations, and some are supported by non-appropriated funds. The table below shows which people are included in the strength and cost discussions in this chapter, and which are excluded.

Table 1
Total Defense Manpower Program for End FY 1977
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Included</u>	<u>Excluded</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Military Personnel</u>			
Active Duty	2,101.0	1.0	2,102.0
Reserve Paid Drill	849.5		849.5
Individual Ready Reserve		619.8	619.8
Retired	1,170.0		1,170.0
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>			
Direct Hire	942.0		965.9
Indirect Hire	93.8	23.9	93.8
Student Programs		9.9	9.9
Military Morale & Welfare Activities	_____	250.0 1/	250.0
<u>Total</u>	5,156.3	904.6 2/	6,060.9

1/ Paid from non-appropriated funds.

2/ 25.2 thousand of these employees are in Civil Functions covered by the Civil Works Appropriations.

Active duty military and direct and indirect hire civilians may be considered to be regular employees of the government. Reserve military are not on active duty, but receive varying types of pay, and are subject to recall. Retired military are being compensated for previous service, generally are subject to recall for contingencies, and are not considered employees. Reserve pay and military retired pay, are included in military payroll costs.

There is little distinction between direct hire and indirect hire civilian employees, except that indirect hire civilians are hired through foreign governments. Payroll costs for both are grouped together under civilian payroll costs in this chapter.

The approximately 250,000 employees of non-appropriated fund (NAF) activities are not included as federal employees. They are employees of self-sustaining welfare and morale activities, such as post exchanges and clubs. DoD manages these employees and establishes their wage scales, but does not fund their salaries or benefits. They are excluded from the strengths and costs in this report.

In addition to the people who are employed by DoD, others work on the national defense in private industry. Employment through defense contracts is not controlled directly by DoD. The cost of these people is funded through procurement, research and development, and other contracts. They are excluded from the data in this report. The manpower requirements and payroll costs for Civil Functions also are excluded, because they are submitted in the budget requests for the Civil Functions, rather than in the Defense budget request. People in special student and disadvantaged youth programs and those employed by the National Security Agency are included in the cost data, but they generally are excluded from the strength discussions.

B. Notes on DoD Manpower Costs

1. Types of Cost.

This report is primarily concerned with payroll cost, which is that portion of the Defense budget directly identifiable as cost of people. Personnel support costs are also discussed. Payroll and personnel support costs are defined in detail in Section E. Unless otherwise specified, costs are presented in current dollar outlays. Since payroll dollars tend to be spent in the year obligated, payroll costs are nearly the same in both outlays and total obligational authority (TOA), but the total Defense budget in outlays and TOA does vary significantly, and with it the percentage of the total budget attributed to payroll and personnel support. ^{1/}

2. Contingency Fund

In the President's budget, contingency funds, listed as a proposed supplemental, are included to cover expected military and

^{1/} Compare tables 2 and 3 of this chapter.

civilian pay raises. In this report, these funds will be allocated to the appropriations where they are expected to be spent, except in Section E of this chapter where budget data are shown in detail. To maintain comparability with the detail submitted in support of the President's FY 1977 budget, the costs in Section E are in TOA, and the contingency funds will be shown as a separate item.

3. Components of Payroll and Personnel Support Costs

a. Payroll Costs ^{1/}

(1) Military Payroll - active, reserve, and National Guard personnel appropriations, and Defense family housing.

(2) Civilian Payroll - direct and indirect-hires (the cost of civilians is budgeted under functional appropriations -- Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and RDT&E).

(3) Military Retired Pay.

b. Personnel Support Costs

The nonpayroll portion of the following elements of the defense program are identified as Personnel Support Costs.

(1) Individual Training.

(2) Medical Support (including CHAMPUS).

(3) Half of Base Operating Support.

(4) Other Personnel Support - (consisting of program elements associated with Recruiting and Examining, Overseas Dependents Education, and others).

Any definition of Personnel Support Costs is necessarily arbitrary. Here the attempt has been to make both payroll and personnel support costs as inclusive as is meaningful, while maintaining comparability with other accounting reports.

Personnel support cost estimates have changed somewhat since they were first introduced in the FY 1975 Manpower Requirements Report. Three factors account for the changes:

(1) Accounting changes: For example, Defense Family Housing is now included as part of payroll costs.

(2) Automated Calculations: Prior to this report, estimates of Personnel Support Costs were made by manually extracting data from the appropriate Service budget submission. Beginning with this report, an automated system extracts data from the Five-Year Defense Program, producing data more accurate than the previous estimates.

^{1/} Detailed definitions are presented in Section E.

Table 2
MANPOWER COSTS 1/
(\$ Billions)

	FY 64	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	President's FY 77 Budget Request	
						FY 76	FY 77
DEFENSE OUTLAYS	50.8	76.0	73.8	78.4	86.0	91.2	100.1
<hr/>							
PAYROLL OUTLAYS							
Military							
Active Duty	(12.8)	(22.2)	(22.3)	(22.8)	(24.2)	(24.7)	(25.7)
Reserve & Natl Guard	(0.7)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.9)	(1.7)
Total Military	13.5	23.6	23.8	24.4	25.9	26.6	27.4
Civilians							
Direct Hire	(7.3)	(12.8)	(13.0)	(13.4)	(14.6)	(15.5)	(16.0)
Indirect Hire 2/	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(1.1)	(1.1)
Total Civilians	7.7	13.5	13.7	14.2	15.4	16.5	17.1
Retired Military	1.2	3.9	4.4	5.1	6.2	7.3	8.4
Total Payroll	22.4	41.0	41.9	43.8	47.5	50.4	52.9
<hr/>							
PERSONNEL SUPPORT OUTLAYS 3/	1.8	3.0	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.7	4.6
<hr/>							
PERCENT OF DEFENSE OUTLAYS							
Payroll	44	54	57	56	55	55	53
Personnel Support	4	4	5	5	5	5	5

End Strengths (000s)
REGULAR EMPLOYEES

Active Military	2,685	2,322	2,252	2,161	2,127	2,087	2,101
Civilians							
Direct Hire	(1,035)	(1,068)	(998)	(1,014)	(989)	(962)	(942)
Indirect Hire 2/	(140)	(110)	(102)	(95)	(89)	(96)	(94)
Total	1,176	1,178	1,100	1,109	1,078	1,058	1,036
Total	3,861	3,500	3,352	3,270	3,205	3,145	3,137

OTHERS

Reserve Paid Drill	953	925	919	925	897	874	849
Retired	435	890	948	1,012	1,073	1,178	1,193

1/ Data excludes civil functions.

2/ Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower cost and strength data.

3/ Personnel support includes all nonpayroll costs of individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), overseas dependents education, and recruiting and examining, plus half of base operations.

(3) Actual data and updated projections: Each year, actual data becomes available to replace projections, and outyear projections are updated. Table 2 shows the personnel support costs adjusted for these three factors.

C. Trends in Defense Manpower Costs

Table 2 shows payroll and personnel support outlays and the associated manpower strengths. Table 3 gives payrolls costs in TOA and as a percentage of total Defense TOA.

While payroll costs have more than doubled in the thirteen years since FY 1964, their proportion of Defense outlays peaked in FY 1973 and has been generally declining since then. This downward trend is a function of the relative cost growth in the manpower and non-manpower portions of the budget.

Compensation continues to increase with comparability pay raises to match Civil Service and military pay increases to those in the private sector. Since FY 1973, efforts to hold down per capita cost increases and major strength reductions have kept manpower costs from increasing more rapidly than the rest of the budget. The limit has now been reached on significant savings through strength reductions, without cuts in real combat capability. The effort to reduce payroll costs in FY 1977 and to restrain the growth of payroll costs in the future is discussed in some detail in Section D of this chapter.

Table 3
DoD Manpower Costs
(\$ Billions TOA)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
DoD Budget	50.6	77.5	80.1	85.1	87.9	98.3	112.7
Military Personnel	13.5	23.9	24.5	25.1	25.8	26.7	27.5
Civilian Personnel	7.7	13.5	13.7	14.2	15.4	16.5	17.1
Military Retired	<u>1.2</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>8.4</u>
Total Payroll Cost	22.4	41.3	42.6	44.4	47.4	50.5	53.0
% of Budget	44	53	53	52	54	51	47

Actual payroll costs have increased significantly from FY 1964 through FY 1975 (the last year with complete actual data) as Tables 2 and 3 have shown. DoD total outlays are up 69%, while total payroll costs are up 112%. During this time the military payroll rose 92%; civilian payroll rose 99%; and retired payroll rose 417%.

For comparison, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), one measure of inflation, rose by 68% from FY 1964 through FY 1975.

By law, military pay increases are tied to Federal civilian General Schedule (GS) pay increases. The latter, in turn, are tied to wage increases in the private sector. Thus, as wages in the private sector go up, the Federal government increases its GS employee wages. These increases are based on a Labor Department Survey -- the National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical, and Clerical Employees Pay (PATCE).

As the discussion of strengths in previous chapters has shown, Defense combated the rising payroll costs by reducing strength levels. The following table shows the cost of hypothetical force #1 with the strength of the FY 1964 force but the average military and civilian pay and grade profile that existed in FY 1975.

Table 4
Comparison of FY 75 Force with Hypothetical Force #1 (\$ Billions)

	<u>FY 64 Actual</u>	<u>FY 75 Actual</u>	<u>Hypothetical Situation</u>
Payroll Cost	22.4	47.5	55.1

The next table shows the opposite hypothetical situation, the grade profile of FY 1964 and the pay and strength of FY 1975:


Table 5
Comparison of FY 75 Force with Hypothetical Force #2 (\$ Billions)

	<u>FY 64 Actual</u>	<u>FY 75 Actual</u>	<u>Hypothetical Situation</u>
Payroll Cost	22.4	47.5	46.4

It has been suggested that large savings would occur if DoD reduced the current grade profile to that of FY 1964. Table 5 indicated a potential FY 1975 savings in total payroll of about \$1.1 billion if such a grade structure change had been made. This \$1.1 billion includes \$0.7 billion for military and \$0.4 billion for General Schedule Civil Service (wage board excluded). A shrinking force creates pressures for average grade increases during transition, since a greater proportion of the change normally must be made in the lower grades.

Cost and strength details were summarized in Table 2. The trends are presented graphically on the following chart.

MANPOWER COST AND STRENGTH TRENDS



D. Restraining Manpower Costs

A major challenge the Department of Defense must meet in FY 1977 and beyond is to lower the proportion of the Defense Budget devoted to manpower. As discussed in the previous section, payroll costs have been 55% of total outlays in FY 1975 and FY 1976. The proposed FY 1977 Budget will reduce this to 53% if approved by the Congress.

There are only two ways to restrain the growth of manpower costs:

- Reduce strengths.
- Reduce the average cost per person.

Based on the levels authorized by Congress for end of the Transition Quarters the FY 1977 manpower program makes substantial reductions of 28,600 civilians and 46,000 Selected Reservists as well as a modest reduction of 5,400 in active duty military strength. These strength reductions provide a savings of about \$230 million for FY 1977 and about \$580 million annually thereafter. Accomplishing these reductions will require the understanding and support of the Congress.

The following actions reflect the major effort that is being made to restrain the growth in per person costs:

- Restraining increases in military and civilian pay.
- Restraining growth in the cost of military retirement.
- Adjusting other elements within the total compensation package.
- Reducing personnel turnover and turbulence.
- Reversing the trend toward military and civilian grade enrichment.

1. Restraining Increases in Military and Civilian Pay

The FY 1977 Budget is based on the following assumptions about military and civilian pay raises to take place in FY 1977:

- Pay raises for General Schedule civilians will range from 3% to 5%.
- Since military pay raises are adjusted by the average percentage increase given employees under the General Schedule, the military increase also will be between 3% and 5%.

- Legislation will be passed to reform aspects of the Federal wage system that result in Federal blue-collar workers earning more than their non-government counterparts.

These actions to restrain pay increases will save about \$2.5 billion in Defense payroll costs in FY 1977.

2. Restraining Growth in the Cost of Military Retirement

The cost of military retirement is a matter of increasing concern. Due to inflation, increases in active duty pay, and increases in the number of retired personnel, retirement costs have increased sixfold in the past twelve years. Projections for the future are staggering. The following table shows projected retired pay costs, including annuities for survivors.

Table 6
Projected Annual Cost of Military Retirement

	<u>Actual FY1964</u>	<u>Budget FY1977</u>	<u>Projected FY1980</u>	<u>Projected FY1990</u>
Number Receiving Annuities (000)	411	1,170	1,291	1,617
Annual Cost (Billions) with Average Annual Adjustments After FY 1977 of 6% in pay and 4% in Consumer Price Index	\$1.2	\$8.4	\$11	\$21

A three-part program is proposed to reduce growth in the cost of military retirement:

- a. Restrain growth in active duty pay on which retirement pay is based.
- b. Eliminate the 1% "Kicker" in the cost-of-living adjustments for retired pay.
- c. Modify the system structurally, as proposed in the Military Retirement Modernization Act now before the Congress.

Both military and civilian retired pay increases are adjusted periodically to keep pace with inflation as measured by the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Under the current formula, whenever the CPI attains a level 3% above the level which resulted in the most recent increase in retired pay, and remains at or above that level for 3 consecutive months, retired pay will be increased three months later by the

highest percentage attained in that three-month period -- plus 1%. The additional 1% is intended to compensate for the time lag between the conditions triggering the increase and the receipt of the actual increase in retired pay.

Studies by the Defense Manpower Commission have shown that the 1% kicker overcompensates during periods of high inflation. Moreover in recent years, retired pay (tied to CPI) has increased faster than active duty pay (tied to private sector wages). To reduce the impact of this pay inversion, legislation is being submitted to Congress to eliminate the 1% kicker starting in FY 1977. This will save about \$75 million in FY 1977 and over \$400 million in FY 1980.

The Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) was submitted to Congress in 1974. Passage of this act will not generate near term savings, but will have important results in future years. Assuming annual wage increases of 6% and CPI increases of 4% we could save a cumulative total of approximately \$11 billion by the year 2000. Also, the RMA incorporates important structural changes which make the military retirement system more compatible with our personnel management needs.

3. Adjusting the Total Military Compensation Package

The Defense FY 1977 authorization request incorporates a number of adjustments to the total compensation package, some of which have already been approved, while others are new initiatives which need prompt consideration and approval by Congress.

a. Adjustments Underway

The major item, saving about \$1 billion annually by FY 1980, is the new method of allocating military pay raises approved by Congress in 1974. Prior to this change, the entire amount of each military pay increase was added to basic pay; allowances for quarters and subsistence were not increased and thus fell farther below the fair cost of housing and food. Under the new law, the percentage pay increase is applied equally to the three pay elements -- quarters and subsistence allowances, and basic pay. Savings to DoD are achieved in two ways: (1) the lower rates of basic pay will reduce retirement costs and (2) military members who are furnished government quarters and subsistence in kind, in lieu of the corresponding cash allowances, will, in effect, be paying higher prices for those items.

An additional savings of one-third billion dollars annually is expected by FY 1980 as a result of the following actions:

- Proficiency Pay has been greatly reduced in scope.

- Reenlistment Bonuses are being strictly allocated only to retain capable personnel having scarce skills. We expect to seek renewal of bonus legislation to provide for retention of scarce skills.
- Enlistment Bonuses, expanded from \$41 million in FY 1973 to \$72 million in FY 1976, are being reduced to about \$29 million in FY 1977. Recruiting success, in some part due to youth unemployment levels, allows DoD to reduce this particular incentive significantly. Since bonus use will vary with the condition of the recruiting market, renewal of the bonus authority, which expires in 1977, will be necessary.
- Reenlistment Travel Payments have been terminated. Heretofore, when an individual was discharged and immediately reenlisted, he was paid one-way travel to his home of record. These payments are no longer made.

The following table shows the costs for these items in FY 1973 and the planned costs and expected savings in FY 1977 and FY 1980.

Table 7
Cost Savings from Adjustments Underway
(\$ Millions)

<u>Item</u>	<u>FY 1973 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1977 Plan</u>	<u>FY 1980 Plan</u> <u>1/</u>
Proficiency Pay	146	38	40
Reenlistment Bonus	339	274	150
Enlistment Bonus	41	29	29
Reenlistment Travel	15	0	0
Total	<u>541</u>	<u>341</u>	<u>219</u>
Savings from 1973 levels	-	200	322

1/ FY 1977 dollars.

Other actions taken in previous years have reduced the compensation package: CHAMPUS coverage of dental care, counseling, therapy, and several other services. The new Aviation Career Incentive Pay Program has resulted in reduced flight pay costs. Jump pay has been reduced by eliminating about 5,000 parachute billets. Collectively these actions will save an additional \$30 million annually by FY 1980.

b. New Initiatives

Elimination of Commissary Subsidies. Last year Defense proposed to eliminate over a two-year period most of the appropriated

fund subsidies for commissary stores. Congress denied the request. This year it is being proposed again, but with a three-year phase-out. This proposal will save about \$94 million in FY 1977, \$188 million in FY 1978, and about \$280 million annually thereafter.

There is no intention to do away with the commissary system. The importance of commissary stores to the military community, both in an economic sense and also as a morale factor is well recognized. They should be more like the military exchanges which have been essentially self-supporting for years and still provide a valuable service to the military community. The long-range interests of the military community will be well served by making the commissaries self-sufficient also.

The proposal would make the commissary stores pay for their employees and utilities out of their receipts. Consumers will still benefit from rent-free space, no state or local taxes, no advertising or insurance costs, and no store profits. The Government will also continue to pay for transportation of goods to overseas locations at an annual cost of about \$88 million to assure that our military personnel overseas can continue to buy food comparable in price and quality to that available in the United States.

The stores now provide about a 20% saving for the average customer in the United States. When the direct subsidy has been eliminated, the saving will be reduced to about 10%. (Management improvements now underway should restore about 2%.) This would represent an increased cost of \$10-\$20 per month to a typical commissary user in grade E-4. While this is a measurable increase in cost, the commissaries will still offer a significant saving.

Terminal Leave Payment. We have already proposed and assume final Congressional approval for limiting terminal leave payments to a career maximum of 60 days for a military member. This reform places both enlisted and officer personnel on a common footing and precludes members from receiving payment for this benefit at each reenlistment.

Fair Market Rental System. A proposal to allocate a greater proportion of future military pay raises to the Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) will be submitted to Congress. The Congress in 1974 provided that military pay raises are to be spread proportionately among basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence. While this was an advance over the previous practice in which increases were allocated exclusively to basic pay, the current BAQ still does not offset the costs of housing for most members with families.

Military quarters vary widely in value. Family quarters on the average have value substantially above the rates of the current BAQ, while bachelor quarters have value substantially below current BAQ rates. Defense plans by 1984 to achieve a system for charging military

members living in government quarters a fair market rental. A first step in this direction would adjust the BAQ rates upward toward the average value of family quarters, by placing more than a proportionate share of future military pay raises into BAQ. Those occupying lower-cost bachelor quarters will receive a portion of their BAQ, rather than having it all withheld.

The Department of Defense will submit a legislative proposal to accomplish this. It estimates that this action will create savings of \$52 million in FY 1977, \$310 million in FY 1980, increasing to about \$700 million annually by 1984.

Cadet and Midshipman Pay Reduction. Cadet pay is set at 50% of basic pay for a second lieutenant/ensign. Because junior officer pay has risen markedly in recent years, cadet pay has risen above the levels needed to cover student expenses and provide them adequate compensation. The FY 1977 Budget Request has been reduced by \$2 million based on a legislative proposal that will be submitted to readjust pay for cadets and midshipmen.

Adjustments in Reserve Pay Practices. A number of adjustments will be sought in reserve pay practices which will achieve savings estimated at \$60 million for FY 1977. The major adjustments proposed are:

- Changing the basis of payment for additional training periods for reservists. Under current practice, certain reservists attending additional training above the regularly scheduled 24 or 48 unit assemblies receive two day's pay for one day's additional training. For these extra drills, it is proposed that only one day's pay be given for each additional day of training.
- Federal employees who are also members of the Selected Reserve now receive their military pay in addition to their full civil service pay. It is proposed to stop this dual payment.

The following table summarizes the savings we anticipate will result from these new initiatives for end FY 1977 and future years.

Table 8
Cost Savings from New Initiatives
(\$ FY 1977 Millions)

	<u>FY 1977 Savings</u>	<u>FY 1980 Savings</u>
Commissary Subsidy Phase Out	\$ 94	\$280
Terminal Leave Payment Reform	\$ 59	\$100
Fair Market Rental System	\$ 52	\$310
Cadet and Midshipmen Pay Reduction	\$ 2	\$ 10
Adjustments in Reserve Pay Practices	<u>\$ 60</u>	<u>\$ 60</u>
Total New Initiatives	<u>\$267</u>	<u>\$760</u>

4. Reducing Personnel Turnover and Turbulence

The DoD spends over \$1.5 billion dollars annually to defray the costs of permanent change of station (PCS) moves. These costs can be reduced by reducing the number of moves which must be made during a fiscal year.

PCS moves occur because people are discharged and must be replaced, finish prescribed tours of duty, or are given school assignments. In an organization of two million military personnel a significant amount of movement and movement-related cost is to be expected, particularly when one person out of four is replaced each year. By the same token, small percentage changes in personnel turnover and average tour lengths can save a significant amount of funds and improve readiness in the process.

Last year, a significant step was taken to reduce turnover by eliminating two-year active duty enlistments and establishing a minimum active-duty tour of three years, which has now been extended to new officer personnel. To reduce enlisted turnover further, goals have been established for limiting first-term early separations. The goals apply only to the post-training period and are not quotas. The Services must continue to have early separation flexibility in order to manage quality.

To increase average tour lengths, we have adopted new policies for assignment practices:

- Enlisted and officer personnel will be assigned no more than two tours during an initial active duty term.
- Career officers will be assigned to schools only after completing their normal tours of duty.

- The CONUS sustaining base will be extended to include Hawaii, which will increase the number of people available for a 36 month overseas tour.
- An individual serving an unaccompanied overseas tour will be returned to his original duty station wherever possible, and families will not be moved. If an individual going to a short tour cannot be returned to his original station, the Services will attempt to designate his next assignment in advance, and move his family to the new station as soon as quarters become available, thus eliminating the cost and inconvenience of an extra family move.

5. Military and Civilian Grade Controls

There has been, for the past two decades, a trend toward military and civilian grade enrichment. While the reasons for this are not fully known, there appear to be two root causes: the growth in technology and management complexity, which has required greater number of higher-skilled people and fewer lesser-skilled ones; and the tendency in the later 1950s and 1960s to increase compensation through promotions, owing to the lack of pay comparability between government employees and private industry.

Except in the very senior positions, competitive pay levels have been achieved for both military and civilian employees. It is time to scrutinize the grade structure to ensure that the force is not richer in grade than is required. In the past two years a review of the military officer force has already made significant reductions, both in total officers and in the senior positions. More reductions are planned for the future, since large adjustments of this kind cannot be made in a short time. However, it is still necessary to come to grips with the observed growth in the civilian grade structure.

a. Military Grade Structure

There has been considerable progress in reducing the military grade structure. During the peacetime period FY 1954-64, the enlisted-to-officer ratio averaged about 7.1. The ratio rose to 7.5 during the Vietnam war as the force structure was augmented with combat units which require relatively few officers. By FY 1973, the ratio had dropped to 6.0 because, during the phase-down, enlisted personnel could be separated more readily than officer personnel. Since that year, officers have been reduced at a faster rate than enlisted personnel. As a consequence the ratio is expected to improve to 6.6 in FY 1977 and to 6.7 in FY 1978. The trend is shown on the table below:

Table 9
Enlisted-to-Officer Ratios
(End Fiscal Years)

<u>Average</u> <u>FY 1954-1964</u>	<u>FY1964</u>	<u>FY1968</u>	<u>FY1973</u>	<u>FY1975</u>	<u>FY1977</u>	<u>FY1978</u>
7.1	7.0	7.5	6.0	6.3	6.6	6.7

The number of senior officers has also been reduced, as noted in the following table:

Table 10
Senior Officers (less Doctors and Dentists) 1/
(End Fiscal Years)

	<u>Average</u> <u>FY 1954-64</u>	<u>FY1964</u>	<u>FY1968</u>	<u>FY1973</u>	<u>FY1975</u>	<u>FY1977</u>
Gen/Flag	1268	1294	1352	1291	1199	1185
Field Grade (000) 1/						
0-6	12.8	13.8	17.6	14.3	12.5	12.1
0-5	31.1	34.8	41.6	34.3	30.6	29.7
0-4	<u>51.3</u>	<u>52.6</u>	<u>68.3</u>	<u>52.7</u>	<u>47.6</u>	<u>45.1</u>
Total 04-06	<u>95.2</u>	<u>101.2</u>	<u>127.5</u>	<u>101.3</u>	<u>90.7</u>	<u>86.9</u>

1/ Including field grade officers who are doctors and dentists would distort the analysis. The number of doctor and dentist field grade officers increased from 5,500 in FY 1964 to 11,300 in FY 1975 to provide better promotion opportunities to help retain these specialists.

b. Civilian Grade Structure

The civilian workforce is composed of Wage Board employees and General Schedule (GS) employees. The U.S. is divided into 137 wage areas and the compensation of Wage Board workers in each area is adjusted periodically on the basis of wage surveys of comparable jobs in that area. The grade pattern of the GS jobs is controlled by a position management system which determines the proper grade for each individual position.

GS employees now represent about 55% of the DoD civilian workforce. The average GS grade in DoD has grown steadily from 5.4 in FY 1954 to 7.2 in FY 1964 and is now projected to reach 7.8 in FY 1977.

Table 11
Average General Schedule Grades
(End Fiscal Years)

<u>Average FY 1954-64</u>	<u>FY1964</u>	<u>FY1968</u>	<u>FY1973</u>	<u>FY1975</u>	<u>FY1977</u>
6.4	7.2	7.2	7.7	7.7	7.8

Much of this growth in average GS grade appears to have been caused by the growth in the number of senior grade (GS-13 to GS-15) employees, which increased from 42,400 to 60,000 between FY 1964 and FY 1973. In recent years the number of people in these grades has been decreasing and is projected to drop to 56,900 by end FY 1977. Some of the growth is undoubtedly justified by civilianization and by the growth in technology. However, it is still difficult to explain all of the growth that has taken place since FY 1964. The following table shows the specific trends:

Table 12
Civilian General Schedule Employees, GS-13 to 15
(End Fiscal Years)

	<u>Average FY 1954-64</u>	<u>FY1964</u>	<u>FY1968</u>	<u>FY1973</u>	<u>FY1975</u>	<u>FY1977</u>
Senior Grades (000)						
GS-15	2.9	4.9	6.0	6.3	6.1	5.9
GS-14	7.2	11.9	14.0	15.0	14.5	14.2
GS-13	<u>16.7</u>	<u>25.6</u>	<u>36.0</u>	<u>38.8</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>36.8</u>
Total GS 13-15	26.8	42.4	56.0	60.1	58.2	56.9

DoD has been successful in controlling the number of civilian supergrades. The number of these senior executives decreased from 1,482 in FY 1973 to 1,355 in FY 1975, and is projected to decrease further in FY 1977 to well below the 1964 level:

Table 13
DoD Supergrades 1/
(End Fiscal Years)

	<u>FY1964</u>	<u>FY1968</u>	<u>FY1973</u>	<u>FY1975</u>	<u>FY1977 2/</u>
Number	1,366	1,489	1,482	1,355	1,288

1/ Includes authorized quota positions, filled non-quota positions, and filled 10 USC 1581 positions.

2/ Assumes same fill rate for 10 USC 1581 positions for FY 1977 as experienced in FY 1975.

c. Assessment

The Department of Defense has made good progress in controlling and actually reversing the grade enrichment trend within the military force which began during the phase-down after the Vietnam war. There has been less success in reversing the trend in civilian senior grade enrichment (other than supergrades). There is some doubt as to whether the civilian position management concept is effective in controlling grade structure within reasonable limits. On the other hand, where grade structure controls have existed -- notably in our management of civilian supergrades and senior officers -- there has been reasonable success.

This matter will be studied carefully, first to determine if there are bonafide reasons for the growth in senior civilian positions since 1964, and second to decide whether some form of grade limitations might be in order to assist in our management of civilian personnel and controlling manpower cost growth.

E. The Components of Manpower Accounting

This section addresses the payroll components in more detail. Since the related budget support detail submitted to Congress is in total obligational authority (TOA), with pay raise contingencies not allocated to accounts, the corresponding data in this section will also be structured in TOA with contingencies not spread. The data below thus will not compare exactly with the cost data in other sections.

The majority of this section will be devoted to explaining the components of the Military Personnel Appropriations. The remainder of the section will briefly address National Guard and Reserve Personnel Appropriations, Defense Family Housing, the Civilian Pay Components, Military Retired Pay, and finally Personnel Support Costs.

1. Military Personnel Appropriations

Military personnel appropriations are the Congressional appropriations accounts which contain most of Defense military payroll costs. A separate account for each of the four Services funds payments to and for active military personnel. The major elements of the appropriations may be categorized as follows:

- Related to strength and grade structure of the force.
- Related to flows into, through, and out of the Services.
- Related to geographical distribution or deployments of forces.
- Related to miscellaneous factors such as tour length policies, Service academy cadet pay policies, numbers of MIAs, etc.

Table 14 summarizes the major TOA components, excluding pay raise contingency funds, for each category.

This categorization is an oversimplification. There are interactions among the categories. For example, the strength related costs are influenced by the personnel flows within a given year, as well as by the average or end strength for the year. If all of the losses to a Service occur late in a year and all the accessions occur early, the many years for which we must pay are obviously higher than if the reverse situation existed. In the ensuing discussion, key secondary variables that influence the size of a given cost factor are noted.

a. Strength and Grade Related Costs (\$20,414 million TOA)

Strength and grade related costs are primarily a function of the size and grade structure of the military forces. As is evident from Table 14, the strength and grade related costs are by far the largest segment of active military personnel appropriations. They are determined by military strength and grade structure and may be subdivided into five elements. Basic Pay, Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ), Subsistence, FICA, and Uniform allowance.

Table 14
FY 77 Active Military Personnel Appropriation Sub-Element
(TOA in \$ Millions)

1. Strength and Grade Related

Basic Pay	\$15,928		
Basic Allowance for Quarters	1,753		
Subsistence	1,697		
FICA Contribution	903		
Uniform Maintenance	134		
	<hr/>	\$20,414	85.9%

2. Flow Related

Initial Uniform Allowances	\$ 152		
Separation Payments	368		
Reenlistment Bonus	274		
Enlistment Bonus	29		
Proficiency Pay	38		
Special Pay (Type A)	39		
PCS Travel (Accession; Separation; Training)	486		
	<hr/>	\$ 1,386	5.8%

3. Deployment Related

Station Allowances	\$ 195		
Family Separation Allowances	37		
Savings Deposit Interest	3		
Special Pay (Type B)	65		
PCS Travel (Rotational)	935		
	<hr/>	\$ 1,235	5.2%

4. Miscellaneous

Pay & Allowance of Cadets/Midshipmen	\$ 66		
Death Gratuities	10		
Special Pay (Type C)	96		
Incentive Pay	278		
PCS Travel (Operational; Unit)	248		
Apprehension of Deserters	4		
Missing in Action	15		
	<hr/>	\$ 717	3.0%
		\$23,752*	100.0%

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Active duty pay raise contingency fund of \$960M TOA not included.

Basic Pay (\$15,928 million TOA) is the only element of compensation received in cash by every military member. It ranges from \$4,335/year for a new recruit to \$37,800/year for a four-star officer. The amount of basic pay any member receives is a function of his pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total value of basic pay is controlled by total numbers of people in uniform and their grade and length of service distribution.

Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) (\$1,753 million TOA) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing, or when the public quarters occupied are declared inadequate. In addition to the overall strength, BAQ is a function of the grade and dependency status and of the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ is from \$800/year for an E-1 with no dependents to \$3800/year for a flag/general officer with dependents.

Subsistence (\$1,697 million TOA) represents both the cost of feeding military men in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food, called basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). Food served in military messes is called "subsistence in kind". All officers are entitled to cash allowance of \$637/year. Enlisted members receive cash allowances only if a mess is not available or they are authorized to mess separately. Otherwise they receive subsistence in kind through a mess or in the form of field rations. In addition to varying with strength, subsistence costs vary with the number of people assigned to locations where no mess is available, and with general food prices.

FICA Contributions (\$903 million TOA) are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law.

Uniform Maintenance (\$134 million TOA) is only one component of the clothing allowances, but it is paid to all enlisted personnel beginning six months after they enter the service. ^{1/} The purpose is to assist enlisted personnel to maintain their prescribed uniform set. In addition, some enlisted personnel receive special payments when assigned to certain units, such as Armed Forces police units, recruiting duty, or ceremonial guard units. These payments are very small.

b. Flow Related Costs (\$1,386 million TOA)

Personnel flow related costs are influenced primarily by the flow of people through the military manpower system and by the

^{1/} The other component of clothing allowance is initial uniform allowances, covered in the discussion of personnel flow related costs.

Services' efforts to influence that flow. They may be subdivided into seven classifications: Initial Uniform Allowances, Separation Payments, Reenlistment Bonuses, Enlistment Bonuses, Proficiency Pay, Special Pay Type (A), and Permanent Change of Station (PCS).

Initial Uniform Allowance (\$152 million TOA) is the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted personnel and officer candidates entering active duty, and payments made to Reserve officers or ROTC graduates upon commissioning. There are also several miscellaneous types of payments included, such as civilian clothing allowances when authorized.

Separation Payments (\$368 million TOA) are paid to four groups of people who are leaving the Services: (1) members with unused leave accrued for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; (2) members severed for physical disability reasons; (3) members severed for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion in the case of officers; or (4) members involuntarily released from active duty after completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four groups is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave. Actions have been taken to reduce this payment by encouraging the use of leave as earned including legislation discussed in Section V to limit total payment for unused leave to 60 days per individual.

Reenlistment Bonus (\$274 million TOA) includes those payments to enlisted personnel who reenlist within three months after discharge or who extend enlistments for at least two years. All personnel who were on active duty on the effective date of the enactment of the Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act, (PL 93-277) receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2000 over a 20-year period. PL 93-277 limited the payment of retention incentives to critical skills with chronic and sustained shortages. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is given only to qualified people reenlisting in such a skill during the first ten years of active military service. Current SRB levels range from zero for most skills to a maximum of \$15,000 for nuclear skills, with \$12,000 for other shortage skills. Initial savings have been limited by a save pay feature allowing all personnel on active duty on or prior to June 1, 1974, to choose to reenlist under the SRB or the regular reenlistment bonus program on their next reenlistment. The SRB concept is intended to apply the economic laws of supply and demand to the career manpower requirements of the Services on a skill by skill basis. PL 93-277 expires in June 1977. Some form of bonus legislation will be necessary to provide bonuses for some skills.

Enlistment Bonus (\$29 million TOA) is paid as an incentive to enlist in shortage skills. Currently, Army and Marine Corps personnel enlisting in some combat (e.g., Infantryman) and combat support (e.g., Radio Repairman) skills are the only personnel receiving this incentive. The eligible combat skills receive \$2500 per capita and the eligible combat support skills receive \$1500. The maximum enlistment bonus allowed by law is \$3000, but the actual level should be a function of supply and demand in the national youth labor market. For FY 1977 the maximum will be \$1500. This program also is under PL 93-277, which expires in June 1977, and should be renewed by Congress.

Proficiency Pay (\$38 million TOA) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas, and for those in special requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain people in critical skills and jobs such as nuclear power-plant operators. In accordance with the intent of Congress, proficiency pay has been sharply curtailed in favor of the use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonuses.

Special Pay - Type A 1/ (\$39 million TOA) is paid to physicians, dentists, and nuclear qualified officers to continue on active duty for an agreed upon length of time.

PCS Travel (Accession, Separation, & Training Moves) (\$486 million TOA) is the costs of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, or leave the service. Training is included because most training requirements are a function of trained people leaving the service.

c. Deployment Related Costs (\$1,235 million TOA)

The third category contains those costs which are primarily a function of the geographic location or deployments of military personnel outside the U.S. and may be subdivided into: Station Allowances, Family Separation Allowances, Savings Deposit Interest, Special Pay - Type B, and PCS (rotational moves).

Station Allowances (\$195 million TOA) are payments made to certain military personnel serving outside the continental United States to compensate for increased cost of living in the areas designated. These payments take the form of per diem for cost of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates of per diem vary by geographical location.

1/ Special pay contains various kinds of entitlements, all of which do not fit into any one of the major categories of the table. For this reason, the suffixes (A), (B), and (C) have been used as shown in the table.

Family Separation Allowances (\$37 million TOA) are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents to compensate for added expenses incident to such separation. A member with dependents assigned to a station where dependents are not allowed, on board a ship away from home port for a continuous period of more than 30 days, or ordered to temporary duty away from his permanent station for more than 30 days is entitled to receive the family separation allowance of \$30 per month.

Savings Deposit Interest (\$3 million TOA) is paid at a rate of 10% per annum on special savings deposits made by military members serving outside the U.S. or its possessions. This savings program has terminated except for members in a missing status.

Special Pay - Type B (\$65 million TOA) is composed of sea duty pay and pay for "duty at certain place" designated by DoD as involving unusual hardship.

PCS Travel (Rotational Moves) (\$935 million TOA) covers those costs of moving personnel and their households to or from overseas duty stations. Such travel is the most costly component of permanent change of station travel expense, and is primarily a function of the numbers of military personnel serving outside the U.S. Secondary influences on the cost are tour length policies, loss rates, grade distribution, and marital status of deployed personnel.

d. Miscellaneous Costs (\$717 million TOA)

Several types of direct military manpower costs, which are driven by miscellaneous factors, represent 3% of direct active-duty military personnel appropriations and include: Incentive Pay, PCS Travel (operational unit), Pay and Allowance of Cadets/Midshipmen, Death Gratuities, and Special Pay - Type C.

Pay and Allowances of Cadets/Midshipmen (\$66 million TOA) is a function of the enrollment at the Service Academies and pay policies for cadets and midshipmen, both determined by law. Enrollment is essentially independent of total military strength and the number of officer separations, since other sources of officers, such as OCS, ROTC, and direct commissioning programs, are varied to absorb the fluctuations in officer requirements.

Death Gratuities (\$10 million TOA) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Such payments vary with the age distribution of the force and levels of hostilities as well with overall strength.

Special Pay - Type C (\$96 million TOA) is additional money paid to physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and optometrists. These payments are a direct function of the numbers of physicians, dentists,

veterinarians, and optometrists on active duty. These payments are included in the "miscellaneous" category as opposed to the strength related category because medical care levels vary with dependent and retired populations as well as with active military strengths.

Incentive Pay (\$278 million TOA) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty, such as flying, submarine duty, flight deck duty, and parachute jumping. Payments are influenced by the grade distribution, as well as by the number of qualifying personnel. It is important to recognize that although incentive pay varies with the strength of special populations, it does not vary directly with total strength.

PCS Travel (Operational and Unit Moves) (\$248 million TOA) is the cost of moving military personnel, their dependents, and their household goods within the United States (or within another geographical area such as Europe or the Far East) due to individual reassignment to a new duty station or the movement of an entire organized unit to a new duty location. While the number of units located overseas does have some impact on overseas in-theater moves, such operational or unit moves are small in number compared to those in the United States. The primary factors influencing operational and unit moves are tour-length policies, force basing policies and decisions, and length of initial obligated service.

Apprehension of Deserters (\$4 million TOA) covers the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control.

Missing in Action (\$15 million TOA) includes pay and allowances paid to beneficiaries of those who remain listed as missing-in-action.

2. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations

There are six separate appropriations for the six Reserve components. Funds are appropriated for drills and active duty training, and to students in the ROTC, Reserve Officer Candidate Program (ROC) (nearly phased out), and the Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP). The costs are a function of the strength of the reserve elements, the amount of training received, and the travel undertaken. The funds cover basically the same elements as Military Personnel Appropriations discussed in "A" above and amount to \$1,686 million in TOA in FY 1977. In addition there is a pay raise contingency of \$70 million TOA.

3. Defense Family Housing

Defense Family Housing is a separate appropriation which funds the leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The appropriation includes funds for paying civilians. These funds are counted under civilian payroll. The nonpay portion of the FY 1977 budget request, considered part of military payroll, is \$975M TOA.

4. Civilian Personnel Costs

Unlike military personnel costs, which are collected into unique appropriation accounts, civilian personnel costs are spread among several accounts in accordance with the function being performed. The Operations and Maintenance appropriations (including the industrially funded activities) are the largest of these. The RDT&E and Military Construction appropriations also contain significant civilian personnel costs.

Direct hire civilians include wage board and general schedule civil service employees and foreign nationals directly employed by the U.S. Government. Indirect hire civilians are employed by the U.S. Government through foreign governments. Civilian pay and benefits, including the DoD contribution to retirement and health insurance, other benefits such as education and training, and payments to personnel involuntarily separated from employment are included in Civilian Payroll Costs. FY 1977 total Civilian Payroll cost \$16,684 million TOA. In addition, there is a pay raise contingency for civilians of \$390 million TOA.

5. Military Retired Pay

Military Retired Pay is a single appropriation for DoD and is not normally shown by service. While not as large as military and civilian payroll costs, Military Retired Pay is the most rapidly rising component of DoD manpower costs. The number of retirees has increased 180% and the cost has increased 600% from FY 1964 to FY 1977. Since the payments are to the personnel who served in forces of previous years, the FY 1977 cost is independent of the FY 1977 force. Total retirement annuities are a function of the number of retirees, the grade of the retiree at the time of retirement the pay levels in effect at the time of retirement, and cost of living increases provided to the pool of annuitants. The TOA costs for FY 1977 are \$8,382 million, plus \$12 million for pay raise contingency. Assuming the Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) becomes effective July 1977, an additional \$40 million will be needed. All of these estimates assume elimination of the "1% kicker" discussed in Section D of this chapter.

6. Personnel Support Costs

There are certain kinds of nonpayroll costs involved in supporting people. Some of the categories of personnel support costs are obviously people-related in total, such as medical support and individual training. The personnel support components of base operating support are not so easily identifiable. However, an effort has been made to account for the personnel support part of base operating support by assuming that half of the operations and investment costs in base operating support are incurred to support people on bases. Personnel support costs definitions are necessarily arbitrary, since practically the entire nonpay portion of the budget might be included if the argument were pushed far enough.

In the past, personnel support costs have not been lumped with payroll in discussing the cost of manpower. They represent a fairly constant percentage of the Defense budget. They are integral to manpower programs, however, and should not be ignored.

The costs shown for each personnel support category contain only the operations and investment costs excluding the pay of military and civilian personnel, since payroll costs have already been accounted for.

Table 15
Personnel Support Costs
(\$ Billions TOA)

	<u>FY64</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>	<u>FY77</u>
DoD Budget	50.6	77.5	80.1	85.1	87.9	98.3	112.7
Personnel Support:							
Individual							
Training	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0
Medical Support	0.2	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.2
Half of Base							
Operating Support	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.1
Other <u>1/</u>	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3
Total	1.8	3.0	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.7	4.6
% Personnel Support	4	4	4	5	5	5	4

1/ Recruiting and Examining, Overseas Dependents Education.

F. Summary

Manpower payroll costs have risen 136% from FY 1964 to FY 1977 and now consume more than half of the Defense budget. A peak of 57% was reached in FY 1973. Payroll costs have been 55% for the past two years but, assuming approval of the FY 1977 President's Budget, will fall to 53% next year, the lowest level since the raise for junior personnel in 1971.

The cost growths since 1964 occurred in spite of a military and civilian strength reduction of 19% and major efforts to hold down per capita cost increases.

The Defense Department has done its best to achieve a proper balance in the allocation of resources. Congress must now deal with this austere program. To the extent that it is not accepted, another hard choice will have to be made, a choice between increasing the DoD budget or cutting real combat capability.

CHAPTER XVI

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

The Department of Defense policy of increasing the number of women in the military and increasing the number of career fields open to them assists in obtaining qualified military personnel in an all-volunteer environment and supports the national policy of providing women the same opportunity as men within existing law. The DoD has revised personnel policies in the areas of assignment, utilization, promotion, and benefits and is well advanced towards its goal of guaranteeing equal opportunity and treatment for women.

A. Numbers of Women in the Military

Expansion of military women's programs began in the Department of Defense in Fiscal Year 1973. The following table compares actual FY 75 and planned FY 76-78 figures to that base year.

Women in the Military (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>Planned</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Planned</u>	<u>FY 78</u> <u>Planned</u>
<u>Army</u>					
Active Military	20.7	42.3	48.9	49.7	53.1
National Guard	.5	6.4	10.6	11.6	20.1
Reserve	2.5	15.7	24.6	26.5	37.6
<u>Navy</u>					
Active Military	12.5	21.2	23.5	24.0	24.1
Reserve	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.8
<u>Marine Corps</u>					
Active Military	2.3	3.2	3.5	3.6	4.0
Reserve	.1	.4	.5	.5	.7
<u>Air Force</u>					
Active Military	19.8	30.2	34.6	36.2	40.0
National Guard	1.0	3.1	5.2	5.5	6.9
Reserve	1.3	3.3	5.7	5.8	6.9
<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>62.3</u>	<u>127.9</u>	<u>159.4</u>	<u>165.7</u>	<u>184.2</u>
Active Military	55.3	96.9	110.5	113.5	129.3
Reserve Components	7.0	31.0	48.9	52.3	75.0
<u>Percent of End Strength</u>					
Active Forces	2.5	4.6	5.3	5.4	6.2
Selected Reserve Components	0.8	3.4	5.6	6.0	8.8

Women will comprise approximately 6% of the active force and 9% of the reserve forces, by 1978. Formal goals have not been established beyond that time.

B. Career Opportunities for Women

Although women are prohibited by law and directives based on law from serving in combat positions, policy changes in the Department have resulted in making possible the assignment of women to almost all other career fields.

Career progression for women is now comparable to that for male personnel. Selection boards for promotion and career enhancing training consider both men and women. In the past, women were considered by special boards. Women are routinely assigned to overseas locations formerly closed to female personnel.

Test programs have been initiated to place women in pilot training and in command of activities and units which have missions other than administration of women.

Procurement of women officers will be greatly enhanced by the increased number of ROTC scholarships currently being awarded to women.

Admission of women to the Service Academies will begin in 1976 and will further the goal of increased numbers of women officers. The Academies will provide single track education, allowing only for minor variations in the cadet program based on physiological differences between men and women. The following chart displays the number of women programmed to enter each Academy in 1976 and the approximate size of the entering class.

Class of 1980

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Class Size</u>
US Military Academy	100	1400
US Naval Academy	80	1250
US Air Force Academy	<u>150</u>	<u>1520</u>
Total	330	4170

The rapid increase of women in the service has not been without problems. Some women are having difficulty performing jobs which require heavy lifting, stamina and exposure to inclement weather. We believe these problems can be solved by:

- Developing more precise physical standards for occupations, especially those open to women.
- Developing better methods for measuring the ability of people to meet the physical demands of jobs.
- Introducing realistic physical performance standards into specialty training courses.
- Insuring that recruiters provide women with full information on all jobs that are open to women, including a description of the physical demands of these jobs.

C. Revised DoD Personnel Policies

Personnel policies relating to women have undergone major changes in recent years. Perhaps the most significant changes resulted from a decision by the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Frontiero vs Richardson* which overturned the assumption that only male service members could have dependents. That case, in May 1973, has brought about the following policy changes.

- Allow women service members who are married to male service members to claim dependency of the couple's children. Previously, dependents of the couple were presumed to be dependent on the male service member.
- Entitle women service members to medical care for their civilian husbands without proof of dependency.
- Provide travel entitlements to husbands and children of women service members without regard to dependency.
- Allow married women service members to apply for family housing. Previously only male service members were eligible to apply for family housing.
- Provide basic allowance for quarters and family separation allowance to women service members equal to that granted male service members.
- Entitle women service members to basic allowance for quarters while on leave without proof of dependency for a civilian husband or other dependents.

Among policy changes directed by the Department were those affecting the discharge of women for pregnancy and parenthood. The Military Departments were directed in 1974 to change separation policies for women who were pregnant or became parents from involuntary to voluntary, with involuntary separations to be based on non-performance.

D. Service Programs

During the period 1972 to 1975, each of the Military Services implemented policies and procedures to improve the utilization of their women members. These policies apply not only to active military members but also to the reserve components.

1. Army.

- The number of interchangeable positions on manning documents eligible to be filled by women have been increased from 19,000 in July 1972 to 200,200 in March 1975.

- ROTC programs were opened to women. In school year 1974-75, enrollment of women doubled in Senior ROTC and increased forty-six percent in the Junior program. One hundred and fifty scholarships were awarded to women participating in Senior ROTC for school year 1975-76 compared to 120 in the 1974-75 school year.

- On 1 July 1974, WAC officers were permanently detailed to other Army branches, with the exception of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense. The career management of WAC officers is now the same as that of their male counterparts.

- The Army opened all courses of instruction formerly closed to female officers, except combat arms, airborne, and ranger courses.

- In 1973 a gradual disestablishment of WAC detachments began, with women being billeted in and administered by the units to which they were assigned for duty. This policy enhances the opportunities for women to be assigned wherever job vacancies exist.

- Effective 1 July 1975, defensive weapons qualification training was required of all WAC members.

- The Army has begun implementing policies to insure consideration for a woman's family status. The concept is to assist the Army woman with family responsibilities to continue her military career.

- Army policy has been changed to permit women to command men, except for combat units. Three WAC officers have been selected for Colonel level command.

- A major effort has been made to increase the numbers of women in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Women have been encouraged to fill non-traditional jobs such as vehicle mechanic, truck driver, parachute rigger, and other non-combat positions. The Civilian Acquired Skills Program, which offers accelerated promotion on the basis of civilian training and experience has been a major inducement to women joining the Army Reserve.

2. Navy.

- The Navy eliminated the requirement for consent of parent or legal guardian for women applicants between the ages of 18 and 21.
- A policy change equalized the length of initial enlistment for men and women.
- The NROTC program was opened to women to complement the OCS program. Both the four year scholarship and college program are available to women.
- Female assignment desks have been eliminated and, within legal constraints, enlisted women are assigned the same as their male counterparts.
- Assignment goals have been established for each occupational specialty to optimize women representation without detracting from male sea/shore rotation.
- The separate officer candidate training programs for men and women have been consolidated into a single officer candidate school.
- Men and women's recruit training is consolidated at Orlando, Florida. The basic curriculum is the same for both men and women.
- The Navy has initiated test programs of assigning women line officers to sea duty and aviation training. Four women officers served on the USS SANCTUARY prior to her decommissioning; six women are serving as aviators and another eight are in training. These women are assigned to flying search and rescue helicopters and transport aircraft.
- Navy regulations have been amended to authorize women to succeed to command ashore. Five women have been selected to command major shore activities.
- Women are now serving in the Chaplain Corps and the Civil Engineer Corps.

3. Marine Corps.

- The Marine Corps Manual has been changed to allow women to command other than Woman-Marine Units.
- Women officers are now routinely considered by the board which selects officers for top level schools.
- Since August 1974, women officers are now considered for selection by the same board membership that considers their male contemporaries.

- Women are now routinely assigned to non-deployable billets in the Fleet Marine Force, although they continue to serve in non-combat jobs.

- All non-combat occupational fields/MOSs continue to be reviewed to determine which ones can appropriately be opened to women.

4. Air Force.

- All non-combat specialties in the active and Reserve Forces are open to women. Women have been assigned to almost all of these specialties including the traditionally male specialties of aircraft and motor vehicle maintenance.

- The ROTC program now includes women cadets.

- The Air Force has equalized age requirements and mental/educational standards for men and women.

- A new management system has been developed which will eliminate dual command of enlisted women and more fully integrate women in their squadron of assignment.

- Efforts to remove assignment limitations on women are continuing. Women are considered on the same basis as men for all overseas and CONUS assignments where suitable housing exists. Ninety-four percent of all short tour authorizations are subject to fill by women and are constrained only in scope because of facility accommodations.

- Air Force separation directives have been changed to include provision for the discharge of a sole surviving daughter. This provision formerly applied only to sons.

CHAPTER XVII

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

This chapter describes efforts by the Department of Defense to improve the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC) and discusses the relationship of these DPPC to the ten Major Defense Programs. It also provides an audit trail of changes made to the DPPC since the FY 1976 Defense Manpower Requirements Report.

A. Improvements in the Defense Planning and Programming Categories

The DPPC used for presentation of manpower requirements in this report are substantially the same as those employed for the past two years. There is, however, a major effort underway to improve the DPPC as a means of explaining Defense manpower and force requirements. In October 1975, a Progress Report ^{1/} was submitted to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. This section reviews and updates that report, summarizing completed actions and discussing current progress and future plans.

1. Preliminary Study

a. Background

Current efforts to improve the presentation of Defense manpower requirements began in April 1975, in response both to internal DoD needs for a better manpower array and to requests by the Senate Armed Services Committee that DPPC definitions be improved.

Within DoD, it was recognized that a more consistent data structure which improved the visibility of units and missions would assist manpower management. The Senate Armed Services Committee called for better relationship of the DPPC to actual missions, units and locations and for more consistent use of the DPPC by each Service. These closely related internal and external requirements established the general direction for both preliminary and on-going DPPC improvement efforts.

b. Initial Study Phase

The DPPC are made up of the same program element (PE) building blocks as the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and Defense Budget. In seeking ways to improve the presentation of manpower requirements, three alternative approaches were considered during the initial study phase. The first involved revision of the DPPC without

^{1/} US Department of Defense, Improvements in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report and the Defense Planning and Programming Categories: A Progress Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, October 1975).

changing basic PE definitions or content. The second called for revision of PE structure and definitions. The third entailed development of a new structure for manpower array not based on program elements.

A set of structural objectives was developed as a criterion for testing the three alternatives. Based on this evaluation, it was concluded that the second alternative, revision of PE structure and definitions, was the most logical approach to DPPC improvement. The first alternative, DPPC revision without modification of the PE building blocks, would offer little opportunity for improving the consistency and unit/mission orientation of manpower arrays. The third, a non-PE-based array would, in effect, divorce manpower from the Defense program and resource management structure, creating a high potential for disconnects and other problems stemming from the need to develop and maintain a new data system.

2. Current Study Efforts

Current DPPC study efforts, which began in August 1975, are being concentrated on two areas with a high potential for producing some needed improvements within one to two years: (1) program element/unit relationships, and (2) enhancement of consistency in manpower arrays. A related longer-range study, addressing the entire Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) has also been started; however, structural changes resulting from this broader effort are not expected prior to FY 1979.

a. Program Element/Unit Relationships

Because DPPC are made up of the same PEs used to aggregate resources into the ten Major Defense Programs, improving the relationship of units (and their locations) to the DPPC requires a closer match between PEs and units. At present, many PEs are not unit oriented; large numbers of units use multiple program elements which cause their strength to be segmented into two, three or more DPPC. The basic objective in this study is to develop PE revisions which will increase the numbers of units reporting manpower in only one program element. This should, in turn, associate a set of operational units with a given DPPC and, thus, provide for better connection between the DPPC and actual missions and units in the field.

Analysis is proceeding on schedule. The extent of multiple program element usage has been quantified by Service. The causes for use of more than one PE by a unit have been identified. the quantification and classification steps have led to the development of some initial alternatives for PE modification which are currently under formal review by the OSD staff, Defense Agencies and Services. A plan has also been established for addressing remaining PE/unit mismatches along with the consistency improvements discussed below.

b. Enhancement of Consistency in Manpower Arrays

This effort, actually a series of discrete sub-efforts, has as its objective improvement in internal and inter-service consistency of the PE structure and the DPPC. Widely divergent demands of PE structure users and organizational differences among the services cause manpower to appear "inconsistently" aligned among the DPPC. Inconsistencies appear in such areas as management headquarters/command, reserve/active force match, telecommunications, training, individuals, intelligence, base operating support, RDT&E and support to other nations. These areas have been identified for review and modification as required to improve DPPC consistency.

Consistency improvements are also on schedule. The initial change proposal, which provides for increased visibility of management headquarters within the DPPC structure, has been reviewed within the Department. Proposals addressing uniformity between active force and reserve component manpower and improved consistency in the telecommunications areas are under review. Analysis of training and individuals categories has been started.

3. Future Plans

Most of the PE and associated DPPC changes resulting from these study efforts should be approved for implementation before publication of the FY 1978 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. There are, however, two factors which can impact on the extent and timing of implementation.

The first is the complexity of many of the issues involved. The impact of changes to the PE structure and definitions extends beyond manpower resources. The diverse requirements of all users of the PE structure must be carefully assessed. Currently unforeseen requirements could well delay or limit the scope of the improvements which are presently under consideration.

The overall PPBS improvement effort, mentioned earlier, is also a factor influencing DPPC improvements. Changes in the PE structure and DPPC must be compatible with this prospect. A decision to depart significantly from the current FYDP and Defense program structure to enhance the PPBS process would, of necessity, require a related modification in approach to manpower array improvements.

Despite these qualifications, there is a strong commitment to improving this report by enhancing the consistency and visibility (in terms of units) of manpower categories. Some compromises will undoubtedly be required in order to meet widely varying internal and external user requirements most effectively and economically; nevertheless, progress will be made. Major structural changes resulting from the study will be presented for review by Armed Services Committees staffs prior to implementation.

B. Relationship of Defense Planning and Programming Categories to Major Defense Programs

As stated in the previous section, the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC) are derived from the same program elements as the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The two management structures are simply alternative groupings of the same resource elements. The ten Major Defense Programs which comprise the FYDP are the basic financial and manpower resource management array for the Department. The DPPC structure is used for presentation of manpower requirements to the Congress in this report.

The following chart illustrates the way program element building blocks are used in these two arrays. Each of the ten Major Defense Programs includes all program elements with resources that are specifically identified and measurable to that program. This includes both mission elements, such as bombardment squadrons, divisions, or maintenance depots, as well as sustaining elements like base operations. The DPPC, on the other hand, group elements into cross-sections related to direct force application (Strategic and General Purpose Forces) and maintenance of force readiness (Auxiliary, Mission Support and Central Support Forces, and Individuals). Thus, the Strategic Forces DPPC includes strategic aircraft resources from both Program 1 (Strategic) and 5 (Guard and Reserve) as well as strategic control elements from Program 3 (Intelligence and Communications) and strategic aircraft research and development project elements from Program 6. Base operations elements for Program 1 are collected in the Mission Support Forces DPPC along with those from other programs. Both methods of looking at Defense resources have their advantages and disadvantages and the aggregation used is dependent on the particular needs of the manager.

C. Changes to the Defense Planning and Programming Categories

Categorization of manpower into the proper DPPC has improved in the past year by several relatively minor transfers among the existing data structure. A brief discussion of the rationale for transfers between categories is presented below. An audit trail follows, showing the current category of each activity transferred, and the manpower involved. Although the reasons for most shifts are immediately apparent, a few merit further explanation.

1. Army

a. Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Advisory Group manpower is more appropriately shown in the Support to Other Nations subcategory of Auxiliary Forces than in Federal Agency Support.

PROGRAM ELEMENTS: THE BUILDING BLOCKS

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS									
	1 STRATEGIC	2 GENERAL PURPOSE	3 INTELL & COMM	4 AIRLIFT/ SEALIFT	5 GUARD & RESERVE	6 RESEARCH & DEVELOP	7 CENTRAL SUPPLY & DEMAT	8 TRAINING MEDICAL & OTHER FUNG	9 ARMY & ASSOCIATED	10 SPT OF OTHER NATIONS
STRATEGIC FORCES	STRAT AIRCRAFT STRAT MISSILE ARMY CIVIL COMM SURV & WARN CIVIL DEFENSE		NAT MIL COMB SYS		STRAT AIRCRAFT STRAT MISSILE	STRAT ACFT PROJ STRAT MIL PROJ COMBAT PROJ SURV & WARN PROJ				
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES		DIVISION FORCES THEATER FORCES TACTICAL AIRCRAFT TAC AIR CONTROL NAVAL FORCES	TAC AIR CONTROL AEROSPACE RESCUE	TACTICAL AIRLIFT STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SEALIFT TRAFFIC MGMT	DIVISION FORCES THEATER FORCES TACTICAL AIRCRAFT TAC AIR CONTROL NAVAL FORCES AIRLIFT (TAC & STRAT) SEALIFT	DIVISION PCS PROJ TAC ACFT PROJ TAC AIR CTR PROJ NAVAL PCS PROJ				
AUXILIARY FORCES			INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS CRYPTOCYCLICAL		INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS CRYPTOCYCLICAL	RESEARCH PROJECTS EXPLO DEV PROJ ADVANCED DEV PROJ OAS DEV PROJECTS MANAGEMENT	CAUTION TEST RANGE			DATA REPORTING MANAGEMENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE
INTEGRATED SUPPORT FORCES	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM COMBAT TRAINING COMMAND	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM COMBAT TRAINING COMMAND	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM AIR TRAFFIC CTRL COMMAND	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM COMBAT TRAINING COMMAND	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM COMBAT TRAINING COMMAND OAS BASE UNITS					INTERNATIONAL OR
CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES		BASE OPERATIONS AERIAL DEMO LOGISTIC SUPPORT	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM COUNTERINTEL INVESTIGATION NUCLEAR ACT		BASE OPERATIONS MEDICAL RECRUITING TRAINING COMMAND LOGISTICS	MEDICAL PROJECTS MANPOWER PROJECTS	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM CENTRAL SUPPLY CENTRAL DEMAT OTHER LOG SPT	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM MEDICAL RECRUITING EDUCATION & TNG COMMAND	BASE OPERATIONS BASE COMM PUBLIC AFFAIRS OTHER ADMIN PER ACT SPT	
INDIVIDUALS	CHIEF THE STUDENTS	CHIEF THE STUDENTS		CHIEF THE STUDENTS	RECRUIT THE STUDENTS			TRANSPORT PATIENTS PROGRESS TRAINERS STUDENTS CARETS		

PROGRAM ELEMENT GROUPINGS

b. World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) ADP Support. Automatic Data Processing Support for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System has been separately identified for better management of resources in the Department. This action resulted in transfer of resources from Command (CSF) to Strategic Control and Surveillance.

c. During calendar year 1975, the Army introduced a new management structure, titled Standard Army Management Language (SAML). This change realigned the structures of the General Purpose Forces (Program 2) and the Guard and Reserve Forces (Program 5) to make them compatible. As part of the restructuring, many new program elements were created in order to better describe the missions and functions of various units. This refinement, however, resulted in the transfer of some resources between DPPC. For example, the Executive Flight Detachment at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was previously accounted for under Land Forces in a program element entitled Field Army Support. Under SAML, it is assigned to a program element entitled Special Activities - Other CONUS Support and placed in the Personnel Support subcategory of Central Support Forces. This and other changes related to SAML are indicated in the audit trail which follows.

2. Navy

a. The shift of Navy Material Command manpower reflects part of an on-going effort to achieve more consistent classification of management headquarters functions as directed by the House Appropriation Committee.

b. Fleet Maintenance Assistance Groups directly support ships assigned to Naval Forces. The associated manpower is now reflected in that category.

c. Transfer of Project Deepfreeze from Naval Forces to Federal Agency Support provides for proper identification of these reimbursable resources.

3. Air Force

a. Mission evaluation units evaluate the readiness of strategic missile and air defense units. The manpower for this function is more accurately placed in the Strategic Forces category rather than the Command subcategory of Mission Support Forces.

b. Air Force Civil Engineering (Red Horse) squadrons have the primary mission of airfield construction in the combat zone, enabling the Air Force to operate from previously unusable airfields. As such, manpower associated with these squadrons has been assigned to the Mobility Forces subcategory of General Purpose Forces.

c. In view of the R&D mission of Wright Patterson AFB, flight-line maintenance manpower has been transferred from Central Support Forces to the Research and Development subcategory of Auxiliary Forces.

d. Moody AFB will be designated a tactical base upon cessation of its pilot training mission. Its Base Operating Support manpower therefore is properly assigned to Mission Support Forces.

AUDIT TRAIL OF ACTIVITIES TRANSFERRED BETWEEN CATEGORIES
(End Strength in Thousands)

Activity	From	To	Military			Civilian		
			FY75	FY76	FY77	FY75	FY76	FY77
Service Changes								
Army								
Foreign Military Sales	Fed Agcy Spt (CSF)	Spt to Other Nations (Aux F)	-	-	0.5	0.5		
Military Asst Adv Groups	Fed Agcy Spt (CSF)	Spt to Other Nations (Aux F)	-	-	0.7	0.7		
WMCCS ADP Support	Command (CSF)	Strategic Control & Surv (SF)	-	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	0.1 0.1 0.1
SAML-related Changes								
3d Infantry Regiment	Land Forces (GPF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Executive Flight Detachment	Land Forces (GPF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4		
Army Security Agency Units	Land Forces (GPF)	Intelligence & Security (Aux F)	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7		
Engineer Power Plants	Land Forces (GPF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1		
Marksmanship/EOD Detachments	Land Forces (GPF)	Base Operating Spt (MSF)	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6		
Headquarters Support Units	Base Op Spt (MSF)	Base Operating Spt (CSF)	0.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		
Mobilization Base Units (ARNG)	Land Forces (GPF)	Base Operating Spt (MSF)					1.2	1.2
Mobilization Base Units (AR)	Individual Tng (CSF)	Base Operating Spt (MSF)					0.3	0.3
Medical Spt Units (ARNG)	Land Forces (GPF)	Medical Spt (CSF)					*	*
Medical Spt Units (AR)	Individual Tng (CSF)	Medical Spt (CSF)					0.2	0.3
Spec Act - Other CONUS	Land Forces (GPF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)					0.1	0.1
Recruiting Act (ARNG)	Reserve Comp Spt (MSF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)					0.1	0.1
Recruiting Act (AR)	Individual Tng (CSF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)					0.4	0.4
Training Units (AR)	Individual Tng (CSF)	Personnel Spt (CSF)					3.3	3.7
Training Spt (ARNG)	Land Forces (GPF)	a/					0.1	0.1
Admin Spt - Other CONUS	Land Forces (GPF)	Individual Training (CSF)					-	0.1
Logistics Spt - Other CONUS	Land Forces (GPF)	Command (CSF)					0.1	0.1
Forces Related Training	Land Forces (GPF)	Logistics (CSF)					0.1	0.1
		Force Spt Tng (MSF)					0.2	0.2
a/ Land Forces, Base Operating Support (MSF), Medical Support (CSF), Personnel Support (CSF).								
*fewer than 50 spaces								

Activity	From	To	Military				Civilian			
			FY75	FY76	FY77	FY77	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY77
<u>Navy</u>										
WMCCS ADP Support	Command (CSF)	Strategic Control & Surv (SF)	-	0.4	0.4	0.4	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Navy Material Command Hq	Command (MSF)	Strategic Control & Surv (SF)	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
	Base Op Spt (CSF)	Command (CSF)	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2	0.2
	Logistics Spt (CSF)	Command (CSF)	-	-	-	-	-	1.6	1.6	1.6
	R&D (Aux F)	Command (CSF)	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2	0.2
Navy Education/Training Hq	Individual Tng (CSF)	Command (CSF)	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Fleet Maintenance Asst Gp	Base Op Spt (MSF)	Naval Forces (GPF)	-	-	-	2.8	-	-	-	-
Foreign Military Sales	Individual Tng (CSF)	Spt to Other Nations (Aux F)	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-
Deepfreeze (Reimbursable)	Naval Forces (GPF)	Federal Agency Spt (CSF)	-	0.7	0.7	0.7	-	-	-	-
<u>Air Force</u>										
WMCCS ADP Support	Various	Strategic Control & Surv (SF)	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	*	*	*
Mission Evaluation (Offense)	Command (MSF)	Strategic Offensive (SF)	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	*
Mission Evaluation (Defense)	Command (MSF)	Strategic Defensive (SF)	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	*
Civil Engineering Squadron (Red Horse)	Base Op Spt (MSF)	Mobility Forces (GPF)	-	-	-	1.2	-	-	-	-
Space Support Program	Strategic Defensive (SF)	Geophysical Activities (Aux F)	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	*
Kirtland AFB	R&D (Aux F)	Base Op Spt (CSF)	-	-	-	1.0	-	-	-	1.3
Consolidation of Support Airlift	Various	Mobility Forces (GPF)	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	-	0.3
FMS Manpower	Various	Support to Other Nations (Aux F)	-	-	-	1.3	-	-	-	1.3
Wright Patterson AFB	Logistics/BOS (CSF)	R&D (Aux F)	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	0.3
Maintenance	Base Op Spt (CSF)	Base Op Spt (MSF)	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	0.5
Moody AFB	Base Op Spt (CSF)	Base Op Spt (MSF)	-	-	-	1.0	-	-	-	0.7
USAF Southern Cmd	Various	Federal Agcy Spt (CSF)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1
NASA Support (Reimb)			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*fewer than 50 spaces.